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# ***Daily Report***

# **Soviet Union**

FBIS-SOV-90-047  
Friday  
9 March 1990

# Daily Report

## Soviet Union

FBIS SOV-90-047

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9 March 1990

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## United States & Canada

### Baker Cited on Aid for USSR Reform Process

PM0803215990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
9 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "J. Baker's Opinion"]

[Text] Washington, 8 Mar—U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker has addressed a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee at which he touched on questions of relations with the USSR and the countries of East Europe. "I believe," Baker said in particular, "that we must encourage the efforts of the supporters of reforms in the Soviet Union, and among them—President Gorbachev. They are moving very rapidly in the direction of greater political pluralism. But they are encountering much greater difficulties than it would have been possible to imagine."

The secretary of state stressed the need for "the creation of a stable international situation for the emergent democracies of East Europe."

When one of the legislators in the subcommittee broached the question of "financial assistance for Russia," the secretary of state declared that the administration "has not requested funds for these purposes," and "the Russians themselves have not asked for this." Baker voiced the opinion that the United States could assist the reform process in the USSR by means of consultations on questions of technical and economic cooperation and by elaborating a trade agreement between the two countries.

### Soviet-U.S. CW Talks Conclude in Geneva

LD0803171390 Moscow TASS in English 1703 GMT  
8 Mar 90

[Text] Geneva March 8 TASS—The 14th round of Soviet-U.S. consultations on a chemical arms ban ended here today.

The talks set the ground for a Soviet-American agreement on chemical arms that will be implemented before the international convention banning chemical arms enters into force.

The agreement envisages the elimination of a considerable part of chemical arms to an equal and low level.

The agreement is expected to be signed during the Soviet-American summit in June 1990.

Negotiators also discussed Soviet-American cooperation in technologies and safety procedures to meet economic and environmental requirements for destroying chemical arms, several verification problems and technical aspects of preparing a comprehensive convention to ban chemical arms within the Geneva conference on disarmament.

The Soviet and U.S. delegations said they will work to complete the convention within the multi-lateral talks as early as possible.

### Further Reportage on CW Talks

LD0903104490 Moscow TASS International Service  
in Russian 1822 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Text] Geneva, 8 Mar (TASS)—The 14th round of bilateral consultations between the USSR and the United States on questions of banning chemical weapons concluded here today. The Soviet delegation at the negotiations was led by S.B. Batsanov, USSR representative at the disarmament conference, while the American delegation was led by (?S. Ledogar), representative of the United States at the conference.

The delegations continued work on a bilateral agreement on mutual USSR-U.S. obligations before the international convention on banning chemical weapons comes into force. It is planned that such an agreement will be signed during the Soviet-U.S. aspiration to achieve a global ban on the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. The agreement in preparation is aimed at helping to speed up the elimination of chemical weapons everywhere in the world, and will also make it possible to amass certain practical experience in carrying out chemical disarmament.

In the course of the consultations issues connected with implementing a memorandum of understanding with regard to a bilateral experiment in monitoring [kontrol] and exchanging data, signed by the USSR and the United States in September 1989, were reviewed. Accord was reached on the exchange of seven visits to three categories of sites: sites for storing chemical weapons, sites for producing them, and industrial chemical enterprises.

The two sides began discussion of issues of cooperation between the USSR and the United States in the field of the technology and procedures for the safe and quickest possible destruction of chemical weapons, which will also satisfy economic and ecological requirements. Highly qualified experts from both sides took part in these discussions. An accord on an exchange of visits to appropriate sites of the USSR and the United States was reached.

The delegation discussed certain technical aspects concerning unresolved issues in the draft international convention on banning chemical weapons. The USSR and the United States put forward proposals on the order of destruction of chemical weapons and sites for the production of chemical weapons, for multilateral negotiations.

At the plenary sitting of the disarmament conference, which took place today in the Palace of Nations, S.B. Batsanov informed the participants in this international forum of the basic results of the round of Soviet-U.S. consultations which has taken place.

The next round of bilateral consultations is planned for April this year.

### Northeast Asia

#### Continuing Ulaanbaatar Demonstrations Reported

LD0903094790 Moscow TASS International Service  
in Russian 0850 GMT 9 Mar 90

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 9 Mar (TASS)—TASS correspondent Dugar Sanjiyev reports: The central square of the Mongolian capital, usually empty on working days, is filled to overflowing with people today. Since early morning, demonstrations have been taking place here in support of the hunger strike declared by leaders and activists of the Mongolian Democratic Union [MDU].

This action began its third day at noon. It has been organized as a sign of protest against the unconstructive—as its participants and organizers consider—reply of the Presidium of the People's Great Hural of the Mongolian People's Republic and the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] to the demand of the many thousand-strong rally held in Ulaanbaatar on Sunday for convening an extraordinary congress of the MPRP in March, to renew the composition of the central committee, and to immediately create, with the participation of all social forces, a provisional people's Hural and adopt a new constitution of the country. Over the past 24 hours, a further 14 people have joined the 10 members of the MDU coordination council, including one woman. Today, an ambulance is on constant duty nearby.

From early morning onwards students organized a march-past in the square and in front of the Government House. A group of Buddhist monks arrived at the scene afterwards, toward the middle of the day.

The flagstaff, which bears state banners on festive days and during visits of senior foreign guests, now flies a blue flag with the national symbol Soyombo. Underneath appears a slogan: "Good-hearted brothers! Let us support the new fighters for progress! We resolutely demand of the official authorities that a provisional people's hural be set up!"

Powerful loudspeakers continuously relay the speakers' words across the square. Many of them call for a general strike to be declared tomorrow. From time to time there are repeats of the demands of the organizers of the last rally and demonstration—the Mongolian Democratic Alliance, the Social Democratic Movement, the New Progressive Movement, and the Union of Mongolian Students—addressed to the government last Sunday.

Streamers raised above the crowds, carry slogans: "Our Goal is Democracy," "Let Us Rid Ourselves of the Bureaucratic Apparatus!," and "Let Us Strengthen Friendship with Peoples of Other Countries!"

Acting on the appeal from the organizers of the action, people have formed a human corridor leading from the hunger strikers to the Government House.

At the moment, TASS correspondents can hear loud chanting, while yet another column of people has passed by the windows, in the direction of the square, carrying slogans: "Let us support the hunger strikers!" and "We are for a provisional people's hural!"

#### End to Hunger Strike Demanded

LD0703204390 Moscow TASS International Service  
in Russian 1810 GMT 7 Mar 90

["Government of the Mongolian People's Republic calls for an end to the Hunger Strike"—TASS headline]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 7 March—TASS correspondent Dugar Sanzhiyev reports: Mongolian Television late this evening interrupted the relay of a festive concert, and broadcast a report by the government of the Mongolian People's Republic, containing an appeal to the participants in the protest action on Suhe-Batar Square in Ulaanbaatar to stop the hunger strike. Party and state bodies are taking measures to renew the political system in the country. The artificial acceleration of events does not promote the establishment of a healthy atmosphere in society, a constructive dialogue and an effective resolution of urgent problems, the document stresses.

In spite of the late hour there are usually many people on Suhe-Bata Square in the Mongolian capital. Residents and guests of Ulaanbaatar are coming here to see for themselves in action which is unusual for Mongolia. Surrounded by a considerable crowd of people, the members of the coordinating council of the Mongolian Democratic Union are continuing the hunger strike.

#### Mongolia's Batmonh Cited on USSR Pullout

PM0603093790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
4 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent A. Nabatchikov dispatch: "Soviet Troops Withdraw"]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar—As has already been reported, as a result of the talks between Mongolian and Soviet Government delegations agreement has been reached on the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolian territory. It will be completed in 1992 and will take place in two stages.

The talks, which were held in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding, ended with the signing of relevant documents, including documents regulating the procedure for the free transfer to the Mongolian side of garrisons, airfields, housing, and social, cultural, and leisure facilities.

Expressing satisfaction with the successful completion of the talks, J. Batmonh, general secretary of the MPRP

[Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party] Central Committee and chairman of the People's Great Hural Presidium, stated that the forthcoming final withdrawal of Soviet military subunits from Mongolian territory is a vivid manifestation of the resolve of the two countries' governments to promote the strengthening of an atmosphere of mutual understanding and trust in the region in the spirit of the new political thinking.

For its part, commenting on these decisions to journalists, Lieutenant General Sh. Jadambaa, head of the Mongolian delegation at the talks, chief of the Mongolian Armed Forces General Staff, and first deputy defense minister, described them as "historic" and a "major step" whose importance goes far beyond the framework of bilateral Soviet-Mongolian relations. The importance of this decision for strengthening confidence in the region and worldwide was noted.

"I believe that this is a direct consequence of the perestroika launched in our countries, and that it is also a manifestation of the humane nature of our states' defensive doctrines," the Mongolian general stressed.

He also explained to journalists that any grounds for the possible reintroduction of Soviet troops into Mongolia had been ruled out. Touching on the prospects for the continued presence in the country of Soviet military advisers, Jadambaa said in particular: "I believe that we have grounds for inviting them even after the final withdrawal of Soviet military units."

#### **Commentary Views Troop Withdrawal**

OW0603032390 Moscow International Service  
in Mandarin 0200 GMT 5 Mar 90

[Libedev commentary; from the "Current Events and Commentaries" program]

[Text] The Soviet-Mongolian talks on the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia ended in Ulaanbaatar. Station commentator Libedev has the following comment.

According to the agreement reached between the Soviet and Mongolian governments, Soviet troops will have been completely withdrawn from Mongolian territory by 1991-1992. Main Soviet combat troops will be withdrawn in 1991 and troops guarding materials and equipment will be withdrawn the following year. Mongolian leader Batmonh pointed out that the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolian territory is the best manifestation of the new thinking and the result of the growing mutual trust and understanding in the region.

Libedev continues: I want to point out that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia can be linked to the second round of talks between the Soviet Union and China on reducing troops along the Soviet-Chinese border. The round of talks recently ended in the Chinese capital. In Moscow's opinions, the balance of conventional forces in Asia should rest on a verifiable basis. It

should be based on all countries taking part in building a common defense on an equal footing.

As everyone knows, the Soviet side has taken a series of major steps. Here, let me cite the following facts: Beginning from 1991, the Soviet Union will cut its troops by 200,000 men; 120,000 of them are in the Soviet Far East. According to the agreement on intermediate-range missiles, the Soviet Union will cut down 446 medium and short-range missiles. From 1985 on the Soviet Union has not increased the number of nuclear missiles in the Far East. Our country has reduced its military presence in Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay. The Soviet Union has also decided on the date of withdrawing the last Soviet troops from Mongolia.

The Soviet Union's efforts to reduce military confrontation in Asia and its actions and desire to consolidate peace and security should receive a corresponding response from the United States and Japan. But regretfully, no such thing has happened. The military policies of Japan and the United States are still based on the so-called Soviet threat. The visit of U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney to the Asia-Pacific region again gives credence to this. The U.S. plans to reduce 10 percent of its troops stationed in this region. However, at the same time, the head of the Pentagon says that the cut is purely intended to reorganize the U.S. Armed Forces. It is not at all a move to reduce the military confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region.

#### **South Korean Consular Office To Open in Moscow**

LD2702184590 Moscow TASS in English 1205 GMT  
27 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 27 TASS—By TASS diplomatic correspondent:

The opening of a consular office of the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (Kotra) at the Moscow World Trade Centre represents a new stage in the development of Soviet-South Korean relations. In accordance with a bilateral agreement reached last December, the Kotra office will be given the right to perform consular functions, a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman told TASS. An office of the Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Seoul will be given similar status.

The consular office will deal with passports and visas, protect the interests of South Korean citizens and promote the development of trade, economic, scientific and cultural relations between the two countries. Its staff members will enjoy all privileges envisaged by the Vienna convention on consular relations, with the exception of the right to use radio communication and hoist the national flag over the office building.

Ambassador Kong No-myong has been appointed head of the South Korean consular office. He is to arrive in Moscow on March 2. Kong No-myong is a career diplomat with 30 years experience. Previously he worked in

Washington and Brazil, was assistant to the foreign minister for political issues and, until recently, consul general in New York.

### Consular Department Head Arrives

LD0303110190 Moscow TASS International Service  
in Russian 1735 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 2 Mar (TASS)—A TASS diplomatic correspondent writes:

Kong No-myong, head of the consular department of the South Korean Corporation for the Promotion of Trade (KOTRA) in Moscow, arrived here in accordance with the bilateral agreement reached at the end of last year, the Kotra representation, which is situated in the Moscow international trade center, received the right to carry out limited consular functions.

The consular department will deal with passport and visa questions, protect the interests of its citizens, and promote the further development of trade, economic, scientific and cultural links between South Korea and the USSR.

On his arrival in Moscow, Kong No-Myong was interviewed by a TASS correspondent. He expressed the hope for the successful development of trade relations between his country and the USSR. "Despite the fact that these relations began to develop only very recently, last year the volume of bilateral trade rose to \$500 million, which is almost double that of 1988, he said. Our representation will strive for the further development of economic links."

### South Korea's Hyundai Opens Moscow Office

PM0603161190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
6 Mar 90 Second Edition p 7

[TASS report: "With the Hyundai Mark"]

[Text] Moscow, 5 Mar—The opening of the Hyundai Corporation's Moscow mission today is evidence of the growing interest among South Korean businessmen in the development of cooperation with the USSR.

This corporation, which firmly holds one of the first places in the world in terms of the diversity of its financial, economic, and trade interests and has more than 50 branches throughout the world, deals in export-import operations, production of steel and electronic apparatus, robot technology, petrochemicals, shipbuilding, and planning and design work.

South Korean businessmen plan to implement a number of serious projects in the industrial sphere in our country together with Soviet partners.

### Hyundai To Build Furniture Plant

SK2602002390 Moscow International Service  
in Korean 1100 GMT 24 Feb 90

[Text] Hyundai, an ROK business firm, plans to open joint venture firms in Nakhodka, a city in the Soviet Far East which has been (?designated) as a site for joint ventures.

Hyundai has already signed agreements with Soviet institutions on running joint ventures centering on the production of furniture. Finished goods will be exported to the ROK and [words indistinct], in addition to the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, Hyundai also plans to build a joint venture ship repair plant in Nakhodka. Business firms representing 16 countries have already proposed about 100 joint venture projects in Nakhodka.

### Agreement Reached on Seoul-Khabarovsk Flights

PM0603122290 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
1 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[I. Irtysheva report: "To Seoul—From Khabarovsk"]

[Text] Talks have taken place in Moscow between Aeroflot and the South Korean airline Korean Air, as a result of which a commercial agreement on air communication between the USSR and South Korea and on the opening of offices of the two airlines in Seoul and Moscow, and also other agreements on mutual cooperation, were signed. Aeroflot plans to start weekly flights to Seoul from Khabarovsk. The sides agreed to continue business contacts between the airlines on 29 March 1990, in order to develop future cooperation.

### Southeast Asia & Pacific

#### PRAVDA on CPSU Delegation Visit to Laos

PM0803142990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
8 Mar 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Announcements"]

[Text] In accordance with the plan for ties between the CPSU and the Lao People's Revolutionary Party [LPRP] a delegation of CPSU party officials headed by O.I. Ozherelyev, deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department, was in Laos 27 February through 7 March to exchange experience of ideological work in conditions of restructuring and renewal. The delegation was received by Somlat Chanthamat, secretary of the LPRP Central Committee.



### Phoumi Vongvichit on Lao Domestic Policies

PM0103084590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
26 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[Article by Phoumi Vongvichit, member of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee Politburo, acting president of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, and chairman of the Lao National Construction Front: "From Theory To Practice"]

[Text] Vientiane, February—Laos is a country with a complex ethnic, social, and religious makeup. Two-thirds of the population of 4.5 million are Lao-Lum, lowland-dwellers. The rest are members of various ethnic groups, comprising two groups—Lao-Soung and Lao-Theung. From time immemorial the Lao-Soung and Lao-Theung have cultivated land on mountain slopes and plateaus, growing rice, corn, and cassava and gathering the fruits of the forest, which they exchange with the Lao-Lum. The three groups of the Lao people differ from one another not only in terms of language and economic activity, but also in terms of culture and religious beliefs.

Throughout revolutionary history, the Lao communists, first in the ranks of the Communist Party of Indochina and then in the Lao People's Revolutionary Party [LPRP], have sought to unite ethnic groups in the struggle against colonialists and interventionists, against feudal lords and capitalists, for independence, freedom, and socialism.

During the years of the struggle for national liberation many people from ethnic minorities joined the party, women's and young people's organizations, and trade unions and fought in the ranks of the Lao People's Liberation Army. At the time our opponents were making slanderous claims that the Lao-Lum were using the Lao-Soung and Lao-Theung in the struggle, but with the victory of the revolution all the leading posts would be occupied by members of the ethnic majority. But the facts refute these false claims. There are representatives of small ethnic groups in the party leadership—Politburo members and LPRP Central Committee Secretaries Maichantan Sengmani and Saman Vi-Gnaket. A-Sang Laoli (a Lao-Soung) heads the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Pani Yatkhantu [name as transliterated] (she is also a Lao-Soung) is chairman of the LPDR [Lao People's Democratic Republic] State Bank.

Under the LPRP's leadership, the Lao National Construction Front [LNCF] (heir and continuer of the cause of the Lao Patriotic Front) is taking all the country's ethnic groups along the road to building a new society. Its activities are geared to uniting the Lao nation within its framework. As it sees it, the Front's task is to educate the Lao nation in the spirit of the solidarity of all peoples, humanitarian ideals, highly developed culture, and ability to defend the homeland and use the country's natural resources for the purpose of improving the people's living standard.

The Lao union of people's revolutionary youth, the union of Lao women, the federation of Lao trade unions, and the brotherhood of Lao Buddhists are group members of the front. Individual membership also exists.

In tackling the nationalities question in the LPDR we follow V.I. Lenin's behests. At the same time, one has to take into account the country's specific features. For example, there is a widespread mood among the Lao-Soung in favor of autonomy. But it is impossible to form individual autonomous territorial units in our country since the population is mixed everywhere, with Lao-Theung and Lao-Lum living alongside Lao-Soung.

In our efforts to eliminate illiteracy in the country we have introduced teaching in Lao, the language of the Lao-Lum. This practice has met with universal approval. The Lao-Soung and Lao-Theung wanted to know the language of the Lao-Lum, since it is the language of interethnic communication, essential even within each group, the only language in Laos that gives its speakers access to scientific, technical, and cultural achievements. The use of a common written language does not eliminate the peoples' ethnic distinctiveness. Each retains its own customs and way of life. The LNCF is helping to develop ethnic cultures.

An important aspect of the solution of the nationalities question is the economic aspect. A feature of Laos is the fact that the mountain peoples practice the slash-and-burn method of farming. The practice results in the loss of forest tracts, which, in turn, has a deleterious effect on the environment. Our party is consistently pursuing a course of eradicating such backward and harmful forms of farming. Organizational and explanatory work is being done to get the Lao-Soung and Lao-Theung to engage in rice cultivation on irrigated land in the plains or stockraising and fruit growing.

The development of ethnic backwaters depends also on communications. This is one reason why our country is paying special attention to highway construction. In its work with ethnic minorities the LNCF is giving a great deal of attention to propaganda of new approaches in the economy, culture, and politics.

Along with other problems, the LNCF has always devoted a great deal of attention to work with the Buddhist sangha, given that 70-80 percent of the LPDR population are Buddhists. During the years of the struggle against the imperialists the Buddhists were among the most active fighters for national interests. Their patriotic feelings and willingness to serve the people and strengthen solidarity with those who advocate justice, peace, and progress developed substantially in that period.

In the period of transition to socialism in our country the sangha is playing an important part in uniting different nationalities, combining the teachings of Buddha with the party line. In present-day Laos each citizen is free to choose whether to follow a religious teaching or be a nonbeliever. The LPDR Government does not prohibit



the Buddhists' activities, but helps them, in fact. In practice this means giving moral and material support to the church through LNCF organizations and the local administration, assisting the Lao brotherhood of Buddhists in their day-to-day activities, propagandizing moral values, restoring temples, and maintaining contacts with Buddhists in other countries.

The LNCF, attaching, as it does, great importance to the international education of the masses, is doing tireless work to get the Lao people to strengthen and develop solidarity and comprehensive cooperation with the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia, the Soviet Union, and other countries and has firmly supported those struggling for freedom and in defense of peace and justice in the world.

Our country is not yet socialist. We are at the stage of improving and developing a people's democracy. Seven forms of economic activity are still playing important roles and they are bound to exist for a while yet. Consequently, the different social strata and groups must participate in economic life on an equal basis. The interests of both the collective and the individual must be respected. It is impossible to achieve the satisfaction of some at the expense of the others.

The front is doing a great deal of work to involve emigre Lao in our country's economic development.

Our party's new economic policy is keenly supported by the people since positive changes are apparent in all areas of the country's economic, social, and political life, and in international cooperation as well. The party, government, and people of Laos will continue the course of reforms, develop the results, improve the state system and running of the economy and society, and widen cooperation with foreign countries. All nations and ethnic groups in Laos are fully resolved to strengthen unity around the LPRP headed by LPRP Central Committee General Secretary Kayson Phomvihane.

#### **Commentary on Jakarta Meeting on Cambodia**

*BK0803043390 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia  
1230 GMT 7 Mar 90*

[Commentary by Aleksey Nikolayev]

[Text] As the participants in the Jakarta informal meeting were returning home, some observers raised this question: Why must a meeting which was expected to be unsuccessful be held?

Comrade Aleksey Nikolayev writes the following commentary:

Journalists claim that it can be presumed no solution to the conflict in Cambodia has been achieved.

Such an idea will only lead toward a deadlock. The current task is not to delay but to continue the efforts to settle the Cambodian problem. The stage has been set. Even though the Pol Pot clique used its right to veto the

Jakarta documents, this could not foil the main prospects already achieved in the search for a solution to the Cambodian problem.

Let us recall just the talks among the Cambodian factions. We can see that progress has been made. This is evident by the outcome of the recent meeting in Bangkok between Comrade Hun Sen and Samdech Norodom Sihanouk. It should be recalled that the meeting participants had reached an agreement and emphasized in their communique the need to establish a supreme council in Cambodia and the role of the United Nations in the search for a solution. Comrade Hun Sen and Samdech Sihanouk also agreed to continue their talks.

Observers have placed their hopes on the prospect of another meeting to be held in late March by the five superpowers—permanent members of the UN Security Council—when they will discuss the concrete tasks of the United Nations in solving the Cambodian problem. During their meeting in February, the participants expressed their common understanding on the main prospects, such as the need for a cease-fire in Cambodia and the cessation of aid to all warring Cambodian factions. The question on the disarming of the warring factions' forces was also discussed. In conclusion, they did not discard the possibility of convening a new meeting on Cambodia. This means that the latest meeting in Jakarta was not a complete failure. Briefly speaking, the situation calls for more measures and joint efforts to normalize the situation in and around Cambodia.

I totally agree with Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila who said in Jakarta that failure to make headway toward a peaceful solution to the Cambodian conflict would only precipitate continued conflict.

#### **Near East & South Asia**

##### **Further Reportage on Attempted Coup in Afghanistan**

##### **Najibullah Press Conference**

*LD0803175790 Moscow TASS in English 1724 GMT  
8 Mar 90*

[Text] Kabul March 8 TASS—President Najibullah of Afghanistan held a press conference in the Afghan Foreign Ministry's press centre today, giving the details of the coup attempt, during which supporters of former Afghan Defence Minister Tanay seized an Air Force base in Baghram and then bombed the presidential residence in Kabul.

Tanay supporters also captured the building of the Ministry of Defence, making it their "revolutionary headquarters", Najibullah said.

The Afghan leadership tried to negotiate a settlement with the rebels, but had to take "corresponding measures" when they refused, he said.

The rebels were routed and Tanay fled to Baghram and then to Pakistan.

Afghan ambassador to People's Democratic Republic of Yemen Asadollah Sarwary was also among those who organized the coup, according to Najibullah.

A total of 25 civilians were hurt and 155 wounded when rebels bombed Kabul, Najibullah said.

The number of rebels and government soldiers killed or wounded in the coup did not exceed civilian casualties, according to the president.

Today, Najibullah issued a decree removing Shahnawaz Tanay, Niaz Muhammad Momand, Mir Saheb Karwal, Nazar Muhammad, and Abdul Qadir from Afghanistan's Supreme Defense Council.

### Current Situation in Kabul

LD0803180490 Moscow Television Service in Russian  
1530 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Correspondent Aleksandr Shkirando report from Kabul; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Life in Kabul is gradually returning to normal today. Admittedly, the main cares of the people of Kabul are not connected with this day, 8 March, but with restoring the city's central streets and squares. Districts adjacent to the Presidential Palace suffered most. It is hard now to recognize Pashtunistan Square, where just one 500-kg aerial bomb fell. Unfortunately, quite a lot of damage was caused, not only to state institutions, but also to residential areas.

[Begin recording by G. Mirza—identified by caption—in vernacular with superimposed Russian translation] I am an ordinary Afghan, and I don't understand all the upheavals of top-level politics, but I am indignant that people who were in the government could commit such evil deeds to achieve their own mercenary goals. As a result of the unsuccessful conspiracy, I have been deprived of my home, and my shop has been almost completely destroyed. [end recording]

Such questions and indignation are now on the lips of almost all Afghans. Kabul is healing its wounds. A calm atmosphere, for wartime, is being maintained in all the country's provinces. However, it is not simple to predict the situation clearly, even for the immediate future. After the failure of the conspiracy, Shahnawaz Tanay's accomplices arrived in the Pakistani border town of Perachinar in a military transport aircraft. The whereabouts of Tanay himself are still unknown. It is not ruled out that the Pakistani special services have used the situation which has developed to create as much tension as possible in the region of Khowst in order subsequently to seize it. Let me note that Tanay is himself a native of that region, and enjoys no small authority among his fellow tribesmen. As for the situation in the Army, not everything is simple here yet, either; but the absolute

majority of units have expressed their loyalty to President Najibullah. Under the leadership of Watanjar, the new minister of defense, control of the troops is being restored and the defense zone around Kabul is being strengthened.

The consequences of the conspiracy have also been reflected in the external appearance of the Soviet Embassy, where five artillery shells fell in the grounds. Fortunately, there are no casualties among Soviet diplomats and specialists, and they are all continuing to fulfill their official duties.

[Video shows mechanical diggers clearing debris of wrecked buildings; Mirza talking to Shkirando; general street scenes; soldiers in a troop carrier; broken windows and damaged car in Soviet Embassy compound]

### Coup Attempt Recounted

LD0803182790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian  
1600 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Vladimir Pasko report from Kabul]

[Text] Following the suppression of the antigovernment plot, it has been announced in Kabul that from today the population may return to its usual activities in the capital and the country's provinces. Our correspondent Vladimir Pasko reports:

[Pasko] Today I drove around Kabul. The city is leading a normal life. The streets are full of people, as usual. The stalls and shops are open, and the bazaars are operating. People are engaged in their daily business.

In various parts of the city, groups of government officials and military men are making an inventory of the damage that has been caused. The government has set up a commission to provide assistance to those who suffered. The total number of dead and wounded is not yet known. At a press conference held today, President Najibullah gave the figures 25 and 125. That is just initial information, referring only to military servicemen. As the president noted, there are far more casualties among the civilian population.

The plotters inflicted the main blow on the city center, where the state institutions are situated, and on districts where forces loyal to the government are stationed. But they also fired on exclusively residential areas, especially, as was pointed out, after the plotters realized their lack of success. Apart from the desire to seize power, they hadn't anything else to their name.

That must also be applied to the organizers of the plot. As he left his study, Tanay, the minister of defense—now ex-minister—cast aside not only his general's greatcoat, but also his party card. His whereabouts are still unknown. There were reports that, accompanied by several generals from his entourage, he fled by plane to Pakistan. The Pakistani authorities have not confirmed this information, but Pakistan's involvement in the plot is not doubted here.

As information arrives, it is becoming clearer that it was a plot against President Najibullah and, above all, his policy of national reconciliation. Tanay refused to accept that policy, considering that there would be no place for him and his people in a government created as a result of national reconciliation.

Today I talked to (Hamid Rokh), the chief editor of the newspaper PAYYAM, an organ of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan Central Committee. He confirmed the information that, literally on the eve of the plot, the president met Tanay and tried to find a compromise. Tanay replied that he would think about it, after which the attempt to seize power was undertaken.

The attempt has failed. The policy of national reconciliation has won yet another victory.

#### **Commentary on Anniversary of Iranian Revolution**

NC1002133790 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress  
in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 9 Feb 90

[Sergey Salgirov commentary]

[Text] The Iranians will mark Revolution Day on 11 February. The 11th anniversary of this historic event is, to a certain extent, different from past anniversaries. Our commentator Sergey Salgirov writes on this:

Iran is marking this anniversary under special conditions. After the death of Ayatollah Khomeyni, former religious-political leader, a new leadership came to power in the country, and the fundamentalists' influence on the country's domestic and foreign policies has decreased relatively. But do these changes give the Iranians hope for fulfilling the democratic ideas of the anti-monarchical revolution which were not fulfilled during the first decade of Iran's progress and development? It is hard to believe so.

The ruling clergy apparently do not intend to make any changes in the policy of monopolized rule and want to continue to maintain control over the people's thoughts and acts and the economic and political tools for ruling.

But after all, the economic and social growth of a society has a special logic. The Iranian society is gradually freeing itself from old cliches, and the representatives of various strata and generations are stating their rights and interests as decisively as possible. Moreover, Iran is not living in a vacuum. The inclination toward reconstruction and democratization in international life affect it. At present, the country is feeling the effects of the domestic and foreign components of reconstruction.

The new five-year plan for economic growth envisages a certain freedom for organizations and individuals' economic activities. Steps are being taken to consolidate the rial's value in foreign exchange. Pressured by international forums supporting human rights, the country's officials had to agree to the arrival of international legal experts to investigate the human rights situation.

Iran's international policy is becoming more realistic and more deliberate. The cease-fire on the Iran-Iraq front is being observed. Direct interventions in neighboring Afghanistan have practically stopped. Cooperation and good neighborliness in Soviet-Iranian relations have been improved.

Meanwhile, difficult problems continue to remain unsolved. As before, many patriots who played a considerable part in the Iranian nation's struggle for democracy and social progress continue to be imprisoned. Land reform for the farmers' benefit has not taken place. The definite rights of workers and intellectuals are not ensured. Also, those who support exporting the Islamic revolution by force are still influential in the country's foreign policy.

All this makes the country's efforts to liberate domestic life more difficult. It also limits the possibilities for the country's playing a positive role internationally and benefiting from international commerce and trade.

Whatever the situation, we want to hope that the first year of the second decade after the victory of the anti-monarchical revolution will become a bridge on which the Iranian nation can move toward a hopeful future from a bitter past. The employees of Radio Peace and Progress wish the Iranian nation success in this.

Dear listeners: We congratulate you on the anniversary of the revolution.

#### **Comments on Amnesty for Prisoners in Iran**

NC1502134890 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1100 GMT  
15 Feb 90

[Interview with Yuriy Andreyev; questions and answers read by two radio announcers]

[Text] An amnesty decree was issued in Iran on the 11th anniversary of the victory of the Islamic Revolution. We asked our analyst Yuriy Andreyev to comment on this.

Our commentator says: Amnesty is not a brand new phenomenon in Iran. Indeed, it has recently become an increasingly common phenomenon. For example, during the past five months, three amnesties were declared in Iran. In October 1989, the amnesty coincided with the birthday of Prophet Muhammad. In January [1990] an amnesty was declared on the eve of the birthday of Fatimah, the prophet's daughter. And finally, in February, an amnesty was declared on the 11th anniversary of the victory of the Islamic Revolution.

The amnesty decree issued by Ayatollah 'Ali Khamene'i, Iran's religious leader, was not unexpected. Iranian officials pardon relatively large groups of prisoners each year on the anniversary of the revolution. For example, last year 2,600 were pardoned on the 10th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution. However, the exact number of persons pardoned this year is not yet known. But it appears that the figure will be sufficiently large.

[Question] Let us see what the current amnesty's characteristics are. Does this decree differ from past decrees?

[Answer] I think that it is no different from past decrees. The list of people to be pardoned was submitted by Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, who heads the Islamic Republic's judicial branch. This was endorsed in a decree issued by Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i, the country's religious leader. This time too, as in the past, the majority of persons freed are criminals.

However, the fate of the political prisoners, of whose existence we are informed by opposition organizations, is not clear. Apparently, this decree—like past decrees—has no political aspects and does not include the regime's political opponents. I seem to recall that these opponents include members of leftist organizations, of whose services to the people of Iran there can be no doubt at all.

[Question] How correct is the information on the existence of political prisoners in Iran and what figures are given?

[Answer] A great variety of views are expressed on this. For example, Tehran categorically denies reports on the repression of political opponents and describes the publication of information on this as anti-Islamic propaganda. However, international organizations defending human rights have another view. It is obviously no accident that, in early February of this year, 114 members of the 177-member European Parliament issued a special statement in Strasbourg calling for Iran's expulsion from the United Nations because of its unprecedented violations of human rights. This document said that 90,000 had been executed in Iran during recent years, while 150,000 are in prison on various political charges.

Of course, these figures should be regarded very cautiously. It is no secret to anyone that the West is hostile toward the Islamic Republic of Iran. I think that it will be more logical to assess the situation after the report by Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, UN expert on human rights, who visited Tehran recently. He is expected to submit his report on this soon at the UN Human Rights Committee session in Geneva. It is better not to draw hasty conclusions, but to wait for the publication of this report.

#### More on Amnesty Declaration

NC1602224590 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress  
in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 16 Feb 90

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] A general amnesty was declared in Iran on the anniversary of the anti-monarchical revolution. From the reports on this amnesty, it is not possible to determine the extent of the crimes perpetrated by those to whom the general amnesty applies. Reference is only made to reducing prison sentences. Meanwhile, the only prisoners who fall under the general amnesty were partially pardoned in the past.

However, the characteristics of those who will not be covered by the general amnesty have been outlined precisely. These people are thieves, hoarders, addicts, atheists, and spies. Finally, the general amnesty will not extend to members of social and political parties and organizations whose activities have been banned. This shows that the general amnesty will include a limited number of people, primarily criminals and those who have declared that they favor the rule. Documents of Iranian and international legal organizations show that this declaration is gained through physical and psychological torture of the prisoners. This torture is described in the Iranian mass media as the process of rehabilitation.

Irrespective of the general amnesty's limitations, it is still a humanitarian act. This general amnesty should have (?determined) the fate of some of the prisoners. Also, it would have been good if this general amnesty were extended to those who have not made any mistakes and were mistakenly imprisoned.

When Iran's new leaders came to power, social circles in Iran and other countries expected them to take more major steps to determine the fate of prisoners because there are selfless combatants in Iran's prison cells who played a great role for the sake of the interests of the toiling people, in consolidating national independence, and in the victory of the anti-monarchical revolution. The experience and knowledge of many of the political prisoners who oppose the war is necessary for the country in its post-war reconstruction. The government, which has taken extensive steps by compiling a program aimed at healing the wounds inflicted on the country by the war, should have focused its attention, first and foremost, on releasing these people. But it seems that those who support the continuation of repression still intensely oppose releasing these people.

It is clear that a limited general amnesty cannot reduce the people's desire for democratic reforms, especially now when the people—after the cease-fire on the Iran-Iraq front—have great hopes that life will improve and that the process of freedom inside the country will (?expand). A limited general amnesty cannot reduce the protests and aversion of world public opinion over the violation of human rights in Iran. Such an amnesty was also declared before, but following it an extensive campaign of repressions and execution of political prisoners began. It is naturally for this reason that many of the strugglers for human rights in Iran and abroad considered the Iranian leadership's general amnesty to be a political maneuver aimed at misleading world public opinion and the Iranian people.

(?This situation can be reversed) only with a decisive step toward the country's [word indistinct] and the release of political prisoners.



**Commentary on Iranian Reaction to CPSU Platform**

*NC2602200390 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress  
in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 26 Feb 90*

[Station commentary]

[Text] The draft of the CPSU Central Committee's political platform for the 28th party congress has been discussed with great interest abroad and especially in Iran. Commenting on this platform, the TEHRAN TIMES wrote: The process of reconstruction will achieve its true victory if all people are granted the opportunity to express their views on the party platform freely and participate actively in political life. At the same time, the Tehran newspaper expressed its doubts over Mikhail Gorbachev's ability to [words indistinct]; that is, to grant people the freedom to express their views and, at the same time, to mobilize them to achieve the general objectives. The newspaper believes that truly Herculean efforts are required to achieve this. Our commentator writes on this:

I think that the Iranian newspaper's assessment is, to a certain extent, far removed from developments in the Soviet Union. Our country long ago left behind the days when (?high-ranking) party and state (?officials) decided whether people could participate in political activities and strictly determined the limits of freedom of speech and thought. The restructuring process granted the people the right to express their will. Of course, this does not mean that the Soviet Union has become an ideal democratic government based on the rule of law. There is a long way to go before this ideal is achieved. However, one should not ignore the fact that the people's thoughts were liberated under the conditions of restructuring.

Yes, the process of restructuring was initiated by the leadership; that is, it started at the top. Actually, many initially believed that the process of restructuring Soviet society was taking place under strict party control and that the party had once again decided to create a sham democracy. However, this belief was proved wrong because the process of restructuring was not a mere whim of a high-ranking party official. It was the crisis in the old model of socialism that triggered this process. The situation called for urgent reforms and it was on the basis of this need that the party initiated the policy of restructuring.

The democratization of society has had an impact on the party itself. Democratization is urging the party to renovate its ideas and activities and it is because of the rivalry among the various political forces that the party sees the urgent need to reform itself.

Nevertheless, not all party officials are ready for this. I think that this explains the growing criticism of the party in Soviet social circles. These circles believe that reconstruction within the CPSU has lagged behind the processes of democratization in society. I think that the objective of the CPSU's political platform for the 28th

Party Congress is to raise the process of reconstruction within the party to the level of the democratic processes in society.

For the first time, the possibility of a multiparty system in the Soviet Union is clearly accepted in this platform. The future will show whether the CPSU will be able to achieve this objective. It is here that Herculean efforts, in the words of the TEHRAN TIMES, will be needed.

One thing, however, is clear and that is that it is impossible to return to arbitrary methods of ruling the country. I think that this is where the importance of the experience of restructuring in the Soviet Union lies as far as those countries where such methods are still in force are concerned.

**Comments on Reports on Release of Hostages**

*NC0803153990 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1100 GMT  
8 Mar 90*

[Interview with Aleksandr Batyev by announcer from "On the Waves of Radio Moscow" feature]

[Text] We asked our commentator Aleksandr Batyev to comment on the problem of the hostages in Lebanon, a major news topic now.

[Begin Batyev recording in Russian, fading into Persian translation] These reports are vague and conflicting. For example, American television correspondents reported that secret talks on the release of the hostages are taking place between U.S. and Iranian representatives. But President George Bush refuted these reports immediately.

Another example: The Arab newspapers reported on the visit to Lebanon by Mahmud Hashemi, the Iranian president's brother, where he held talks on the release of the hostages with Hizballah leaders. However, Tehran described this report as a lie.

There are other examples, but each report is refuted immediately after it is published.

[Announcer] Then is this commotion only propaganda about the hostages and nothing more?

[Batyev, speaking in Russian, fading into Persian translation] No, I do not think so. Something is going on. It seems that practical steps are being taken for the release of the hostages and this commotion is helping to veil these steps. Remember, late last year Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani officially promised to help in the release of the hostages. Apparently Tehran does not want to show that the solution to this problem is directly linked to Iranian officials, because the Islamic Republic of Iran has repeatedly announced that it was not involved in the hostage issue. But there is evidence that the pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon were the ones who took the Western hostages.



[Announcer] Some of the hostages have been in captivity for years now. Why is Tehran taking steps for their release now?

[Batyev, speaking in Russian, fading into Persian translation] This is linked with the policy of the current Iranian leadership of opening Iran's doors to the outside world more than in the past. This situation on the one hand stems from Iran's need for foreign financial and material resources for the reconstruction of the country's economy. On the other hand, the (?officials) cannot ignore the fact that developments aimed at establishing international trust and cooperation are taking place in the world and that Iran is still behind in this. CBS Television Network of America emphasizes that Iran now wants to present a better face to the world and that it does not need the hostages any more. In its editorial, the TEHRAN TIMES wrote that the current year will be the last year that the Western hostages will be held captive in Lebanon.

#### Arabs Asked To End Anti-Soviet Campaign

JN2802175890 Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic  
27 Feb 90 p 24

[By 'Abd-al-Karim Abu-al-Nasr from Paris]

[Text] High-level Arab sources revealed to AL-QABAS that the Soviet leadership has asked friendly and allied Arab states and parties to work to end the anti-Soviet Arab campaign over the issue of Soviet Jewish emigration. The sources added that the Soviet leadership warned that continuation of this campaign would cause serious tension and probably a crisis in Arab-Soviet ties—something which Moscow wants to avoid at all costs. The sources went on to say that this Soviet demand is the centerpiece of a countercampaign initiated by the Soviet leadership in response to the anti-Soviet official and media criticism voiced by the Arabs against the background of Moscow's responsibility for Jewish emigration to Israel. These sources told AL-QABAS that Soviet officials explained to several Arab states, within the framework of this countercampaign, the facts pertaining to the responsibility of the United States, West European states, and Israel toward this issue. They added that the Soviet officials informed these states of important and new information showing that the USSR cannot be viewed as "the main party responsible" for this emigration.

AL-QABAS would like to divulge the secrets and details of this new and important development regarding the Soviet Jewish emigration to Israel.

AL-QABAS has learned from high-level Arab sources that the Soviet leadership expressed hope that the friendly and allied Arab states and parties, including Syria, Libya, and the PLO, would intervene with other Arab states to convince them of the need to end the large-scale anti-Soviet Arab diplomatic, political, and media campaign which, for weeks, has been under way in the Arab world. This campaign asserts, in particular, that

the USSR is to be viewed as the main party responsible for this Jewish emigration and stresses that a new danger threatening the Arabs and Palestinians and endangering the Middle East peace prospects has emerged. This is the first time Soviet officials have submitted this demand to Arab "friends and allies" since the issue of Soviet Jewish emigration began to elicit reactions and became the "major Arab issue" as it is viewed right now. Informed East European diplomatic sources affirmed to AL-QABAS that Moscow had submitted this demand to Arab friends. These sources told AL-QABAS that the Soviet leadership decided to launch this counter political and diplomatic campaign after officials and experts at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs had taken into consideration the large number of reports sent by the USSR ambassadors in most Arab states stressing "the existence of a worrisome change in the Arab world toward the USSR—a change in the way some political leaderships, the public, intellectuals, and the intelligentsia are viewing the USSR because of the emigration issue. This change might reflect negatively on Arab-Soviet ties in various fields if this issue is not tackled." In addition to these reports, Soviet envoys who have recently visited some Arab states, including Soviet envoy Gennadiy Tarasov, informed Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze that some Arab governments have "real worries and concern" over this new wave of emigration and also over the responsibility of the USSR in this.

For example, Tarasov "was surprised" during his talks with some senior Arab officials by "the disappointment" that they felt toward Moscow. In these talks, Tarasov realized that "Arab indignation" was not "theatrical" but rather something resulting from a deep feeling of "bitterness" toward the USSR. Because of this, the Soviet leadership asked some Arab friends and allies to "make moves and intervene" to secure an end to this anti-Moscow campaign or at least to reduce its intensity. The Soviet leadership voiced "concern" that the continuation or escalation of this campaign might create a crisis in Arab-Soviet ties—something which Soviet officials seek to avoid.

Within the framework of this request and as part of the attempts to respond to the Arab campaign and "minimize" Soviet responsibility for the emergence of this "new danger" facing the Arabs, Soviet officials informed several Arab states and parties of the following:

1. The USSR is allowing mass emigration of its Soviet Jews as a result of the far-reaching political changes that it has been witnessing, due to compliance with international commitments and laws pertaining to emigration, and also due to the increasingly growing warmth in ties between the USSR and the United States and Western Europe. The USSR, however, is not asking these Jewish emigrants to leave for Israel. Besides, the USSR does not provide any financial or economic aid to the Israeli Government to help it settle these emigrants in Israel or elsewhere as the United States in particular is doing.

2. The USSR can in no way be held responsible for the imposition by the United States of stringent restrictions on the immigration of Soviet and East European Jews to U.S. territory. Moreover, the USSR has not asked any world state to close its doors before these Jewish emigrants. The opposite is true. Soviet officials have held unannounced contacts with some West European states, including prominent ones, in an attempt to persuade them to absorb a large number of Soviet Jewish and Eastern European emigrants. It has become clear to the Soviets that most West European states refuse to accord Soviet Jews "special treatment" and to facilitate their emigration to their territory instead of Israel. This practically means that the West European states do not want to receive large numbers of new Jewish immigrants for several reasons, including economic considerations. Hence, these states, along with the United States, are contributing to the Jewish emigration to Israel.

3. The Soviet leadership believes that it is possible to reduce the intensity of this "new danger" which threatens the Arabs. This requires the formulation of an effective plan containing three basic elements. The first element, would be the adoption of a strongly-worded and binding international resolution that would prohibit the building of any new Israeli settlements by the Israeli Government in the Arab territories occupied in 1967. The second element, would be the opening of the doors of the United States as well as those of West European states or the major industrial states to Soviet and East European Jewish emigrants so that these emigrants would not find themselves compelled to go to Israel. The third element would be "bringing pressure to bear" on the Israeli Government to make it soften its stands on the efforts being made to attain a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question and the Arab-Israeli conflict so that real and serious peace negotiations can begin. These peace talks must eventually lead to the return of the occupied territories to the Arabs. They must also secure the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people. It is clear that the implementation of this three-pronged plan first and foremost requires U.S. endorsement of the plan. The USSR is ready to participate in any joint U.S.-USSR effort designed to "put pressure" on Israel to make it stop the building of settlements and activate peace talks. The major responsibility in this regard, however, lies with the United States and not with the USSR, thanks to the strong and firm alliance binding Washington to Tel Aviv.

4. If the anti-Soviet Arab campaign were to be maintained and cause a crisis in Arab-Soviet ties, Israel and the West European states and forces which support Israel or sympathize with it would then benefit. These forces would gradually wield influence in the Soviet arena, particularly after this arena has been opened for the activities of unofficial Soviet and non-Soviet forces. Therefore, it would not be in the interest of either the USSR or the Arab world to see their ties deteriorate or to see these ties plagued by a crisis.

Hence, the Soviet advice to the Arabs can be summed as follows: "Do not fall into the Israeli trap. Also, do not hold the USSR mainly responsible for Jewish emigration, as the major responsibility in this regard lies with the United States and West European states. The USSR is willing to shoulder its responsibilities in this regard if the Arabs handle the emigration issue fairly and justly and apportion responsibility and blame to all sides equitably."

### Sub-Saharan Africa

#### Shevardnadze Meets With Ethiopian Counterpart

PM0803152790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
8 Mar 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Soviet-Ethiopian Talks"]

[Text] Talks took place 7 March between E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister; and Tesfaye Dinka, member of the Workers Party of Ethiopia [WPE] Central Committee Politburo, deputy prime minister, and Ethiopian foreign minister, who is paying a brief working visit to Moscow.

In the course of the talks the ministers discussed most topical questions of Soviet-Ethiopian relations and confirmed the Soviet and Ethiopian Governments' desire to strengthen and improve interaction and cooperation in accordance with the two countries' fundamental interests.

E.A. Shevardnadze described the current phase of perestroika in the Soviet Union in the political-legal, economic, and other spheres, its achievements, the difficulties that have arisen, and the foreign policy efforts made by the Soviet diplomatic service aimed at creating a nonviolent, harmoniously developing world secure for all.

Tesfaye Dinka in turn provided information about the WPE Central Committee plenum's decisions designed to impart dynamism to the democratic renewal of Ethiopian society which accords most fully with the contemporary phase in its development and to liberalize the economy with a view to encouraging individual entrepreneurial activity, notably in agriculture, and attracting foreign private investment.

There was a detailed exchange of opinions concerning the current situation in and around Ethiopia. The Ethiopian minister provided detailed information about the exacerbation of the military-political situation in the north of his country as a result of the large-scale offensive mounted by armed Eritrean People's Liberation Front [EPLF] detachments. He noted that the armed operations unleashed by the EPLF are seriously undermining efforts to reach a political settlement to the Eritrean problem.

E.A. Shevardnadze confirmed in this connection the USSR's stance set out in the Soviet Government statement of 14 February this year. He stressed the urgent need to immediately secure an accord on a mutual cease-fire in order to put an end to fresh bloodshed and killing and on the resumption talks with a view to seeking mutually acceptable forms of national reconciliation. He noted with satisfaction the Ethiopian foreign minister's avowed desire on behalf of his government for peace and dialogue with opposition forces. The Soviet Union, E.A. Shevardnadze stated, is prepared to do its utmost to promote progress in this direction and the quest for political solutions at the negotiating table rather than on the battlefield.

During the discussion of the situation in the north of Ethiopia they also broached questions related to international food aid to the population, which is threatened with starvation. In the opinion of the sides, UN special institutions and other donors could help to resolve this humanitarian task under current conditions, above all insofar as questions of the delivery and distribution of such aid to areas in the combat zone are concerned, by using corridors determined by the Ethiopian Government for this.

The Soviet side supported the Ethiopian stance that initiatives put forward by any states and international nongovernmental organizations regarding food aid to Ethiopia must not violate its government's legitimate rights or, especially, be implemented behind its back.

During the discussion of the contemporary international situation, at the Ethiopian guest's request, E.A. Shevardnadze gave the Soviet side's assessment of the development of political processes on the European continent and of the positive changes away from confrontation to cooperation that are taking place in the international arena, which accord with the interests of all peoples and states and promote the creation of more favorable conditions for the settlement of regional conflicts and countries free development, particularly in the Third World.

Tesfaye Dinka described the current situation in the Horn of Africa, pointing out Ethiopia's desire to establish relations of trust and cooperation with all its neighbors.

On the same day E.A. Shevardnadze gave a dinner in honor of his Ethiopian guest.

#### **Discussion on Eritrean Rebel Offensive, Food Aid**

*EA2302101190 Moscow International Service  
in Amharic 1530 GMT 20 Feb 90*

[Text] The distribution of food aid to famine victims in Eritrea has been halted because of the outbreak of war there. Anatoliy Doronin, Radio Moscow reporter in Ethiopia, has sent us the following report:

Food aid was being delivered to Ethiopia through Mitsiwa port before the Eritrean People's Liberation

Front [EPLF] began a strong offensive against the port town. The aid was being loaded onto lorries and taken to Asmera, where the food was distributed to the rationing stations. The food was distributed by the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission [RCC]. Food distribution in rebel-held areas was carried out by church organizations. Now the food aid has been halted because of the war on the road to Mitsiwa. Although there is a lot of food stored in Mitsiwa, it is not possible to distribute the food from there.

Deputy Prime Minister Ashagre Yigletu, in a statement he made to the UN special representative on relief aid and donor representatives, said the Ethiopian Government's food aid program cannot be implemented.

According to the RCC and the Food and Agriculture Organization, between 3,500,000 and 4,000,000 people are in need of food aid in Eritrea and Tigray in northern Ethiopia. If the food aid does not reach them in time, they will starve to death.

The Radio Moscow reporter, Anatoliy Doronin, says the EPLF strongly attacked Mitsiwa so as to defeat the government forces and take full control of the stored food. However, he said, it is the innocent people who suffer when war is intensified. For this reason, the parties concerned should take immediate coordinated action to save the lives of famine victims in northern Ethiopia. It is only the innocent people who have suffered in the many years of war between the secessionists and the central government.

The Canadian foreign minister, Monique Landry, calling on the international community to continue its effort in bringing the opposition parties to continue the already begun peace talks, also accused the EPLF of hindering the distribution of food to the hungry people.

#### **Platform of New Ethiopian Party Explained**

*PM0703140590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
7 Mar 90 First Edition p 5*

[TASS report: "WPE Central Committee Plenum: New Course Elaborated"]

[Text] Addis Ababa, 6 Mar—Defending the unity and territorial integrity of the state and overcoming the negative phenomena in the economic and social spheres inherited from the past are the main aim of the new political course of development proclaimed by Mengistu Haile Mariam, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia [WPE] Central Committee and president of Ethiopia, at the 11th WPE Central Committee Plenum, which opened here on Monday.

In his report to the plenum Mengistu Haile Mariam proposed renaming the WPE the Party of Ethiopian Democratic Unity, open to representatives of all classes and strata of society. The party will represent the interests of all the republic's citizens irrespective of their nationality and creed, he noted. Opposition groupings

who demonstrate a desire to create democratic unity in Ethiopian society will be able to take part in its work.

With regard to the country's economy it is planned to decentralize planning and switch to a mixed system of economic activity founded on state, private, and cooperative ownership, Mengistu Haile Mariam said.

The state reserves the right to land ownership, the report says. Individual land use will be determined by law.

The government is not ceasing its efforts to find a peaceful solution to the problem of the north of Ethiopia, the president noted. However it cannot secure peace owing to the destructive position of separatist groupings.

### **Commentary Views ANC Committee Meeting**

*MB1402212790 Moscow in English to Southern Africa  
1900 GMT 14 Feb 90*

[Igor Potovskiy commentary—read by announcer]

[Text] A two-week session of the national executive of the ANC [African National Congress] of South Africa opened in Lusaka today. It will consider the organization's strategy in new conditions. Commentary is by Igor Potovskiy.

This is the second session of the national executive in one month. According to observers, its significance lies in the fact that the session is to define the role and status of the ANC inside the country among other organizations such as the United Democratic Front. The complex situation the ANC has found itself in is connected not only with the natural difficulties of the transition to the legal position of the ANC inside the country, but also with the pace of political changes in South Africa set by the government.

I am beginning to think that the government intends to act quicker than we expected, declared Walter Sisulu, an ANC leader. Many believe that after the speech made by President de Klerk in Parliament the government has lost control over the process of reforms in the country, but to date the initiative is on the side of the president, and he must retain it.

Lengthy delays in conducting the talks (?of) democratic forces will make the president vulnerable to the supporters of the right among the white voters. The president may lose his main trump card in his argument with the conservatives—that is, the weakening of sanctions.

The ANC is no less interested in a speedy development of the current political processes in South Africa. The reason, as information agencies report, with reference to sources inside the organization, is that the ANC is to either accept the pace set or lose the race.

The key role in the ANC's policies, just as in the development of the situation in the country as a whole, undoubtedly belongs to Nelson Mandela. Mandela himself has declared that he is a loyal and disciplined

member of the ANC and he is ready to follow the decisions of the leadership made in Lusaka. Nevertheless, the ANC will reportedly outline his future role in discussing the matter directly with him. In two weeks Mandela is to arrive in Lusaka for the purpose.

Meanwhile, the statements made by Nelson Mandela after his release are carefully studied. A government spokesman noted with evident satisfaction that his speech at the meeting in Soweto was more moderate than at his first news conference. It was underlined that they should regard Mandela's statement about adherence to an armed struggle with understanding, that there is sufficient common ground for solving the country's problems by nonviolent means.

The government is especially encouraged by Mandela's readiness to discuss the question about the apprehensions of the country's white community and his striving to create a constitution that would satisfy all South Africans.

On the whole, Mandela's stand looks extremely balanced and, as the government believes, gives ground for sensible discussion during talks. But time is required to begin them, even if, because in Mandela's opinion, he can be given the right to take part in the talks at the ANC conference scheduled for June. [sentence as heard]

The ANC needs time in order to get used to the new conditions. However, since the dynamic development of the political process in the country does not allow a vacuum, many politicians agree that some kind of talks-about-talks are inevitable.

### **Vyshinskiy Statement on South African Sanctions**

*MB2602192690 Moscow in Zulu to Southern Africa  
1930 GMT 22 Feb 90*

[Statement by USSR Deputy Justice Minister Mikhail Vyshinskiy on RSA sanctions; date and place not give; Vyshinskiy in Russian fading to Zulu translation—recorded]

[Text] Relaxing, or totally lifting sanctions against South Africa will indicate to people living in South Africa that, internationally, governments and their peoples now accept the apartheid regime.

It will seem the message now is that whites in South Africa have a free hand in deciding how the Pretoria Government should deal with apartheid. A quick look at the past will show that the reforms apparent now in South Africa came about because of the pressure of sanctions by the international community.

It would be a big mistake to relax sanctions now, at such a critical time for the struggle. Any relaxation of sanctions against that country can only come about when all apartheid legislation has been abolished, and we are of the opinion that this will be achieved through peaceful means.



The wealth and economic strength of South Africa were achieved through the joint effort of white, black, colored, and Asian communities within that country. Therefore, all these nationalities deserve equal rights in a new, independent, and democratic South Africa. A just and equitable system, respected by all in South Africa, will not cater singularly to the needs of the white community but will, nonetheless, be fulfilling. While today they live in insular communities, in the new South Africa they will learn to live in peace with neighbors of different nationalities.

The continuation of sanctions against South Africa will help forge a spirit of sharing in those that are hanging on to the past and will show that apartheid rule has no place in the world and that no one in South Africa will be satisfied with fragmented reform.

But, there are other views. President de Klerk's government sees things differently. Yes, it talks much about taking the reform bull by the horns, but is that enough to warrant the relaxation or total lifting of sanctions?

We cannot do more than to support the international resolution on sanctions. Yes, Mandela and other prominent political prisoners have been released, but the leader of the African National Congress has noted that it took over 27 years of his incarceration for the Pretoria Government to acknowledge that it was in error.

De Klerk is on top of reform, yet the pillars of apartheid remain in place, loosened just a little, but still intact. Apartheid rule is entrenched in the country's laws. The black majority still cannot get representation in Parliament, and has no say in the running of the country of their birth.

Much still has to be accomplished in the elimination of the apartheid scourge. The Pretoria Government is merely at the starting point of the road to reform in South Africa.

In our opinion, the lifting of sanctions against South Africa would stem progress on reform in South Africa.

### Queried on Sanctions

LD2202211690 Moscow in English to Africa  
1700 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] [Announcer] Should the economic and other sanctions against South Africa be lifted or mitigated in the light of the changes taking place in that country? This question is today being animatedly discussed in the political circles of many countries. Most of the participants in the session of the EEC Council of Ministers on the foreign ministers level, that has just ended in Dublin, spoke out for preserving the sanctions. Objections came only from the British representative. London intends to lift the ban on new investments in South Africa and will not object against tourist trips to that country, and develop scientific and cultural ties with it. Our correspondent asked Mikhail Vyshinskiy, the USSR deputy

minister of justice, to express his viewpoint on the problems of sanctions in relations to South Africa:

[Vyshinskiy in Russian fading into superimposed English report] For the South African population the lifting or mitigation of sanctions will practically mean that the international public opinion, the world community of states, accept apartheid and hand over its disbandment to the well-wishing judgement of the government, Mikhail Vyshinskiy said. But if we were to look back a little it becomes clear that what led to the present reforms in South Africa were precisely the sanctions. It would be a big mistake if today, when the struggle in that country is heightening, sanctions would be lifted. Without any doubt sanctions will be lifted completely when apartheid would be eliminated in South Africa. I am sure it must be done in a peaceful way. The wealth of South Africa, its economic might, were created jointly by all the people of that country: whites, Africans, and coloreds. They all should be ensured equality in the future democratic South Africa. The new multiracial society will not only halt the normal life of the whites but will fill it with new content. If today they're living as a garrison in a besieged fortress then they will become good neighbors with representatives of other racial groups. Sanctions would help create a state like that by political means because sanctions show the conservatives that the world community does not accept apartheid and will not be satisfied by halfway reforms.

[Announcer] But there is another viewpoint. Some say that the government of Federik de Klerk is conducting bold reforms. The lifting or mitigation of sanctions will help him in that.

[Vyshinskiy in Russian fading into superimposed English report] I would not overestimate what was done so much, but would rather agree with the trend of the process and support it, Mikhail Vyshinskiy said. Yes, Nelson Mandela has been released, as well as other political prisoners, but the African National Congress [ANC] leader was in jail for 27 years before the government acknowledged its mistake. De Klerk is conducting reforms. But apartheid in South Africa is still preserved. This system is based on a whole complex of laws and most of them are yet in force. What's most important is that the Africans so far do not have their representatives in parliament, and that means they are deprived of the possibility to take part in managing the country. Therefore there is yet much to be done before there would be any grounds to say that apartheid has been eliminated in South Africa. The government of Pretoria is only at the very start of its road. From my viewpoint the lifting of sanctions may not speed up the transformations but just suspend them.

### South African Presence at Summit Questioned

MB2402153790 Moscow in English to Southern Africa  
1900 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Aleksandr Fedorov commentary—read by announcer]



[Excerpt] The South African president, Frederik de Klerk, was expected to attend an African summit in Zaire on Saturday [24 Feb].

Due to certain reasons, the meeting will not be held, but the very fact that the leader of the apartheid government was invited to participate in a dialogue with African states is rather unprecedented.

It may seem strange, but the report immediately made me remember ex-President Pieter Botha. What would be his response to an invitation like this? No doubt, I thought, he would consider it a great achievement of his diplomacy.

The few meetings with separate African leaders, arranged with great effort, concerned bilateral relations in narrow fields. It was in that period that a South African philosopher characterized his fellow countrymen as the most estranged people in the world.

Yet, the situation is changing, and I would regard de Klerk's planned participation in the Zaire meeting as an event more important than even the recent visit of South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha to Hungary.

Whatever officials in Pretoria are saying about their achievements, the country used to be aware of its isolation from the rest of Africa. It felt isolated psychologically and economically (?set) in our interdependent world. Walling one's self in is, obviously, out of date.

Are there any economists capable of counting how much South Africa would have gained if it had had open contacts with the other countries of the continent?

There is another aspect of alienation: the political one. South Africa still remains in a state of vacuum. The other African countries refuse to deal with it because of apartheid. Apartheid is also the reason for semiclandestine contacts with the Western countries, which, fearing to ignore the position of the rest of the world, advocate further economic sanctions.

I have always found politically naive, to put it mildly, the talk in South Africa about Soviet policy toward it and the African liberation movement and, in general, about Soviet plans with regard to the continent. Such speculations reveal a desire to look well-informed for the building of complicated combinations in political games on a regional and international scale.

It is natural for every country, especially for one such as South Africa, to wish to take part in the life of this human community. But, it is unfeasible as long as apartheid remains a government policy, since such a system rules out the possibility of diplomatic contact or trust.

The invitation of Frederik de Klerk to take part in the meeting in Zaire can be viewed as a move made in the

expectation of future changes in South Africa and recognition of its present steps towards democratization. On the other hand, a natural question arises: Hasn't the invitation come too early?

The African National Congress says that the expected meeting in Zaire contradicts the task of isolating the regime. But, there is another factor which must not be ignored either: As time is changing, the notions of concrete actions and their forms change, and any positive contribution of South Africa to the lessening of tensions is taken into account. [passage omitted]

### Supreme Soviet Delegation Arrives in Tunisia

LD0803122590 Moscow TASS International Service  
in Russian 0923 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Dar es Salaam, 7 Mar (TASS)—A USSR Supreme Soviet delegation led by Yu.I. Borodin, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Public Health arrived on Tuesday in Tanzania.

At Dar es Salaam airport, the Soviet delegation was met by deputies of the national assembly of the United Republic of Tanzania, and representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and public organizations of the country.

### Joint Announcement on Visit to Mozambique

PM0803123990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
8 Mar 90 Morning Edition p4

[Unattributed article: "Joint Announcement on Visit by USSR Supreme Soviet Delegation"]

[Text] A USSR Supreme Soviet delegation led by Yu.I. Borodin, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for the Protection of the People's Health, was in this country on an official visit on 28 February-6 March 1990 at the invitation of the People's Assembly of Mozambique.

The Soviet parliamentary delegation was received by M. dos Santos, speaker of the Mozambican People's Assembly. They also had a conversation with Foreign Minister P. Mocumbi and meetings with People's Assembly deputies and representatives of the Mozambican public. The delegation toured the country and was acquainted with the life of the Mozambican people.

During the meetings and conversations, which were conducted in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding, the sides exchanged information on political, economic, social, and cultural relations in their countries. The members of the Soviet delegation talked in detail about the progress of perestroika in all spheres of Soviet society's life, the development of democracy and glasnost in the Soviet Union, and work by the USSR

Supreme Soviet to resolve economic and political problems, broaden the power of the soviets, and build a Soviet Federation based on new principles.

The Mozambican side informed the Soviet side on the domestic political situation and socioeconomic situation in the country, the work of the People's Assembly, progress in the struggle against armed banditry, the Mozambican leadership's peace initiatives, its program for emergency aid to the population, the development of Mozambican society, and also the current political situation in southern Africa.

During their discussion of international problems the Soviet and Mozambican parliamentarians noted the coincidence or proximity of their views on current events in international life. They said that the political climate in the world is noticeably improving. New thinking is gaining a growing foothold in the world arena and in international relations. Nations are showing an increasing willingness to cooperate in the sphere of security, disarmament, ecology, the settlement of regional conflicts, and other problems of concern to mankind. The two countries' parliamentarians are actively contributing to this process. They expressed themselves in favor of all countries and peoples increasing their joint efforts in the task of further developing and multiplying positive trends in world politics in order to ensure mankind's survival and create a nuclear-free, nonviolent world.

The Mozambican side highly appraised the Soviet Union's foreign policy course based on the new political thinking, and stressed the important significance of its disarmament activity, which is in the interests of all countries and peoples.

The Soviet Union, the Soviet parliamentarians said, greatly respects the foreign policy line adopted by Mozambique, which aims to guarantee the sovereignty and independence of countries and peoples, values its contribution to the common struggle for peace and international security and to the task of settling the conflict in southern Africa through negotiation, and supports the Mozambican leadership's peace proposals.

Touching on the situation in the southern Africa region, the participants in the conversations welcomed the birth of Namibia, a new independent state, and the release of N. Mandela and his colleagues and expressed hopes of a positive outcome to efforts to achieve a political settlement in Angola.

The Soviet and Mozambican parliamentarians expressed the belief that, without the elimination of apartheid in the Republic of South Africa [RSA], there can be no peace and stability in the southern Africa region and reaffirmed their countries' support for the African National Congress [ANC] and democratic forces in the RSA struggling to dismantle this system. They noted that, with the release from jail of ANC leader N. Mandela and the lifting of the ban on activity by the ANC,

the South African Communist Party, and other democratic organizations in the RSA, a qualitatively new situation is taking shape. Pretoria has taken an important step forward in the right direction. At the same time, they said that there is still a long way to go before apartheid is eliminated in the RSA and that sanctions against Pretoria must be maintained. They expressed the hope that the RSA government will go further in adopting measures to create a favorable atmosphere for starting talks with the ANC and other democratic organizations in the country on eliminating the apartheid system and forming a nonracist state.

The two sides welcomed the dynamic development of the traditionally friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Mozambique. They stressed the desire of the Soviet Union and Mozambique to continue to strengthen and develop multilateral Soviet-Mozambican cooperation on the basis of the new conditions and tasks being resolved in the two countries. The Mozambican parliamentarians expressed deep appreciation to the Soviet people for the support and multifaceted assistance they give to Mozambique.

The USSR Supreme Soviet delegation sincerely thanked Mozambican parliamentarians and officials for the warm, friendly reception given to it. On behalf of the USSR Supreme Soviet, it invited a delegation of the Mozambican People's Assembly to pay the Soviet Union an official visit at a time convenient to both sides. The invitation was accepted with gratitude.

#### **Cultural Agreement Signed With Togo**

*LD1002111390 Moscow TASS International Service  
in Russian 0942 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] Cotonou, 9 Feb (TASS)—A protocol on cultural and scientific cooperation between the USSR and the Republic of Togo for 1989-90 has been signed in Lome. It provides for an exchange of academic and methodological literature and scientific and technical information, and a continuation of bilateral contacts in sports. The document states that Togo is to provide 40 bursaries per year for the training of students in Soviet higher education establishments. Togolese students who have already graduated there are given the opportunity of further training in the USSR. The protocol was signed by Yaoivi Adodo, Togo's minister of foreign affairs and cooperation, and O.N. Chernyy, Soviet ambassador to Togo. Speaking at the signing ceremony, the Togolese minister expressed his government's gratitude to the Soviet Union for its constant assistance in the cultural field.

#### **Zambian President Supports Perestroika Process**

*PM2302085990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
20 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4*

[TASS report: "Statement by Zambian President"]

[Text] Lusaka, 19 Feb—The changes taking place in East Europe enjoy the support of all progressive countries, including African countries, Kenneth Kaunda, president of Zambia and chairman of the group of "frontline" states, stated. In our view, the main aim of the changes being implemented by the Soviet leadership headed by M.S. Gorbachev is to further enrich the concept of socialism and gear politics to the individual, he stressed in an interview here with your TASS correspondent.

Those who maintain that socialism has collapsed are confusing the ideas of Stalinism and socialism, the president noted. Socialism has practically come to a standstill, but it has not died, it was able to hold out and is now quickly gathering force, showing its vitality. It is now, after the process of renewal of social, economic and political life started in the USSR, that the advantages of the socialist system have started to be clearly manifested.

The events in Armenia and Azerbaijan are an echo of the problems which the Soviet people inherited from the Stalinist regime, K. Kaunda said.

Personally and on behalf of all the Zambian people, I would like to wish the USSR leadership rapid successes in the realization of wide-ranging reforms in their country, which have undoubtedly influenced and will continue to influence the situation in various regions of the globe, the president stressed. He expressed satisfaction with the development of Zambian-Soviet relations. Quite strong ties have formed between our countries in various spheres and economic cooperation is developing.

### East Europe

#### Shevardnadze Meets Romania's Foreign Minister

LD0903112890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian  
1000 GMT 9 Mar 90

[Text] From 7 to 9 March, at the invitation of the Soviet Government, Celag, minister of foreign affairs of Romania has been in Moscow on a working visit. During talks with Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, both countries confirmed their resolve to develop Soviet-Romanian relations on a new, healthy, and mutually beneficial foundation, based on the principles of independence, sovereignty, equal rights, and non-interference in internal affairs. An agreement has been reached on completing the groundwork, in the immediate future, for signing an agreement on mutual visits by citizens of the two countries as well as on the opening of cultural and information centres in Moscow and Bucharest. Both sides agreed to examine the issue of opening general consulates of the USSR in Iasi and of Romania in Kishenev.

#### Correspondent Views Lenin Monument Demolition

PM0703135390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
7 Mar 90 Second Edition p 6

[Own correspondent V. Vedralshko dispatch: "On Civilization and Human Dignity"]

[Text] Bucharest, 6 Mar—There is no longer a Lenin memorial in Bucharest.

It took nearly three days to pull it down, and this gave those who were present in Free Press Square time for reflection. Even the most excited people, who were expressing one mood on Saturday at midday, saying "It's happening!" were, by evening, already asking "What are we doing? And how are we doing it?"

There had already been an attempt to lift the statue with the help of a single crane, people had already tried to displace it by striking it under the elbow with a cast iron ball attached to another crane... And the statue still stood firm. Then they started cutting down the base and shattering it with pneumatic hammers. The construction [word as published] site was not fenced off, and hundreds of Romanians spent hours watching the punishment meted out. Dan Predescu, mayor of Bucharest was in charge of the work.

What was it like for people of the older generation for whom Lenin symbolized their life's work, to watch this?

What was it like for the young people who were assimilating from this graphic demonstration their fellow citizens' methods of bidding farewell to historical symbols?

For today's Romania, where anticommunist sentiments are strong, the reaction of a significant part of the population to the dismantling of the monument was comprehensible. However, the opinions of many intellectuals who see themselves as the *creme de la creme* of the nation, are important in this connection. The unworthy nature of the political action that has been carried out can be attributed to their nonintervention. A great deal is being said in Romania now about civilization and human dignity. The National Salvation Front's program notes that its aim is to "transform Romanian society on the basis of the value of democracy, freedom, and dignity." Whichever way you look at it, the fact remains: The lack of engineering and technical backup, and bad organization have encouraged actions that bear little relation to dignity. On Saturday night or in the early hours of Sunday morning, someone managed to cover the statue, which had by then been tied up with ropes, with yellow paint.

The Romanian mass media have reported on the events in different ways. A feeling of shame can be detected in the restrained tone of certain articles. But another assessment is now more typical, according to which Leninism is a Utopian ideal and now the "moment of truth has come." Well, if such an assessment has the right to exist, then another opinion also probably has the right to exist: Barbarity was a basic feature of the "moment of truth."

The methods used by Romanian constructors under the leadership of their engineers and with the blessing of present-day politicians, cannot, unfortunately, by any means be called civilized.

#### **Friendship Union Deplores Anti-Soviet 'Outrages'**

LD2102163790 Moscow TASS in English 1522 GMT  
21 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 21 TASS—The Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries has addressed a message to members of East European societies for friendship with the Soviet Union and to the East European public in general.

The message expresses profound concern, bitterness and pain about the outrages committed upon V.I. Lenin's monuments, desecration of the graves of Soviet soldiers and anti-Soviet slogans at meetings and demonstrations which are becoming increasingly frequent of late.

"Pretending to combat Stalinism and dogmatism, some people are going out of their way to discredit the essence of friendly relations with the Soviet Union, to curtail the activities of friendship societies," the message says.

The document notes that friendship between the Soviet people and the peoples of East European countries was born in their joint struggle against fascism and reaction. It has yielded much good to our countries and has become a factor that contributes to the independence of our peoples, to the deepening of their mutual understanding and trust. "The appearing aggressive intolerance and disregard for all that is sacred for other peoples, disrespect for one another, are dangerous for [words indistinct]. The Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with foreign countries called on the East European public to display reason and responsibility, to prevent the destruction of things that bring people closer together.

#### **Jaruzelski Cited on German Border Issues**

LD0703145390 Moscow TASS in English 1426 GMT  
7 Mar 90

[Text] Bonn March 7 TASS—"It is necessary to clarify the West German Government's stand on the Oder-Neisse border." President Wojciech Jaruzelski of Poland said in an interview with the West German DIE WELT newspaper.

Jaruzelski noted that this issue remained open. "I understand," he said, "that there are definite rules in every election campaign, that there are certain domestic political considerations compelling Chancellor Kohl to adhere to an evasive and somewhat equivocal stand on the border problem.

"We, however, would like the chancellor to join the ranks of those numerous West German political leaders whose stand is unequivocal. This is actually a test for our

reconciliation. Continuing the discussion will create an atmosphere that will eclipse everything positive in our relations and everything we have previously achieved."

Evaluating the current rapprochement of the two German states, Jaruzelski said: "The pace of reunification is unexpected and even staggering. It has by far outstripped European developments. The haste and desire to confront the public with accomplished facts, as well as surfacing nationalistic tendencies, give the impression that we are witnessing an impending anschluss and not reunification.

"This process is occurring in disturbing conditions. The situation in West Germany reminds me of an orchestra in which every political leader plays his own score. Particularly alarming is the fact that these voices sound differently, depending on when and to whom they are addressed."

"European equilibrium must not be upset," Jaruzelski said. "The process of unification must be synchronised with European integration. The present historic period offers great chances for the future. However, such periods are fraught with definite perils. These chances must be used to the utmost and the dangers must be neutralized."

Jaruzelski backed Premier Mazowiecki's proposal that Poland should take part in the "2 plus 4" negotiations on Germany's unification. "The proposal refers primarily to the stage of negotiations that will deal with Germany's borders," he noted.

Declaring Poland's resolution to continue playing an active role in world politics, Jaruzelski said that West Germany and Poland should jointly advance "bold initiatives on the radical reduction of military potentials in Europe."

Asked about the Soviet military contingent in Poland, the Polish president said: "The presence of Soviet troops in Poland should be regarded within the context of changes occurring in Europe. Much will depend on whether the united Germany will be a member of NATO or a neutral state, on what will happen to Soviet troops in the GDR, on where and what kind of troops will be deployed by other states, and on how European security will be implemented at a lower level of armaments. We should proceed carefully until these fundamental issues are clarified. Consequently, Soviet troops cannot be withdrawn from Poland at present."

Jaruzelski rejected attempts to draw a parallel between the terms of Soviet military presence in Poland and Czechoslovakia. "There are substantial distinctions here," he said. "First of all, the Soviet Army came to Czechoslovakia and Poland at different times and with different purposes. It remained in Poland after the war as an element of the East-West balance of forces, whereas it moved into Czechoslovakia in 1968. Secondly, Soviet Troops in Poland are a natural mainstay of the Soviet Army in the German Democratic Republic. And,



thirdly, the Czechoslovak border is not the focus of discussions, whereas the Polish border is," the president said.

### Status of Soviet Troops in Poland Viewed

PM0803164190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA  
PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 90 p 3

[Own correspondent V. Shutkevich dispatch under the general heading: "Slavs' Farewell"]

[Excerpt] Warsaw—[passage omitted] "We have poor cards in the game that will soon begin in European politics," GAZETA WYBORCZA said frankly. "The presence of Soviet troops in the country—even if this sounds paradoxical—may be our trump card. Europe is interested in them remaining on our territory until a new system of security emerges." That is why, Skubiszewski, the country's foreign minister, said recently, the Polish Government has no intention of raising the question of a Soviet troop withdrawal.

It is worth noting that there is a considerable difference between the troops' status in Poland and, say, in Hungary or Czechoslovakia. They are in Poland on the basis of an international treaty concluded by our countries' representatives in 1956, which was later supplemented by other agreements. Soviet units ended up in Budapest and Prague, as everyone remembers, under quite different circumstances. Admittedly Poles can often be heard saying that our troops have also acted as "ideological gendarmes" at certain moments. However, Polish newspapers now recall with increasing frequency that their main task nonetheless lay elsewhere—in defending the postwar borders.

Does everyone in Poland share this viewpoint? Of course not. Demands for Soviet troops to be withdrawn and insulting attacks on our army can continually be heard at rallies and demonstrations held by extremist youth organizations.

Of late "hardline" young people have once again organized a number of rowdy demonstrations—in Krakow, Gdansk, and other cities—demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops and accusing Walesa and other political leaders of "doing a deal with the occupiers." These attacks seem to have had a definite effect on the chairman of the Solidarity trade union. During a recent conversation with Soviet Ambassador V. Brovikov Walesa also began to talk about the need for the complete withdrawal of the Soviet troops before the end of the year. Otherwise, in his opinion, "demagoguery and the street will begin to guide politics." However no official has supported this statement.

Are there now disagreements between the Polish Government position and Lech Walesa's viewpoint? I asked Polish Prime Minister T. Mazowiecki this question during a recent press conference. "The troops will probably have to be withdrawn after a while," Mazowiecki replied, "but we take a realistic view of the situation on

the basis of the prospect of German unification and so we are not raising this problem now."

### Polish Draft Law on Privatization Approved

PM0703161990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 7 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Draft Law Approved"]

[Text] Warsaw, 6 Mar—An important draft law for the future of Poland—on the privatization of state enterprises—has been approved at a session of the Polish Council of Ministers chaired by T. Mazowiecki. This document is an integral part of the government's economic program, which was elaborated in cooperation with experts from the IMF and the World Bank. Putting state enterprises which are currently the foundation of the Polish economy in the hands of joint-stock companies and firms and also private owners was one of the conditions for various international finance organizations and banks granting Poland large loans.

The report on the session says that the government draft law makes it possible to truly change Poland's economic model. The gradual transfer of ownership to shareholders and private operators must, in the opinion of this document's creators, result in demonopolization, the development of competition, and incentives for labor. The main principle behind the draft law is the introduction of market mechanisms, which will compel private owners or joint-stock companies to shoulder full responsibility for economic decisions and become the object of free market forces, which entails the risk of bankruptcy.

The authors believe that the legal decisions enshrined in the draft law are based on flexible use of various methods of privatizing the state sector. Sale of shares and shared participation are planned first, which creates conditions for a capital market to emerge. Up to 20 percent of an enterprise's shares can be sold to employees on preferential terms. It also admits the possibility of selling fixed capital belonging to enterprises, above all economically weak enterprises, into private hands and also of "mini-privatization," the sale of individual pieces of state enterprises' property—machinery, equipment, stores, canteens, and so on.

There is one proviso here: In order to guarantee that the state's interests are properly protected in the privatization process, provision has also been made for the Sejm to determine every year the overall amount of state enterprise property destined for privatization and determine what the income obtained from the change in the form of ownership will be spent on. What is more the Council of Ministers will determine enterprises of special significance for the state economy whose privatization will require government consent.

### **Nishanov Meets SFRY Prosecutor's Office Group**

*PM2802104990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
25 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4*

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 23 February R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities, received an SFRY Prosecutor's Office delegation headed by Federal Prosecutor L. Prljeta. In the course of talks the guests were familiarized with the activity of the country's supreme legislative organ under modern conditions.

USSR General Prosecutor A.Ya. Sukharev participated in the talks. M. Veres, SFRY ambassador to the USSR, was present at the meeting.

### **Moves Toward Resumption of LCY Congress Noted**

*PM0503133990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
28 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4*

[Unnamed special correspondent dispatch: "Will Delegates Return to the Congress?"]

[Text] Belgrade—According to a TANJUG report, a session of the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] Central Committee Presidium has been held in Belgrade to discuss the possibility of resuming the 14th LCY Congress. Members of the congress presidium discussed a document prepared by its working group.

As is well known, the extraordinary 14th LCY Congress was suspended during the night of 23 January when amendments to the party's key documents had already been agreed and approved. All that remained to be done was to vote on them as a whole and elect the LCY's new leading organs. However, this was thwarted by the demonstrative walkout from the session of the Slovenian Communists' entire delegation. It would, of course, have been possible to complete a forum of such significance for the party and the country without the Slovenians. However, for the sake of the unity of the party's ranks and the unity of the federation, the delegates decided not to forge ahead but to adjourn the plenary session and discuss the prevailing situation in republic and autonomous province party organizations.

It was assumed that the delegations would meet again in 15-20 days. However, as we can see, the adjournment is already in its second month.

During the first few days, as many observers noted, there was a feeling of obvious confusion in party circles. An unusual silence settled on the floors of the high-rise Central Committee building in New Belgrade. However, in primary party organizations in republics and provinces, and especially at major enterprises, Communists took what had happened at the congress to heart. A quest for ways to save a united mass political organization throughout the territory of the SFRY was launched

everywhere. The majority are convinced that only a united LCY can uphold the interests of all Yugoslavia's peoples and ethnic groups.

I regard the support given by Yugoslavia's working people to the LCY during these difficult days as being of fundamental importance for the rebirth of the party and the Communists' faith in their own strength. The newspaper BORBA has carried out a sociological study of public opinion. Those who took part in the poll in all six republics and the two autonomous provinces were asked: "Who will you vote for during the upcoming elections this spring?" One-third of those polled answered: "For the Communists." This figure is several times higher than the "percentages" of other parties and movements which have sprung up recently. Almost half of those polled predicted the victory of the Communists in the elections.

However, the resumption of the congress has proved to be a tough task. Plenums and conferences in republics and provinces have revealed divergent opinions as regards the return of the delegates to the conference hall. Communists in the Yugoslav People's Army have proposed that a partywide referendum be held. Another option would be to redraft the key documents, subject them to a preliminary discussion by Central Committee plenums, and only then resume the work of the congress. There is a proposal to recognize the split of the LCY into national detachments as a fait accompli and to set up a new sociopolitical party of democratic socialism. It is claimed that experience to this effect already exists in Europe.

A special working group of the congress presidium is studying all these opinions and generalizing them. The declaration which it has submitted has been rated by presidium members at their latest session as a good basis for continuing the extraordinary 14th Congress. This declaration will be the key document of the congress and the LCY until a new program is drawn up.

### **PRAVDA Views Situation in SFRY, LCY**

*PM0503111990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
2 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5*

[Own correspondent Ye. Fadeyev dispatch: "Debates Within the LCY Continue After the Congress, Which Is Still Not Over"]

[Text] Belgrade—Since the beginning of the new year political and economic passions in Yugoslavia seem to have decided to seriously compete with the vagaries of this winter.

Just as the wind unexpectedly changes direction and the temperature soars from minus two to plus ten degrees in the space of a few hours, so the "country's cardiogram," to use VECERNJE NOVOSTI's expression, is often unpredictable.

More than a month has elapsed since the 14th (Extraordinary) League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY]

Congress sittings suddenly came to an end and it is still not known when it will continue its work. This subject crops up periodically in all the mass media. There are as many opinions on this subject as there are commentators. Naturally only the LCY itself or—more correctly—its leading bodies can provide the answer. But there too there has been no clarity on this point until the last minute and a number of supreme party leaders have gone... on vacation.

There was a session of the LCY Central Committee Presidium in mid-February, which announced that a Central Committee plenum would convene 1 March to examine topical questions. The session also resolved a cadre question: S. Korosec, secretary of the LCY Central Committee Presidium—I would remind you that he walked out of the congress' working presidium with the Slovenian delegation—was relieved of his post. Yet he could soon have become the leader of the Yugoslav Communists. That is the turn events have taken within the party.

There is no answer as yet to the question of when the extraordinary LCY Congress will end, if at all.

What is the Yugoslav press writing about this.

"Did the LCY disintegrate or not after the Slovenian delegation decided to walk out of the Congress?" TANJUG asked. "The communist party today is nothing like the organization it has been for the past 70 years. The old model has long since become constricting for a Yugoslav communist organization. That is why, despite seeming dramatic, the interruption in the work of the congress was not an unexpected denouement to the intraparty struggle. It is the general conviction that this event must not be seen as the end of the Yugoslav federation..."

Ante Markovic, head of the country's government, who has been described by many people as the man of 1989, firmly told press representatives: "Yugoslavia will undoubtedly function with or without the party."

What is the reading on the "cardiogram" monitoring the country's political and economic life these days? The main events are currently taking place within the SFRY Federal Assembly (parliament). Its sittings are considering a considerable number of important questions, but the main one was without doubt the discussion of the new draft SFRY Constitution proposed by the country's presidency. A constitution which legalizes a multiparty political system, various forms of ownership, and market relations and gives the go-ahead for direct free elections for the first time in the socialist federation. Elections in which representatives of alternative movements, of which there are approximately 60 in the country today, may also take part.

The stormy election campaign is a new feature in the current picture of the country's political life. For the first time since the Communist Party took power after a successful armed struggle against the fascist occupiers, it

will fight for seats in parliament and local bodies on an equal footing with candidates from other parties. For the first time the question of power will arise at the elections, observers note—power which the Communists may lose not only in theory but also in practice. That is why many people are perplexed by the LCY's delayed reaction to the events that are taking place: After all elections will be held in some republics in April.

According to a public opinion poll conducted by BORBA, one-third of the voters will vote for the LCY. Some 43 percent of those polled predict a victory for the LCY in the elections and cite its numerical strength, acceptable program, and historical services as positive points. But those are merely forecasts...

The special feature of the current elections is that they will not be held in all six Yugoslav republics. Moreover, one thing is known as yet: They will be held in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. A program and list of contenders have already been ratified in Ljubljana, where, I remind you, the League of Communists of Slovenia declared itself an independent party—the League of Communists-Party of Democratic Renewal—after withdrawing from the 14th Congress. M. Kucan, recent leader of the republic's party organization, has been nominated a candidate for the post of chairman of the republic's presidency.

That is how the election struggle looks in Croatia, where approximately 20 alternative movements have been registered officially. The largest of them being the Croatian Democratic Association, which has the greatest chance, in the opinion of the commentators, of getting itself noticed on the political horizon. F. Tudzh [name as transliterated], former member of the LCY and a former general, who was convicted of nationalist activity, is its ideologist. The political credo of the Croatian Democratic Association, which was founded last February, is "support for the interests of Croats and Croatia." Election strategy was ratified at the recent session of the League of Communists of Croatia Central Committee, confirming once again that Communists are prepared for a coalition with all movements.

Yet the leaders of the League of Communists of Macedonia proposed putting off the election until a later date. The official reason is that time is needed to finalize the laws which will define more clearly the conditions for the opposition's participation in the elections.

Journalist colleagues note that the Communists of Serbia and Montenegro can feel calm. Early elections were held in these republics last year and representatives of the League of Communists won a convincing victory. Nevertheless the following question continually arises in some mass media: Why not hold fresh elections in these two republics when other parties have been allowed to operate?

I would add on my own behalf that a law on political organizations was recently ratified in Serbia. Henceforth they may be founded by all citizens who possess the right

to vote provided there are no fewer than 100 of these citizens. The SFRY's largest republic has witnessed the formation of approximately 20 alternative movements, including several in Kosovo Autonomous Province, which, as is well known, has long been the country's biggest "hotspot." Things are not calm there even now: Its Albanian inhabitants are demanding free elections and the introduction of a multiparty system.

One thing is clear: The new Yugoslavia is moving steadily toward the first direct secret elections in its history, where, the press writes, people will really be able to elect rather than just vote for candidates as before.

By and large the "battle for Yugoslavia" is under way—this expression is popular here. The last two months have indicated the success of the first convertible national currency—the dinar—in the state's postwar development. Although the January inflation results were not as expected (inflation reached 17 percent instead of the planned 13 percent) prices have begun to calm down all the same. The revaluation of the dinar (10,000 have been exchanged for one) since 1 January has not only played a purely psychological role.

Nevertheless, representatives of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, which has for the first time become the center of all financial establishments, say that there is a determined struggle ahead to combat inflation. The main thing now is to retain strict control over the money supply.

These days news came from the IMF: Yugoslavia is about to sign an 18-month agreement with the latter providing it with credits totaling \$600 million. The significance of this agreement, PRIVREDNI PREGLED ("Economic Review") writes, resides in the fact that it effectively gives the SFRY access to other international financial centers and strengthens its positions not only at talks to obtain new credits but also at talks on postponing repayment of the old credits.

There is another item of news. The SFRY has officially announced that it is becoming an associate member of the EEC.

Lastly, the final topical subject of the day which I want to discuss, which is provoking heated disputes among political specialists, journalists, and the country's ordinary citizens. In view of the processes which are taking place in the countries of Eastern Europe with the speed of a typhoon, the question is formulated in brief as follows: "Where is Yugoslavia going?" I have had many conversations and meetings with Yugoslav comrades recently on this topic. To try and generalize their results, my resume would sound something like this: Many people believe that the SFRY is lagging behind the changes in socialist countries. But it must not be forgotten that it broke in 1948 with the actual model of "real socialism" which is now crumbling like a house of cards and that it has not been standing still throughout this period.

Considerable changes have taken place in the country over the last 40 years. It has frequently found itself ahead of other socialist states in reformist processes. That is why, my interlocutors said, our country now has not only a more favorable launchpad for the coming changes but also objectively the soundest preconditions for joining in European integration processes.

In conclusion my Yugoslav comrades invariably stressed the following: All this does not of course mean that we have few problems. However, I would do better to give observer Mirko Klovine the floor here: "Yugoslavia has lagged behind but not in comparison with Poland or, say, with Hungary, but in comparison with its own potential; it has failed to keep up with the programs and plans which it presented to the world in the past so generously but which it has been unable to implement at home."

So, Yugoslavia these days, Yugoslavia after the congress... Will the congress complete its work? I personally was struck by the opinion of D. Zarkovic, a prominent economist in the country and member of the League of Communists of Vojvodina provincial committee presidium:

"I believe that the congress can be continued with minimum disagreement on problems relating to the development of our country and the League of Communists. Provided that all passions are tamed to ensure that common sense comes to the fore. Only then, once this has been achieved, is there any point in continuing the interrupted work."

...The sun shines brightly and unrestrainedly outside the office. A cloud suddenly rolls off the Danube, the local wind—the kosava—blows harshly, and there is no longer warm snow on the streets but cold rain. In the country winter is turning into spring.

### SFRY Plant Failure Blamed on Soviet Policy

90U10407A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
28 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent Ye. Vostrukhov, Belgrade: "They... Archived the Contract"]

[Text] Initially, they even took pride in this brand-new plant built in a picturesque valley in Bosnia and Hercegovina. This modern enterprise with spacious shops, efficient equipment, and excellent "amenities" was set up in the city of Srebrenica, a locality far removed from industrial centers and whose citizens were not exactly spoiled by a surplus of jobs. Permanent and well-paying jobs in these parts used to be difficult to find. The young people had to leave their native homes for ore mines or faraway cities, or altogether emigrate in search of jobs.

Suddenly, about 10 years ago, hopeful rumors began to spread in the surrounding area: They are going to build a large plant in Srebrenica and make batteries at it; after all, they mine lead in the mountains nearby. The rumors proved to be correct. Very soon, well-proportioned



buildings were erected one by one at the foot of the hill. Eight years ago, the battery plant turned out its first products. It employs up to 1,000 people, residents of Srebrenica and adjacent localities. By local standards, this is a respectable production facility. Over there, they make stationary general-purpose batteries for power stations and telephone exchanges, industrial enterprises, transportation, communications...

Director Ilija Petkovic told me: "Perhaps, there are two main peculiarities of our plant. Since its construction the acuteness of the employment issue in the region has diminished considerably. Therefore, the social significance of this new facility is hard to overestimate. Second, this enterprise is very advantageous for our republic: Its construction was paid for by a Soviet loan which is to be repaid over a long period of time. We pay off the loan by selling our products. Actually, our entire plant is the product of our cooperation with Soviet specialists. Almost all the equipment in the shops is Soviet, and this is also true of the technology of battery production and the design of batteries."

...The bright sun was shining, and plastic walls and transparent skies were blue. The workers, whom the director greeted in a friendly manner while showing me the plant, looked businesslike. Indeed, the plant conveyor operated with precision. However, believe me, I felt bad because I had already found out that all of this well-kept production facility has long been doomed.

Recently, the Yugoslav Skupstina (parliament of the country) adopted a resolution according to which all enterprises operating at a loss were to be closed this year without exception. "Our plant" in Srebrenica turned out to be among the first candidates for bankruptcy. It has long been unable to break even; it has operated at a tremendous loss; on many occasions, it has had no money to pay wages to workers. In addition, on strictly predetermined days the bank draws from its account a certain large sum of money in order to pay back the Soviet loan and the interest on it. The plant has been kept halfway afloat due to state subsidies. The collective has been grumbling: "What lies ahead for us when they discontinue the subsidies?"

It was doubly painful for me to grasp that the collective has come to the brink of bankruptcy through no fault of its own. Our fellow countrymen have condemned it to a financial failure.

In July 1975, the All-Union Export and Import Association Prommasheksport signed a general contract with the Yugoslav company Energoinvest from the city of Sarajevo for technical cooperation in the construction of a plant in Srebrenica which was to produce batteries designed in the Soviet Union. The second tier of the enterprise was planned to produce almost a million of these products which were in short supply. All conditions for the cooperation of the parties were set forth in 16 pages of small print in the contract. However, one of the first items in the contract read: "From the output of the

battery plant built pursuant to the present general contract, the Soviet foreign trade organization will purchase all batteries which comply with Soviet standards over a long period of time (no less than 10 years)." The contract was signed by the ranking managers of both associations. All provisions of the contract were fulfilled in an irrefragable manner while the plant was designed and built and while its equipment was assembled.

Subsequently, the incomprehensible began, at least as far as the Yugoslavs are concerned. Initially, it took several years to confirm the price for batteries. Later, it became even worse. Despite its obligations, the Soviet side refused to purchase the batteries in full. You may recall that the promise was to acquire all good-quality products for at least 10 years; meanwhile, we have been buying less than one-half of the annual output. I am looking at a memorandum from the office of the Soviet commercial representative in the SFRY: Since the day the plant was commissioned, not more than 45 percent of its planned capacity has been utilized for deliveries to the USSR.

The plant found itself in a financial trap. Can you imagine what it means for a large enterprise to spin its wheels? The Yugoslavs are virtually unable to sell their products to anyone else: At present, nobody needs Soviet-designed batteries. The Srebrenica collective fails to comprehend this. The failure to meet contractual obligations may be attributed to the universal irresponsibility of the period of stagnation, but why has this deception continued in the years of perestroika as well?!

Perhaps, nobody is left to be held accountable at present: Recently, the Prommasheksport was disbanded, and the monopoly on purchasing batteries was taken over by the USSR Ministry of Electrical Equipment Industry and Instrument Making. The troubles of the citizens of Srebrenica are of no concern to the new foreign trade association Sovelektro. For the functionaries of Sovelektro, the financial ruin and unemployment with which the people are threatened through the fault of our great country are nothing.

For several years now, the office of the Soviet commercial representative in Belgrade has been trying to help the plant which is in trouble. V. Dmitriyev, USSR Deputy Commercial Representative in the SFRY, said: "The office of the commercial representative believes that this kind of attitude toward the partners is impermissible and that it discredits Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation. However, our attempts to help the enterprise have, unfortunately, turned out to be in vain." Three years ago, the office of the commercial representative approached the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee] and the former Ministry of Foreign Trade with businesslike proposals, but the departments rejected them: "Nobody needs so many batteries from the SFRY. The general contract is merely a piece of paper in the archives; we did not sign it..."

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations continues to defend this position which is a shame for

our country. It sent a perfunctory written reply four months after the office of the commercial representative in Belgrade approached the ministry with its last petition. N. Rodionov, chief of the Main Administration for Facilities Design and Construction, believes that battery purchases serve to maintain the imbalance in trade between the USSR and the SFRY the continuation of which is supposedly the fault of... "the Yugoslav organizations which do not comply with commercial obligations to import Soviet equipment and goods."

Statements to the effect that at present the imbalance interferes with regular trade are an attempt to camouflage one's own laziness and incompetence. The departmental, command approach to foreign trade continues to interfere with commerce. We still enter the market being shackled by instructions, pointers from "the top," licenses, and other administrative restrictions. We can see in the same case of Srebrenica that the same officials in the trade and allocation offices continue to decide the fate of commercial transactions at present, under perestroika, just as they did in the years of stagnation, rather than the market, common sense, and the mutual interests and needs of those who sell their products and who purchase them.

The imbalance has nothing to do with Srebrenica: After all, we increase annually our purchases of batteries from other Yugoslav plants, and the imbalance somehow is no obstacle. We spend tens of millions for something which, in the opinion of specialists, we can easily do without. The reason for all of this is that several people in the union Gosplan and Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supplies] used to decide, and still do decide, what is to be purchased abroad and how much of it—batteries, computers, wallpaper... (I could give you their names but specific people are not the issue here). Several highly placed officials continue to enjoy the right to allocate hard currency for purchases abroad to departments. The foreign-trade companies of ministries which are sprouting everywhere have been assigned the role of passive executors which are not responsible for anything. Others make all the decisions for them. Contrary to any logic, Sovelektro is spending hard currency to purchase batteries of a similar type not only in Yugoslavia but also in other countries. This is what the Gossnab decided and the Gosplan agreed to. The command system of management leads to the irresponsibility of our failing businessmen operating in foreign markets: Foreign partners are amazed by the ease with which the contracts signed, various obligations, protocols, and so on are violated. The inability to keep our word is becoming the main item in our exports. The country is rapidly losing the reputation of a reliable trade partner which it once enjoyed.

Let me give you one more "Yugoslav example." In October 1988, the Belgrade Plant "Grmec," the largest producer of high-quality general-purpose linoleum, self-adhesive films for furniture, and tiles in the country, signed a long-term contract for production cooperation with our "Roofing and Polymers" Association. The

contract called for setting up several joint enterprises producing linoleum, tiles, and water sealants which are in short supply in Leningrad, Barnaul, Kuybyshev, and other cities. V. Ilyin, general director of the association, and other managers signed the contract for our side. The significance of this production line for our industry is beyond any doubt.

A year has passed, and what has been accomplished? Nothing! For half a year, Ilyin did not respond at all to the search started by the Yugoslavs. He sent a perfunctory letter to the "Grmec" only after the office of our commercial representative intervened: You see, it is... perestroika that is interfering with his cooperation with the colleagues from the SFRY. I visited the enterprise recently, and Yugoslav specialists said: "Our products do not gather dust in warehouses. They are eagerly purchased abroad. However, we would very much like to help our Soviet colleagues, share with them our experience and technology, and keep up the contacts of long duration. We are prepared to cooperate even now."

In Srebrenica, they are also prepared to continue cooperating with their Soviet colleagues, provided, of course, that the enterprise over there is not closed down in keeping with the new law. The collective also signed a scientific and technical cooperation contract with the Kursk Battery Plant. The two collectives have quickly found common ground and turned out to be useful to each other in many endeavors. However, in this instance as well departmental arbitrariness interferes with accomplishing in full what has been planned.

Having found itself on the brink of bankruptcy, Srebrenica did not throw its hands up. They are planning to restructure production and produce batteries of an improved design together with the West German company "Hagen." As a result of modernization, the capacity of the plant should increase considerably; the plan is to sell new batteries abroad. Ilija Petkovic, faithful to his duty as an ally, is once again suggesting that we cooperate within the framework of a joint venture.

Therefore, we have this last chance to redeem ourselves at least a little. Could it be that this time as well the approach of officials will outweigh common sense and considerable economic advantages? Could it be that, having built "our plant," we will bring about its bankruptcy ourselves and throw the workers out into the cold?

#### **Albania Said To Recognize Need for Change**

90UI0392A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY  
in Russian No. 8, 24 Feb-2 Mar 90 p 7

[Article by V. Mashin: "Whither Albania?"]

[Text] Now, when the cleansing thunderstorms have died away over many countries of Central and East Europe, everyone is asking: What is happening in

Albania, a country fenced off from the world by a palisade of ideas about socialism which were shaped in 1950's?

There is no shortage of forecasts, conjectures, and guesses, particularly in the Western media. Some believe that the day is not far off when "the last bastion of Stalinism" in Europe will fall and are predicting the tragic development of events "per the Romanian script".

Others are not so categorical and are speaking more about growing ferment in Albanian society and cite in confirmation the testimony of those deserting Albania for neighboring countries.

The material of the recent Ninth Plenum of the Albanian Workers Party Central Committee, which was held in Tirana recently, and the speech at the Plenum by R. Alia, first secretary of the Albanian Workers Party Central Committee, testify primarily that it would be an oversimplification to portray Albania as a country where time has stood still, where the events going on in the world, in the socialist countries particularly, are not scrutinized and where attempts are not being made to learn from them. The current regime there is far from thinking that it is doomed: It has done and will continue to do everything to survive and it has adapted and will continue to adapt to the changing conditions in Albania itself and those surrounding it.

The mere fact that the processes in the Central and East European countries were discussed at the Albanian Workers Party Central Committee Plenum was indicative. And they were discussed not for the purpose of dissociation.

R. Alia's speech was notable for its unconcealed uneasiness in connection with the possible destabilizing impact of these events on the social and political situation in Albania. And judging from everything, Tirana does not intend to stand pat.

The main lesson which the Albanian leadership has learned for itself is that it is essential to set processes of the democratization of society in motion. In which spheres and how extensively is another matter. But this is what one notices here: The measures which were discussed by the Albanian Workers Party Central Committee Ninth Plenum echo in some respects, in terms of their focus, the way things began in a number of European socialist countries.

The need to address the needs of the people and to improve the provision of the population with foodstuffs and industrial commodities, given the continued stability of retail prices, is recognized as a most important task in the economic sphere with a hitherto unusual categorical certainty. The creation of preferential conditions for agricultural cooperatives and private farms which would stimulate the growth of production, of animal husbandry products primarily, is contemplated.

Notice is given of the elaboration of measures encouraging housing construction with the attraction of the citizens' personal savings.

Until most recently Tirana refrained from speaking about economic reform. Now quite appreciable changes are being outlined in the economic mechanism. The plenum called for their implementation, with no time being lost.

Formulation of the question of the need to abandon the command- administrative management of the economy and decentralize it and transfer many functions of the central planning bodies to the localities comes as quite a surprise. The task of reinforcing the independence of all economic subjects and moving toward their gradual transition to self-financing, the introduction of economic management methods and the more extensive use of material incentives has, albeit in general form, nonetheless been advanced.

There are many innovations also in the approach of the Plenum of the Albanian Workers Party Central Committee to the question of transformations in the party. Even recently it was hard to imagine that the Albanian leadership might announce its readiness to agree to quite extensive democratization within party life. There is talk now not only about holding generally open party meetings and limiting the prerogatives of the party apparatus but even of competition and multiple choice in the elections of party and state officials from the bottom up, members of the Central Committee and People's Assembly deputies included.

Of course, it is a tremendous distance in Albania from declarations of intent to the realization of what is planned. However, the mere fact that these questions have been formulated indicates that the Tirana regime has perceived a threat to its foundations and would like to avoid an unchecked development of events. Its choice in favor of a gradual approach to the solution of urgent problems still affords no guarantees against possible social upheavals. If the transformations are implemented more or less consistently, this could lead to a liberalization of the regime and ease to a certain extent the seriousness of the problems confronting Albanian society. If, however, the decisions of the Albanian Workers Party Central Committee Plenum remain merely good intentions or their realization is confined to half-measures, the growth of social discontent and protest in its various manifestations cannot be ruled out. Time will tell, as they say.

#### **Albanian Economist Urges Joint Ventures**

90U10391A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian  
22 Feb 90 p 3

[TASS report: "New Opportunities"]

[Text] London, 21 February—Henceforth foreign firms will be able to participate in the country's economy

through joint capital investments with Albanian enterprises. "We will welcome foreigners' imports of their technology and know-how while making available to them our workforce and materials, sharing profits and risk," leading Albanian economist Fatos Nano said in an interview with a Reuter correspondent.

According to him, Albania could develop all types of joint economic activity except for classical credit agreements inasmuch as the country "is not yet open to classical joint ventures."

The state will continue to pursue a policy of keeping capital in its own hands and will not permit foreigners to own property, F. Nano emphasized.

He observed also that Albania could implement a number of projects in, for example, clothing and footwear production and the recovery and treatment of chromium ores with foreign assistance. It could also offer cooperation in the production of environmentally clean foodstuffs.

We realize that we will encounter certain difficulties owing to the changes in the mechanisms in the economy of the East European countries, F. Nano said. For this reason we aspire to expand our trade with all who are interested in this.

### West Europe

#### Gorbachev Interviewed on German Unity, NATO

AU0803165890 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER  
ALLGEMEINE in German 8 Mar 90 p 4

[Exclusive interview with USSR General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev by Gabriele Krone-Schmalz and Stefan Kuehnert in Moscow on 6 March; all quotation marks as published]

[Text] In a talk with the Moscow correspondent of the West German ARD Television Network, Gabriele Krone-Schmalz, and the correspondent of GDR television, Stefan Kuehnert, Soviet state and party leader Gorbachev stated what he thinks about any form of a united Germany's membership in NATO:

"No, we will not agree to that. This is absolutely ruled out. We believe that the process of reunification of the two German states is a natural process. This is also reflected in the opinion that I have always had in this connection. We have inherited this question from history, and history will show how this question is to be solved. History just suddenly started to move at a fast pace. I think that the interests of the Germans must be taken into account in this process. There can be no doubt about this, and we are ready for it. The Germans and all parties involved in this process must take into consideration the natural interest of those states that have common borders with the two German states. They must take into account the interests of all Europeans. Since the German question is among the great questions of world

politics, the interests of the rest of the world must also be allowed for. This must not be simplified. In such fateful days, which affect such fundamental issues such as the interests of the peoples, the Germans themselves, the Europeans and the entire world, it would not be a suitable method of international politics to act inconsiderately and clumsily in the face of such important questions. I think that this question requires a stage-by-stage approach in the interest of both the Germans in the GDR, who are wondering what is to become of them and what fate the next generation can expect, and the Germans in the FRG, who want to know what reunification demands from them. I believe that even all business people will think about this question. This question is most important as far as the internal processes are concerned, as well as life within the two German states and the life of the Germans in the GDR and in the FRG. I think that a stage-by-stage, well-balanced approach to this question would serve the well-being of everybody. External questions also matter if this process is linked to the European process. After all, this would mean that these two processes must be harmonized so that all reservations, which could emerge if one were to fail to establish this link, are removed. Such reservations already exist. The question concerning the borders has already been raised. I said that the chancellor revised some of his positions in the past few days, which I have welcomed. Unclearness in such fundamental issues are not part of serious politics. One thing is that everything must be presented clearly and the people must know everything. The second thing is the question of where a unified Germany should stand. I think that there is a uniform European process. There is the Vienna process, we are approaching Helsinki 2, and NATO and the Warsaw Pact will change to become military-political or political organizations. The question as to Germany's positions is of great importance in this connection. Recently I was asked by a leading representative of the West why this question is so important to Mr. Gorbachev. He said that the Germans are no longer the same as they used to be and that the Germans in East and West support peace, to which they have contributed a lot. All this is true. However, one could also ask this questions the other way around: Why do they have to belong to NATO? Why do they not join the Warsaw Pact, if, after all, this question is no longer really important? No, people say, why should they? I say that this counter question explains everything. So why do we not discuss this question seriously?

I have always stressed that we have witnessed major changes in the world and in Europe, now and earlier. These processes comprise all countries. They are holding out prospects of major changes, prosperity, a new Europe, new relations between the people, the countries, and the nations. That means that we must not miss this opportunity. However, that requires all of us to act very responsibly, so that what we all have contributed to will not be destroyed. What is happening now is the result of common decade-long efforts. We have learned from



positive and negative experiences. Now that an opportunity offers itself, we must show responsibility. In answering your brief question, I went into so much detail because it is of considerable importance for us all. We will have an active and constructive share in it; however, we will not allow these increasingly positive tendencies of changes in Europe and the renewal of relations between the European states to be destroyed. That is what we assume."

Asked whether he did "not have the impression" that unification is not being pursued with sufficient responsibility in Germany, Gorbachev said:

"You see, there are very touchy areas where you should not interfere in a country's internal affairs. We highly emphasize this view. However, that does not mean that we do not back a process if we are in favor of it, or that we are not opposed to other processes. However, this is ultimately every nation's own decision. I am following the election campaign from Moscow, and I see that some people are very much in a hurry, and some people want to impose their views and opinions on others.

I also see that there are attempts to exert pressure on the people in the GDR in the interest of political parties and political considerations. You asked this question and provoked my answer. However, I hope that people in the GDR and the FRG will not interpret it as if I intended to interfere in their election campaign. On the contrary. I see how many visitors are coming from the Federal Republic and are interfering in the GDR's affairs, as if the GDR had ceased to be a sovereign state, and as if the GDR was not an independent, generally recognized state. However, let the Germans deal with that among themselves. I think that the people must thoroughly think about who they will vote for. In this phase it is particularly important that people are voted into parliaments, governments, and power organs who are able to bear responsibility and act responsibly in agreement with all other governments and nations.

Asked about the Soviet Union's future relations with a united Germany and whether these relations would be basically different from those with the FRG and the GDR, Gorbachev said:

"I believe, of course, that the relations will change. It is hard to imagine that they might not change. I commented on this issue in the talks I held with the Modrow government just now. I think that these relations hold out good prospects. However, that also depends, of course, on what our mutual relationship will be. Cooperation between us may expand and even deepen. However, it is also possible that mistrust will develop.

As for bilateral cooperation, I believe that both sides must act responsibly. We maintain very comprehensive relations with the socialist states; that has also been the case with the GDR and will continue to be so. We have very comprehensive relations with the West European countries, including the FRG. That, too, is very important. We do not want the interests of the Federal

Republic and the Soviet Union to suffer when and if unification comes about, which will encompass all areas, including the economic area. Looking at our common history, they know that the relations between Germany and Russia have a long history. There has always been some sort of cooperation, even though in some cases we have been taught a lesson. Above all, we must not forget what happened when fascism took power in Germany, and what consequences that had for all of us—for the Soviet people and for the Germans.

I think the fact that we have embarked on a trusting road and have placed our relations on a new basis, including cooperation in our bilateral interest and in the interest of the whole world, is an important achievement of both nations and both countries, and that must remain so. We, for our part, will do everything to make sure that it will remain so; however, in this respect, mutual interest plays a major role. The prospects are good. I see that the Germans from the Federal Republic, the businessmen, are highly interested. Unifying the intellectuals, the scientific forces, and the technical resources of our countries and nations can also be of advantage for our peoples. In this sense, I am very optimistic."

#### Yeltsin on German Unity, RSFSR Elections

LD0703153690 Hamburg DPA in German 1422 GMT  
7 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Munich (DPA)—According to the Soviet radical reformer Boris Yeltsin, a united Germany should decide on NATO or Warsaw Treaty membership if unity takes place faster than the dissolution of the blocs. "There should be no pressure from us," Yeltsin stressed in Munich today at a launch of his book "Against the Grain." However, he does not believe unification will take place "so quickly, within months." He was assuming the military blocs in Europe will cease to exist as a result of more far-reaching disarmament.

Following his success in the elections in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], Yeltsin will try for the office of RSFSR chairman if the reformers have a majority in the newly elected parliament. The former Moscow party boss stressed he will answer the question whether he could soon belong to a new Social Democratic Party only after the congress of people's deputies on 12-13 March. [passage omitted]

#### Yeltsin Book To Be Published in USSR

PM0803140590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
8 Mar 90 Morning Edition p4

[Own correspondent M. Zubko dispatch: "Visit to Stockholm"]

[Text] Stockholm—A press conference has been given at Stockholm's Foreign Policy Institute by B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Construction and Architecture Questions, who is here in

connection with the publication of his book "Against the Grain" ["Isproved na Zadannuyu Temu"] in Swedish on 5 March.

It was announced at the press conference that this book is simultaneously appearing in the bookstores of 15 countries. Essentially, the discussion of the book turned into a conversation between journalists and the author on the situation in the Soviet Union in general.

Your IZVESTIYA correspondent asked whether B.N. Yeltsin's book would be coming out in the Soviet Union and, if so, when. To this question he replied that "Against the Grain" is due to be published in the Baltic (in Russian), Leningrad, and Sverdlovsk.

#### **Kohl Visit to NATO Headquarters Reported**

LD0903100490 Moscow TASS in English 0854 GMT  
9 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Shashkov]

[Text] Brussels March 9 TASS—West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl visited NATO headquarters on Thursday where he held consultations with his allies on Germany's reunification.

He met NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner as well as the permanent representatives of NATO countries.

The content of the talks was not made public. However, local analysts believe that Kohl tried to calm down his partners, many of whom openly express apprehensions that agreement on Germany's reunification would be achieved without their opinions being taken into account and insist that all interested states should be involved in the talks.

Kohl also confirmed this at the end of the talks, saying that the interests of not only Germany but also of Germany's allies and neighbors in the East and West should be taken into account when settling the German question.

According to the chancellor, West Germany's partners in NATO and the Economic Community should not fear that a decision on reunification will be made behind their back.

Woerner noted that consultations with allies would be conducted parallel to the talks between West Germany, the German Democratic Republic and the four allied powers.

He stressed that the representatives of NATO member-states unanimously welcomed Germany's reunification and expressed satisfaction with a resolution approved by the Bundestag on Thursday.

The resolution says that the parliaments and the governments of the two German states should make statements on guarantees of existing Polish borders.

Woerner said that NATO member-countries also unequivocally favored the membership of a united Germany in NATO.

#### **Brutents Confers With UK Premier's Aide 23 Feb**

PM0103152590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
23 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Conversation Took Place"]

[Text] A conversation took place 22 February between K.N. Brutents, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, and P. Craddock, the British prime minister's special adviser on foreign policy.

Prospects for an all-European process in the context of problems of German-German relations were examined during the meeting.

#### **UK's Hurd on Cooperation With East Europe**

PM0203164090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
1 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Report from TASS, REUTER roundup: "D. Hurd for Developing Cooperation"]

[Text] British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd has come out in favor of developing the West's economic cooperation with the countries of Eastern Europe. Addressing representatives of business circles in London, the minister stressed that the EEC should respond constructively to the positive changes taking place in East European countries by giving them practical assistance and developing economic ties. The minister pointed to the enormous opportunities that are opening up for British and other West European companies in the markets of these states. D. Hurd did not rule out the possibility that in future the countries of Eastern Europe could become full members of the EEC. "I see no reason to prevent them from doing this after they have achieved full democracy and created a market economy," the minister said.

#### **UK Embassy Official Views Trade Prospects**

LD2602163590 Moscow TASS in English 1529 GMT  
26 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 26 TASS—The British business community is very enthusiastic about Soviet economic restructuring and wants to expand its activities on the Soviet market, economic adviser of the British Embassy in Moscow Don Brown told TASS.

Brown said that over 100 businessmen daily ask the British Ministry of Trade and Industry how to enter the Soviet market. They are especially interested in legal measures to rebuild Soviet economic structures, which will provide additional ways to expand bilateral trade relations and increase mutual goods turnover.

Britain uses various methods to develop business contacts with the USSR, Brown said. These are, for instance,

trade missions, which are organised monthly by the British-Soviet Trade Chamber.

Exhibitions are also very important, especially "British festivals in Moscow". The first festival of the kind was held last April in Moscow.

Next summer a similar event will be held in Kiev, including a month-long trade show and a cultural programme. Princess Anne is expected to open the festival and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is to visit it. A ten-year programme for the development of Anglo-Soviet cooperation will be signed during the festival.

Five British banks have opened credit lines for Soviet orders.

Last year's bilateral intergovernmental agreement on mutual investment protection is an important step forward. Brown believes that the agreement will be ratified.

The mixed intergovernmental commission on economic, scientific and technical cooperation is still significant. It has over ten working groups that consider topical areas of interaction. However, it is time to make the commission more flexible and receptive to current changes in the Soviet Union.

The sides are constantly looking for new forms of interaction. For instance, they have decided to build a British trade centre in Moscow. The British Government fully supports this project.

Trade relations are still hampered by the non-convertibility of the rouble, structural difficulties of Soviet exports, Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] restrictions and other factors. However, the Soviet market has huge potentials, which will be fulfilled in Soviet economic reform, Brown noted.

#### **UK Ambivalence on Nonproliferation 'Obvious'**

*LD0503154790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0430 GMT 5 Mar 90*

[Excerpts] Today it is 20 years since the agreement on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons came into force. [passage omitted]

What is the attitude to this document of the ruling circles of Britain? I put this question to our London correspondent Vsevolod Shishkovskiy.

[Begin Shishkovskiy recording] Britain, being one of the three depositing countries, from the beginning displayed considerable attention to the agreement and has done much to make it come into force and acquire those international law guarantees that it now has. In this respect our stand is practically identical with that of Britain.

But at the same time the ambivalence of London's position is obvious. On the one hand it indeed displays great interest in the continuation of the agreement so

that its guarantees can be strengthened and no other state can break it. But if one is to be entirely frank, one has to admit that such a position of London, and especially of Thatcher's Government, toward the agreement is largely determined by the needs of the Thatcherite policy itself. Its core as before remains reliance on nuclear forces and on Great Britain's independent nuclear deterrent. [end recording] [passage omitted]

#### **Consultations Held With Ireland on Cooperation**

*LD2002112690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0724 GMT 20 Feb 90*

[Text] Dublin 20 Feb TASS—Soviet-Irish consultations, held here, discussed the expansion of cooperation within the framework of the Helsinki process, including the holding in 1990 of a summit conference of countries—participants in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Participants exchanged views on the preparation of the Bonn conference on economic cooperation in Europe and the Copenhagen conference on the human dimension at the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The sides also discussed the development of relations between the USSR and West European intergovernmental institutions.

Taking part in the consultations on the Soviet side were Yu S. Deryabin, chief of the department for questions of security and cooperation in Europe [name and title as received] at the USSR Foreign Ministry, and on the Irish side P. Murphy, Irish deputy foreign minister. G.V. Uranov, USSR ambassador to Ireland, took part in the consultations.

#### **Soviet-Greek Shipping Commission Holds Meeting**

*LD1602145890 Moscow TASS in English 1100 GMT 16 Feb 90*

[Text] Athens February 16 TASS—The Ninth Session of the Mixed Soviet-Greek Commission for Sea Shipping was held here on February 12-15.

The sides discussed the state of bilateral cooperation and the implementation of the 1975 agreement between the Soviet and Greek Governments on merchant shipping.

The agreement suits both sides and promotes further improvement of relations between the two countries, speakers at the session pointed out.

The commission considered matters concerning two-way shipping and the chartering of ships from the two countries and pointed out that the scope of chartering operations considerably grew compared to the previous year.

A final document was adopted. The next session of the commission will take place in the Soviet Union.

### Talks Held With Spain on Latin American Problems

LD1602163490 Moscow TASS in English 1958 GMT  
15 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 15 TASS—Three-day Soviet-Spanish consultations on Latin American problems ended at the USSR Foreign Ministry today.

An exchange of opinions between Yago Pico de Coana, director-general of the Latin American Department of the Spanish Foreign Ministry, and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Komplektov showed concurrence of positions of the two countries on a broad range of regional problems, including those on a political settlement in Central America.

### Latin America & Caribbean

#### Castro Cited on Threat of 'War Against Cuba'

PM0803213590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
9 Mar 90 Second Edition p 7

[TASS report: "F. Castro Speech"]

[Text] Havana 8 Mar—Fidel Castro has addressed the closing session of the Fifth Federation of Cuban Women Congress. Although this took place on the eve of International Women's Day, the Cuban leader did not broach women's problems but instead devoted his speech to international issues.

Describing the processes taking place in the countries of East Europe, Castro declared that "The socialist camp no longer exists in fact." "What socialist camp can we speak of today? We can speak of the Soviet Union. Fortunately, it exists and is pursuing a consistent international policy; it is fighting for peace. The Soviet Union has not disintegrated and, we hope, will not disintegrate. No civil war has begun in the USSR and, we hope, it will not begin, although such a threat exists and is a completely real one."

We have recently been witnesses to yet another major historical lesson in connection with the Nicaraguan elections. An "unreal, absurd situation" has taken shape in that country, and in this connection the question arises of reexamining Cuban-Nicaraguan cooperation, of abandoning assistance to Nicaragua in certain spheres. As far as military cooperation is concerned, this is impossible.

The speaker stated that a new situation has now emerged which obliges Cuba to prepare itself for "a special period in peacetime," and in this instance the threat of the complete suspension of social programs will arise. We are living, the Cuban leader emphasized, in an exceptional period of history, when it is being decided whether the wave of counterrevolution will be able to sweep away the banners of revolution and socialism, and whether a war against Cuba will break out. And if this "special period" arrives, we will be able to prepare ourselves and stand our ground.

#### 'Vremya' Notes Cuban Concern Over Changes

LD0803211590 Moscow Television Service  
in Russian 1800 GMT 6 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report over video by correspondent Ye. Fateyev from Havana]

[Text] [video shows mass rally, interspersed with old newsreel clips of ship on fire, Castro addressing rally, funeral procession] Patria o muerte, Homeland or death; this slogan from the first years of the Cuban revolution is now resounding with renewed force throughout the country. The celebrations of the 30th anniversary of its proclamation have reached an unprecedented scale. This occurred at the beginning of March 1960 when Cuba bade farewell to the victims of a barbaric act of sabotage—explosions on the French ship "La Coubre" which was then moored at a wharf in the port of Havana with an important cargo of weapons and munitions. Over 80 lives were lost as a result of this monstrous operation which Cuba immediately laid at the door of the CIA.

On that sorrowful day 30 years ago Fidel Castro made an appeal to the whole Cuban nation: Patria o Muerte, Venceremos. Homeland or death, We shall be victorious. And now, before the start of a demonstration by young people devoted to the 30th anniversary of the slogan, Homeland and death, its participants were given factory-made headbands. Apart from the phrase Patria o muerte they have written on them the new appeal from the Cuban leadership: Socialism or death. Recently Cuba has taken upon itself the concern for defending socialism throughout the world, believing that the changes in the European socialist countries and in the USSR, too, are leading to the restoration of capitalism and to the forgetting of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. [video shows Fidel Castro addressing rally and then an interview with a young woman taking part in demonstration] Yes, now, as never before, we must be true to the cause of socialism and give no mercy to those who deviate from its ideology, (Theresa Idalopez) says.

[Studio presenter] Thus, the Cubans are unable to give up their principles. Well, it is no secret to us that people in Cuba have a negative attitude to many events and processes taking place in our country and in other countries of Eastern Europe. We know this and we even report some of the harsh utterances which are heard in Havana at times. But this does not prevent us from continuing to come out for the strengthening and development of Soviet-Cuban relations. Every people has the right to choose its path of development for itself.

#### Roa Criticizes UN Body's Anti-Cuban Resolution

PM0903110190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
9 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 1

[TASS, REUTER, UPI column report: "Cuba's Stance"]

[Text] Raul Roa, Cuban vice minister of foreign relations, has declared that the anti-Cuban resolution thrust upon the UN Human Rights Commission undermines the role



of this organization. "Countries which have always been on Cuba's side, such as Bulgaria, for instance, have been ensnared in the belief that the draft is not discriminatory. We thank them for their past support but consider it necessary to point out where the U.S. ruse has led. The case of Czechoslovakia and Poland which have joined the resolution as coauthors is a reflection of the political changes taking place there," he noted.

### Former Envoy Praises Relations With Cuba

PY1302162490 Moscow in Spanish to Cuba  
 0130 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Interview with Aleksandr Alekseyev, deputy chairman of the Soviet-Cuban Friendship Association—passages within quotation marks recorded in Russian fading into Spanish translation]

[Text] On 11 May the Soviet and Cuban peoples will commemorate the 30th anniversary of the reestablishment of Soviet-Cuban diplomatic relations. On the eve of this commemoration many comrades will come before the microphones of Radio Moscow. Among them will be Aleksandr Alekseyev, who is well known to Cubans. Aleksandr Alekseyev was Soviet ambassador to Cuba for six straight years and he is currently the deputy chairman of the Soviet-Cuban Friendship Association.

We have learned that Aleksandr Alekseyev is about to publish a book on Soviet-Cuban relations. We asked him to speak to our listeners on this book and the ideas he wishes to share with readers. Alekseyev accepted our proposal and we begin a series of talks with him today.

Aleksandr Alekseyev, deputy chairman of the Soviet-Cuban Friendship Association and former Soviet ambassador to Cuba, is in the Radio Moscow studios today:

"Good evening, dear Cuban friends: Although we are far away from each other, I am delighted to meet with you again. I am fortunate to have worked in Cuba for eight years [as heard] and to have been the first Soviet to arrive on the Isle of Freedom after the victory of the revolution. Those eight years were the happiest of my life.

"Except for the Spanish Civil War, I believe that no other event in the history of the world revolution awakened as much interest and sympathy in the Soviet people—who have been educated on the principles of internationalism—as what happened then on that faraway Caribbean island known in the USSR as the Isle of Freedom.

"Since I have followed the achievements of the Cuban revolution and have personally met Cuba's leaders, I have very fond memories of those exciting years.

"I have been an admirer and sincere friend of Cuba for 30 years. I have been toying with the idea of writing my memoirs for some time. I even had several offers from Soviet editorial houses. Although I already had a great deal of written material, this project had been postponed because of different issues. I just needed to organize this material and edit it."

Aleksandr Alekseyev says: "In the current era of glasnost, it is now time to publish these memoirs. You can see what I believe are irresponsible articles in some Soviet publications every once in a while. We even listen to statements made by some peoples deputies who, because they do not have all the information on the situation, whether they like it or not, distort the issues on Soviet aid to countries struggling for their independence, including Cuba.

"In view of this situation, I thought it necessary to be more expeditious in publishing the book. It (?is shocking) to hear the so-called street strategists, who, instead of understanding the different stages of international policy and who overlook the principles of the international proletariat, make efforts to blame all of our economic evils on the supply of Soviet aid to Soviet friends.

"They charge that the USSR is paying higher prices for Cuban sugar than international market prices. But they forget that the USSR does not pay in currency for Cuban sugar but in merchandise made with rubles.

"It must be noted that in 30 years of cooperation the USSR has received over 50 million tons of Cuban sugar. As a result the Soviet Union has not experienced a sugar shortage. Imagine how much currency we would have spent if we had had to buy sugar from other countries. We must also point out that during the first eight years, when I was ambassador to Cuba, the USSR bought Cuban sugar at a price slightly higher than in the international market but at a much lower price than what it would have cost to produce sugar in the USSR.

"The Soviet leader during that time, Nikita Khrushchev, understood this quite well, and in 1964 he proposed a 50-percent increase in prices. In other words, the sugar trade was advantageous to both countries. Of course, the United States put quotas on the purchase of Cuban sugar and paid higher prices on the international market, but Americans did not protest.

"Therefore, some statements and articles published in the Soviet press are the result of a lack of information. I have not yet discussed the benefits that the Soviet Union has reaped by purchasing other Cuban products like citrus, [words indistinct].

"We must admit that Cuba does owe a considerable amount of money to the USSR, but is there a country in the world that does not have a foreign debt? Even the USSR has a foreign debt."

Aleksandr Alekseyev states: "Fortunately, Soviet leaders have a different view of Soviet-Cuban trade and it is not up to the street strategists to design Soviet policy toward strengthening the unalterable Soviet-Cuban friendship.

"In my memoirs I would like to show that the establishment and strengthening of the Soviet-Cuban friendship is based on mutual benefits for the parties involved.

"I invite Cuban listeners to listen to excerpts of the book I am writing in upcoming programs. I am willing to answer any questions you may have. Send your questions to the Cuba section of Radio Moscow International."

## Supreme Soviet Session

### Armenians Oppose 5 Mar Supreme Soviet Decision

NC0803185890 Yerevan International Service  
in Armenian 1630 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] The third closed-door session of the USSR Supreme Soviet took place on 5 March, and the members discussed the situation in Azerbaijan and Armenia. A new draft resolution was presented to the people's deputies and it is exactly like the previous ones. Thus, the country's supreme legislative body again adopted a decision which, like its predecessors, will not be able to eliminate tension in the region. This is how the deputies corps of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] regard this decision.

An ARMENPRES reporter asked People's Deputy Sazonov, who voted against that decision, to clarify his position. He said that today the NKAO problem disturbs everybody. It is not a secret that even the most well-intentioned decisions are unacceptable to the people if they lack concrete and constructive measures. I think that the only correct solution is to temporarily subject the NKAO to the central government. On 28 November 1989 we heard the Azerbaijani leadership promising the Supreme Soviet that it would lift the blockade of Armenia within a month, yet we all know what happened to that promise.

People's Deputy Genrikh Igityan, commenting on the 5 March decision, said that the words and ideas are devalued to such an extent that they no longer have any practical applicability. If the decision includes no constructive proposals, then it would be meaningless to accept it. We do not believe that law and order will be established in the region; one cannot solve the NKAO problem with incomplete measures.

### Supreme Soviet Discusses Defense Conversion Plans

LD0803000190 Moscow TASS in English 2032 GMT  
7 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 7 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

The Supreme Soviet Defence and State Security Committee discussed on Wednesday the state programme of defense industry conversion for the period up to 1995 and approved its main provisions.

The programme envisages a considerable increase in the production of consumer goods and equipment for their production at the expense of reduced supplies of armaments and combat equipment.

Presenting the programme, First Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Committee Valentin Smyslov told the deputies that conversion will embrace more than 400 defence enterprises, or 40 per cent of their total number.

The conversion of the present and the creation of new facilities for civic production needs around 40 billion roubles in investments.

The programme focusses on social protection of workers at converted enterprises. It envisages subsidies to bolster wages, pensions and other allowances at levels prior to conversion.

These measures are designed to prevent possible work force fluctuations and retain highly-skilled and qualified people in the industry, to preserve the unique industrial and scientific potential and use it to create high-quality civic products.

During the debate, many deputies favoured more intensive exports of hi-tech products, including civil aircraft. Many questions were evoked by the proposals for balancing the programme with respect to material resources and for forecasting demand for certain groups of commodities.

The committee formed a specialised group to finalise the programme.

### Time Wasted at Supreme Soviet Session Lamented

PM0803151190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
8 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report from the Third Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet by IZVESTIYA parliamentary correspondents V. Dolganov and A. Stepovoy: "Now It Is Up to the Congress"]

[Text] At around 1600 hours on 6 March there was a burst of applause in the USSR Supreme Soviet chambers' hall of sessions, a rare event these days. A.I. Lukyanov, in the chair, addressed the parliamentarians:

"I congratulate you, the Law on Ownership has been adopted!"

One could appreciate and share the feelings of those present. Many years, if not decades late (who could calculate the time that has elapsed), we have at last obtained, following the Law on Land, another document which any rule-of-law state would have and which will enable us to embark on the establishment of new economic relationships that have nothing in common with the pie-in-the-sky "economical economy." The new laws will certainly affect social relations and the course of political reform in the country.

The law had a long and difficult birth. People's deputies talked about our society's need for it at their very first Congress. It took many months for the ideas of scholars and practical experts, politicians and many "ordinary" people to be embodied in the six sections and 34 articles of the USSR Law "On Ownership in the USSR."

Here is the result of the final vote on the draft law: Adding up the votes in both chambers, you have 350 deputies "for," three "against," and 11 abstentions. In

all, 364 parliamentarians. Not a very impressive attendance by our legislators at the birth of one of the most important laws for the future of perestroika? Indeed not, unfortunately. And we will return to this topic, as the USSR Supreme Soviet was forced to do at the last plenary session before the Congress of People's Deputies.

But more about that later.

### A Law Created for All

Believe me, this is no exaggeration. The new legal act considers all aspects of our production, public, and private life. In fact, when talking about the citizen, you should begin with his rights. For the first time we have in our body of legislation an act which, according to deputy K.D. Lubchenko, is not pure propaganda and sloganizing. The previous laws have not, as a rule, had any legal force and in the main have served to assert particular ideological principles.

There are, of course, defects and weak spots in it, and they were pointed out by people's deputies during the debate. But, by and large, the law (and very, very many parliamentarians said this) can and certainly will serve to increase the labor activity of people endowed with real proprietorial rights.

Judge for yourselves. For example, the articles in section two on "USSR Citizens' Ownership" imply that people will be increasing all their assets not only through income from participation in social production. You can now run your own business and invest in credit institutions and shares and other securities.

There is a very important entry that gives a citizen the exclusive right to take charge of his own talent for productive and creative labor and to exercise this right independently or on the basis of a labor contract.

A financial or material investment can be made in the property of an enterprise, peasant farm, or other business in which a person is working on contract. Most importantly, one can also participate in the distribution of profits and income. Finally, one can acquire the right to own a fully paid-for cooperative apartment, dacha, garage, or other structure or building or buy the apartment you and your family occupy in a state apartment block. After acquiring this property a citizen is free to do what he likes with it—sell it, bequeath it, lease it out...

New? Strange? Revolutionary? Yes. But it is a bloodless revolution, without upheavals; for people's sake, not for the sake of ideological dogmas. There are many such innovations in the Law on Ownership. Readers will soon be able to read the full text of the document and assess its merits.

As well as the law, a resolution was adopted on the procedure for enacting it. It also caused a great deal of argument in parliament, but in the end it was adopted with only three votes "against" and eight abstentions.

And 346 deputies were in favor of the law's coming into operation this July. In this connection the government was given a number of very important instructions. Above all, to prepare and submit for consideration by the Supreme Soviet several legislative acts ensuring the unconditional implementation of the Law on Ownership in the USSR.

And this is essential too: A document of such power and such significance for society must not be left without a mechanism for enacting it. As many people's deputies stressed both on 6 March and at previous sessions, the search for the mechanism must not be delayed a single day.

And that is not all either. The new law has to go through a ratification procedure at the upcoming extraordinary, third Congress of USSR People's Deputies. It was for that reason that the session participants also adopted a Supreme Soviet resolution "On the Draft USSR Law on Amendments and Additions to the USSR Constitution (Basic Law) on Questions of Ownership."

The path from conception to draft and then to the law itself has been hard and long, as has been said. And you can understand the chairman when he says: Laws on taxation, on the local economy, on the enterprise are too come. If we manage to cover them at the present session it will be a considerable step forward in the establishment of guarantees of the irreversibility of perestroika processes.

Two laws are not enough for that. It requires a whole package of functioning economic legal acts. Will it be possible to get them adopted? It all depends on the session participants themselves. On them alone. We, the voters, can wait, hope, give our elected representatives advice, and make suggestions. But only the deputies can turn our hopes into neat articles in documents which are to lead the entire country out of the impasse.

Whether we like it or not, we have to return to the topic of the effectiveness of every working minute in parliament. Particularly as some legislators have been extremely worried about the problem of late, whereas others appear to have forgotten about their basic obligations and duties as deputies.

### Who Is Playing Truant From the "School of Democracy?"

Scarcely had all the aforementioned documents been adopted at the 6 March plenary sitting, when deputy E.A. Pamfilova took the floor. Only the real stalwarts remain, she said, so I hope they will back my proposal: The results of Supreme Soviet attendance should be published in the press before the Congress of USSR People's Deputies begins and Congress rotation should be decided on that basis. Deputies have no moral right to work the way they are working at the moment. You cannot urge the people to enhance responsibility, order,

and discipline and talk about the moral condition of our society and, at the same time, show total disdain for the work of a deputy.

The proposal was backed and clarified by deputy N.M. Piryazeva. Indeed, the list of people neglecting their duties must be published. The voters in the okrugs are right to wonder why some deputies are not to be seen in the hall for weeks. And if they are not attending sittings, why are they not meeting with voters, working locally? All that is needed is a careful examination of the reason for the specific deputy's absence.

There were other calls for "disciplinary action" against those who appear to think that an election victory is the culmination of their political activity or are, perhaps, already worn out by the intolerable legislative burden. So how come a number of deputies who did not attend this week's sittings intend to work in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] parliament as well? Indeed, some of them have either gathered the requisite number of votes for yet another deputy's seat or have gone into a second round of voting.

However, as readers will have deduced from our recent reports, sometimes a quorum has had to be scraped together even in the country's parliament. The committee sittings, both before and during the session, have rarely been attended by all the listed deputies.

Summing up the proposals on what is, to be frank, a problem we should be ashamed of (we are not talking about lackadaisical first-years in a secondary school, after all, but about the country's supreme legislative organ), A.I. Lukyanov agreed with the speakers. He even advocated holding a special Supreme Soviet sitting after the Congress. A session that is not provided for either in the priority items or in the other items and points on an already busy session-approved agenda.

Not counting holidays and the Congress, the parliament has already used up exactly half of the time allotted for the third session. But, to be frank, not as much has been achieved as the situation in the country requires.

#### Words, and More Words...

Deputies, analyzing the effectiveness of their work, also spoke more than once about the failure of many of the debate participants to observe the standing orders and the norms of parliamentary ethics. Is it really necessary after two readings in the Supreme Soviet and careful elaboration in its committees and commissions to waste several more sessions on pointless verbal skirmishes? And all because someone did not take the time to attend a committee session where literally every letter and comma was debated from morning till late into the night. Or because certain people have not "excelled" in front of the television cameras for some time and try to get a vote on articles that have already been voted on, forcing comrades yet again to prove self-evident truths that have been grasped by virtually everyone.

It has become a sad tradition that the chairman of a specific committee has to reply to numerous questions from the floor as follows: "During the finalization of the document this amendment was not submitted in either written or verbal form. Comrades! This is no way to work!" And how much time the people chairing plenary sessions have to waste in order to explain again and again provisions of draft laws which have been formulated clearly enough and have, moreover, been discussed and "chewed over" from all angles for hours.

During the third session, we encountered another unpleasant phenomenon. Everyone probably recalls the episodes when both M.S. Gorbachev and A.I. Lukyanov had to bluntly caution individual deputies to stop trying to hold up the discussion of laws which we are all waiting for. Is the officially recognized opposition likely to achieve a great deal and retain its prestige in people's eyes for long if it chooses as its tactic overt or poorly veiled torpedoing of enactments which its members advocated only yesterday in their efforts to gain this prestige? If we really are close to political pluralism, then this question has to be answered honestly. And one incontrovertible fact ought to be taken into consideration: Since there is nothing left to destroy in our house, why not adopt a constructive attitude at last.

In our view, among the unquestionable "impediments" which have hampered the work of the past two sessions (and also that of the Congresses) and the current debates is the very persistent bent for strident, rally-type declarations "on behalf of the entire people." Loud calls which were by no means conducive to the people's peace of mind also rang out at the last plenum before the session.

For example, a deputy who fails to introduce himself and features in the stenographic record as a "question from the floor" asks: Are certain comrades not trying to incorporate in the law the possibility of the exploitation of the working man and to avoid any mention in the law of our state being a socialist state? While another session participant makes the umpteenth attempt to start a polemic around the "loopholes left for the sharks of the 'shadow economy'." And a third expresses indignation: No one has consulted the people...

And so precious minutes, hours, and days have been lost without a trace. Let me remind you, that the time we have left equals the time we have used up.

#### Courtesy Is Always Mutual

The Commission for Questions of Parliamentary Ethics, which has just been set up, is yet to draw up its statutes and principles of work. However, you get the impression that it will not be short of work. All too often arguments and altercations turn into mutual recriminations and even insults. Deputies A.A. Sobchak and F.M. Burlatskiy will once again accuse each other of ignorance of legal norms.



Or deputy D.G. Smirnov takes the floor and while submitting a proposal that is, on the whole, businesslike, he suddenly, as if in passing, drops an unethical remark about a government establishment. He is pulled up by the chairman, and deputy N.N. Engver apologizes on behalf of his colleagues to L.I. Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, for his colleague's indelicacy.

I must request that it be not Deputy Engver who apologizes for someone else, but that the previous speaker summon up enough courage to admit that he has insulted staffers of a state organ sanctioned by the USSR Supreme Soviet and has cast aspersions on a vast collective of the State Planning Committee by accusing its staffers of loafing and describing the organ as bureaucratic, the deputy head of the government said.

Unfortunately, L.I. Abalkin himself did not set the best example of ethical conduct when he argued that "What a journalist or a writer on current affairs who has no responsibility toward the people or voters can permit himself, is not permissible for a people's deputy."

Incidentally, D.G. Smirnov apologized without delay. But the question remains: To whom are the "journalists and writers on current affairs" unjustly accused of irresponsibility (once again in the name of the people) to appeal to? After all, we have no access to parliamentary microphones...

#### The Array of Committees Grows

During the third session the question was raised of the need to establish another body of the Supreme Soviet. The rise in crime in the country demands the special attention of a special parliamentary organ. A new committee—for questions of combatting crime—was formed 6 March. It is an "offshoot" of the Committee for Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order. None of the deputies objected to the establishment of the committee, and Deputy Yu.V. Golik became its chairman.

The youngest head of a standing parliamentary body is 38 years old. He is a lawyer by training, a Russian, and a member of the CPSU. Prior to his election to the Supreme Soviet he worked as dean of the Kemerovo State University Law Faculty. He managed to make a name for himself both by his contribution to the committee's work and his active participation in the parliamentary investigation of the so-called "Gdlyan-Ivanov Case."

#### Beyond the Agenda

There was a temptation to engage in a serious discussion here of the various kinds of appeals with which various groups of citizens continue to bombard the Supreme Soviet in an attempt to influence the decisions under discussion. Incidentally, there was a debate on this subject, and a very heated debate at that.

However, we came to the conclusion that this is a topic for a separate article. And we decided to back the chairman's initiative when he asked all the men present in the hall to congratulate the women deputies, who have a heavy burden to bear, on International Women's Day 8 March by getting to their feet. The press gallery applauded sincerely and ardently all of them together, and Yevdokiya Aleksandrovna Gayer, whose birthday falls on this day, in particular.

And so the questions which were to be considered before the opening of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies have been dealt with. Many committees and commissions continued their work on the eve of the holiday and the scheduled rest-days, including the commission in charge of organizing and running the Congress. Ahead of us are the crucial days of the Congress.

### Political & Social

#### BBC TV Interviews Ligachev, Other Officials

PM0603153090

[Editorial Report] London BBC Television Network in English at 1800 GMT on 4 March carries a 75-minute report by Jonathan Dimbleby, "Russia at the Rubicon." The report comes from Yaroslavl on the day of local and regional elections and includes statements from various political and economic leaders on the deepening crisis. Dimbleby apparently interviewed these leaders earlier; edited clips from the interviews, in Russian with English subtitles, are used where relevant. In addition, the screen shows printed quotes from Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, which Dimbleby reads to introduce or sum up the subject discussed.

Vadim Medvedev, CPSU Politburo member and Central Committee secretary, tells Dimbleby: "What has happened in the past 18 months is not just a matter of shortages: It's more a kind of disintegration, a destabilization of the market." Yegor Ligachev, CPSU Politburo member and Central Committee secretary, states: "The situation is very serious politically, economically, and socially. I think that the program we have put forward will—to a certain extent, possibly temporarily—permit us to remove the tensions and reinforce our positions. But all hangs on how our society starts to function." Nikolay Petrakov, introduced as "newly appointed personal economic adviser to President Gorbachev," says: "We are at a turning point, an historic moment. I would never have believed it three years ago. And the question now is how the party can function in these new conditions. This means the people leading the party will have to think quite differently." Dimbleby quotes Gorbachev from the Party Congress in 1986: "V/e shall not be able to move a single step forward if we do not learn to work in a new way, do not put an end to inertia and conservatism in any of their forms, if we lose the courage to assess the situation realistically and see it as it actually is."

Academician Otto Latsis, introduced as "an influential economist with close links to key members of the Politburo" talks about the new cooperatives: "To understand what has happened to the market, we must remember that the reforms so far have been half-measures, or even less than that. We have a situation where people have money: They can work harder and earn more. But it's still the state—not the market—that determines whether their work is needed." Dimbleby points out that the state still controls 98 percent of the national economy and that "the law of supply and demand is virtually irrelevant, and the consequence—according to Gorbachev's reformers—is a catastrophe for the consumer." Latsis goes on: "People are producing goods they themselves don't need and being paid money which they don't much need either because there's nothing to buy with that money, so there has been a panic-stricken growth in demand. This is a particular phenomenon of a distorted market, of a collapsed market: People are grabbing things they don't really need. There are huge stocks of washing powder in people's homes but none in the shops. There is a fantastic degree of speculation. Prices are insane—even in the co-ops that are honestly run—and then there are masses of thieves and bribe-takers, so the customers become indignant and ask: 'What's going on here? We can do without this.' They don't understand that the co-ops are not to blame—it's the state. If the whole economy were market-led, then this speculation would not occur."

Academician Vladimir Tikhonov, Supreme Soviet people's deputy and "chairman of the cooperative movement," tells Dimbleby: "The co-ops already form the basis of a free market in our economy, and it is precisely for this reason that the state monopolies attack them: They're antagonists, irreconcilable enemies." Dimbleby asks: "So there is full-scale war between the two?" Tikhonov answers: "It is not a bloody, but an economic war; but the state is actively trying to stifle the cooperatives."

Dimbleby reports that "the most desperate and humiliating failure of the Soviet system was in agriculture—in the production of the means of survival." Again he quotes Gorbachev—this time from the 1985 party plenum: "The task is to make the most of all the resources for increasing food production at collective and state farms and on individual citizens' smallholdings.... So, comrades, we ought to step up our work on fulfilling the food program." Tikhonov says: "Whether we can revive the agricultural economy depends on whether we can resurrect the peasant from among the hired laborers or semi-serf workers of today's state and collective farms. Some people say we can't solve this problem because the farm workers don't want to acquire their own land. I think that is just empty phrases. You must understand this: A collective farm chairman or a state farm director is the landowner of our day. He enjoys total power over the land and the people in his village, and he doesn't want to lose his position as overlord." txt

Ligachev says of collective farms: "Well now, what's the mildest way I can phrase it? To label our collective farm managers as landowners and the agricultural workers as serfs! If they were to hear that with their own ears, they would be very angry and indignant. They'd rise up! It's an insult to everyone, to every peasant. I should know: I'm in the villages much more than Academician Tikhonov. I know the peasants." Petrakov adds: "Very few people here understand the idea of the market, and even fewer can imagine living in market conditions. And you see, this is not only a problem of totalitarian power: It's also a problem that the people have become parasites. The entire population has come to believe that the state must give them everything. No tyrant ever taught a peasant how he should plow, how he should sow, and how he should bring in the harvest. It was the Communist Party that decided it knew everything. It began to decree when the sowing should be done, when the harvest should be gathered, and then the peasant said: 'Fine, now feed me.'"

Dimbleby comments: "If the draft law on land reform is finally approved, it will allow property to be leased and passed from one generation to the next, but the outright purchase of land is not permitted. The next logical step—a central tenet of an effective free market—is that one individual should be allowed to hire the labor of another. For the old guard this notion is tantamount to blasphemy." Ligachev responds: "If the party advances that point of view, I shall disagree on principle. I shall fight, try to prove and convince them, because for me, it's a matter of principle. It's a question of mode of production, of our way of life: That's what I shall do." Dimbleby asks: "And this is a big fundamental question which is going to be the source of a big political battle?" Ligachev states emphatically: "Absolutely right." Dimbleby: "And if you lose?" Ligachev fiddles with his earphone. Dimbleby repeats the question: "And if you lose?" Ligachev says: "Then I shall fight my case outside the party."

Commenting on the open economy, Petrakov states: "I am in favor of an open economy in the Soviet Union, being part of the world division of labor and the world economy, and belonging to all international economic organizations." Dimbleby says: "That means that you will have to ensure that the price mechanism is much more closely related to the real market. Is that an urgent priority for you?" Petrakov answers: "Yes, I believe that one of the serious tasks we must tackle is indeed the problem of moving to flexible market prices, balancing supply and demand." Dimbleby asks: "So it is a tight-rope you have to walk?" Petrakov replies: "Yes, of course, and it is particularly interesting to walk a tight-rope." Dimbleby asks: "And how much time do you have before you have to get to the other end of the tight-rope?" Petrakov says: "Without falling off?" Dimbleby: "How much time?" Petrakov answers: "I think we have two and a half years, but if we are to take great risks, we might do it in a year. But then we might fall off." Ligachev says: "It would really be a serious shock. If you

only look at the problems which have been tackled, the unprepared transition to market relations would, I deeply believe, bring about the suffering of millions of people. We need to build on what we've already achieved and only move forward when the conditions are right, otherwise all these leaps and jumps can only lead to disaster. I'm quite sure of that." Tikhonov tells Dimbleby: "Our crisis is going to be long drawn out, but sooner or later, these ideas will become reality." Dimbleby says: "They have to be?" Tikhonov replies: "It is not so much that they have to, but that they will become a reality. It is quite another thing that reaching our goals may be fraught with major cataclysms. There could be bloodshed and violence: Anything could happen. But one way or another, the world is proceeding along a single path—the path of increased freedom for humanity. This means free enterprise. I'm convinced of this."

Dimbleby goes on to talk about politics and Gorbachev's plea for the powers of an executive presidency—eventually to be elected by the people with an early "interim" election by congress. Deputy Boris Yeltsin remarks: "The conservative forces are gathering strength, so we should not introduce presidential powers quickly. We need to think through the issues first: There is the issue of impeachment and how to make the president answerable for his errors and what limitations we should place on his power. There is also the need to strengthen legislative power, and all that this entails." Dimbleby asks: "Otherwise, what would be the consequences?" Yeltsin answers: "If individual presidential power is very strong, and if parliamentary legislative power doesn't grow, then the consequences could be dictatorship: too much power in one pair of hands. We've had enough examples of that already."

Next Dimbleby discusses the multiparty system and the possibility of the party's "leaving the center stage." Medvedev tells Dimbleby: "There is no question of this at present. Both our own assessments and those of other observers testify that there is no other social force in our society at present which could both head perestroika and somehow lead society forward." Dimbleby tells him: "Of course, you'll be fighting very hard for the party, but if the constitution allows the existence of other parties, presumably it will create the circumstances in which those other parties could—I don't say 'will'—could replace the Communist Party if the Communist Party doesn't satisfy the popular demands." Medvedev answers: "Yes, purely hypothetically, this supposition is possible, but we are dealing with real political processes. This is what we are analyzing. I think it is necessary to reply to your questions by expressing my opinion thus: At the moment there is no real possibility of things' turning out like this. No, it's impossible. But, of course, the automatic way before—under the old system of safeguarding the party's role—this can't go on. The party must work more energetically and more actively—including when it enters into dialogues with other political forces in the country."

"Others, and especially the radicals," Dimbleby says, "are now convinced that the multiparty state is all but a fait accompli." Dimbleby asks Yuriy Afanasyev, Supreme Soviet deputy and rector of the State Archive Museum: "Do you believe, then, that the Communist Party as it exists is in the process of inevitable collapse—that that is what we are now seeing?" Afanasyev answers: "Of course, it's not just inevitable—it's already collapsing. In fact, it's already collapsed, and it no longer exists as a party. In real terms the CPSU still exists—in the form of the leaders of the party and the government: That much is clear. It exists in the form of the apparatus, but it doesn't exist as an alliance of like-minded people, because the 19 million members of the CPSU are people who adhere to the most diverse political and social attitudes. They have their own names, their own interests. Already there is nothing which unites them in these things." Boris Yeltsin says: "Everything will depend on the decisions of the 28th Party Congress. If it draws up radical measures on the party's renewal, on the possible formation of factions—various platforms with their own structures—then this will somewhat delay the transition to a multiparty system; otherwise, the party will simply split and new parties will be created. Many people who are today in the ranks of the CPSU will pour into them." Dimbleby asks him: "Can you, Mr Yeltsin, imagine forming such a new party yourself?" Yeltsin smiles and says: "I consider this to be a provocative question." He raises his eyebrow and continues to smile as Dimbleby says: "It's an invitation." Yeltsin, still smiling, nods and says: "Thank you for the invitation." Dimbleby asks: "You don't accept it?" Yeltsin replies: "I'm not refusing it."

Yaroslavl CPSU First Secretary Igor Tolstoukhov tells Dimbleby: "I think that we must retain the Leninist conception of the party's role as a vanguard in society, but we must also gather round our party all the progressive parties which support perestroika and the renewal of our society on socialist principles."

Dimbleby considers various groups and individuals participating in the coming election, including an archbishop of the Russian Orthodox Church, whose appeal is for nationalism. Ligachev tells Dimbleby: "Of course, the Russian patriot starts to figure things out about the present and the future. Indeed, there are hotheads who think that Russia should leave the Soviet Union!" Dimbleby asks: "The Russian people are feeling their Russian-ness, is what you're saying?" "Yes," says Ligachev. "I think so. Just as I should think the English feel English, so the Russians feel Russian—that sense of pride and dignity that belongs to a nation." Dimbleby asks: "And if the Russian people are feeling either threatened or treated with contempt, that feeling can become more powerful with potentially dangerous consequences: That's your concern?" Ligachev says: "There's no doubt about it, no doubt. That is absolutely true: There is that danger."

Dimbleby ends the report by saying: "The great question now is whether Mikhail Gorbachev can hold the line and save the Soviet Union from itself."

After the report comes a studio panel discussion in English live from Moscow. The following is a text of the discussion:

[Dimbleby] So where does the Soviet Union go from here? With me now: Academician Yevgeniy Velikhov, the most famous nuclear physicist in the Soviet Union, a member of the Supreme Soviet Commission on Defense and Security, a close friend and key adviser to President Gorbachev. Professor Aleksey Shulus is an economist from the Institute of the Trade Union Movement. He's known here as a prominent conservative, a Marxist-Leninist who is a critic of the reform program of President Gorbachev, but who regards himself not as a conservative but as a man of the left, a radical. Sergey Stankevich is a leading radical, ally of Boris Yeltsin, and a deputy in the People's Congress, and a member of the Supreme... of the Soviet Commission on Legislation. Yuriy Boyars is a deputy from Latvia in the Supreme Soviet, where he's a member of the Commission on Nationalities. He's a leading advocate of independence for the Baltic States.

If I could ask you, first, Sergey Stankevich: These elections—something like three quarters of the Soviet people have been voting today if you include in the Ukraine, Belorussia, as well as Russia—the reports are that there's a certain amount of apathy about these elections. How significant are they in your judgment?

[Stankevich] You see, I think that this electoral campaign is more important than the previous one when we people's deputies of the USSR were elected. During electoral campaign we had last year democratic forces in this country have achieved only limited success: We managed to create the first parliamentary opposition in the history of the Soviet Russia since 1917, and now the stakes are much higher. We created an electoral block called "Democratic Russia." It is not new political party, but it is something quite close to it. We cannot prevail throughout Russia, but we can win elections in certain central industrial cities; and I think that using these liberated regions, we can start further expansion of economic, political, and social democracy in our country.

[Dimbleby] How important do you judge them to be, Aleksey?

[Shulus] Well, I think that the very future of this country is at stake today, and for me as an economist, the crucial question is to be decided in this election: whether the transition to a free market system is to be sped up or whether the course of perestroika in the economy would be changed drastically in order to find the right combination of plan and market and to avoid the social unrest.

[Dimbleby] And these very elections can help determine that decision, because whether or not the radicals—or

what are called the conservatives—emerge in the superior position at the end of them will condition what happens.

[Shulus] Yes, exactly.

[Dimbleby] Thank you. Yuriy Boyars, for you from Latvia, looking at these elections: How important are they for you?

[Boyars] Well, I think that those elections are as important for Latvia as for Russia, for example. But we are very much concerned with the fact that the new parliament in Latvia would be very complicated—both in the demographic aspect and in the aspect of political field. Because we think that many radicals will be there; some—many, even—conservatives will be there. And thus the center—maybe the most stable part of the new parliament—will be weakened. And this may create... we're very much afraid of having a, say, very destabilized parliament, very much confronting parliament: This is what we are afraid of.

[Dimbleby] Thank you. Academician Velikhov, for you the significance of today's elections?

[Velikhov] First of all, this is the first real election in our history, and from down to the level—and this is very important part in transformation of the power system from party power to the Soviets, to the people. Of course, I am not 100 percent happy with the organization of the election because I think it is some apathy—some connected with the very complicated election—because we elected from local soviet, municipal soviet, to the republic authority...

[Dimbleby interrupts] And there is a huge list of names...

[Velikhov interrupts] Huge, yes...

[Dimbleby] That people can choose from without really knowing a great deal about what those individual names represent.

[Velikhov] Yes, the last radio told it's like 55-60 percent of people going to the polls.

[Dimbleby] Now, in this turmoil that there is in the Soviet Union at the moment... and these elections, the results of which will be known over the next few days, will give us some guidance. However, they will not in any way affect the decision made by President Gorbachev—and likely to be approved by the People's Congress—that he should become an executive president of the Soviet Union with enormous powers. Sergey Stankevich, you and others—Boris Yeltsin only yesterday said that this could create a Stalin in Russia, referring to Mr Gorbachev—why are you so fiercely opposed, under the conditions of the Soviet Union at the moment, to such an election?

[Stankevich] First of all, we support the introduction of a presidency in this country. It was our idea—and I mean our idea of opposition group: But our main idea was to



reinforce executive power in this country, because we do feel a real lack of executive power. But we can introduce a presidency only on certain conditions: One of the most important conditions is that we should have a strong parliament as a counterbalance to presidential power. We should have all forms of legislative control over the presidency.

[Dimbleby] And otherwise you fear—as Mr. Yeltsin was saying in our film—you fear a dictatorship could emerge?

[Stankevich] Maybe not directly dictatorship, but a quite authoritarian presidency—imperial presidency.

[Dimbleby] Why, Academician Velikhov, was it necessary, when apparently the president believes in the principle of one person, one vote, to put through very quickly, without a clear framework—a process which would give him enormous executive power, with the power to suspend the constitution for four years?

[Velikhov] This is the... if you're looking on this not as the static situation but as a process, we're in the very critical moment because before this, you know, all the main decisions in the economy... not only economical, but I mean foreign policy, military, security—all these decisions made by Politburo. Today, Politburo lost this power, and we need to keep this system working.

[Dimbleby] Does this mean that there is a clear transfer of power from the party to the states?

[Velikhov] Yes. I give you an example... an example: We waiting for long time for establish the so-called defense council, but defense council not fit in the... It was idea to make a defense council close to the Supreme Soviet, but defense council not fit to the legislative power—it is part of the executive power.

[Dimbleby] But would you accept the charge that the risk is that President Gorbachev could end up giving himself enormous dictatorial power, which would have no real mandate from the people whatsoever.

[Velikhov] You see, the totalitarian or dictatorial power is not connected with presidency. Stalin was not president: It was completely different mechanism. And in the constitutional situation—when we going to the real state of law—I think, we have no such chance.

[Dimbleby] So his fears are ungrounded—Mr. Stankevich's fears are ungrounded.

[Velikhov] No, not completely ungrounded, because I think we need to organize: If you're looking for long time, we need to organize a balance between executive and legislative power. But I not see... I see the problem today to transfer the power from Politburo to the president is much more urgent, and this process is longer.

[Dimbleby] As a Marxist-Leninist—I don't say necessarily of the old school—but Aleksey Shulus, you presumably view with abhorrence this process of the transfer of power from the party to the state in this way.

[Shulus] Well, for me, the crucial question is now: Why the presidency is being introduced in the... at that very moment. And I... as I understand, it is because of Gorbachev's desire to speed up the economic reforms. Even the supporters of free market system admit that in this country 80 percent of population are against the free market system, because for them it means unemployment, inflation, and the differentiation of people. So to make these reforms go rapidly, you need a very strong presidential power.

[Dimbleby] But do you oppose that from your perspective: Are you against this increase in presidential power?

[Shulus] Well, I would say that I'm not against the presidential power in principle, but my attitude towards Gorbachev as a president depends on whether he's going to pursue the same course in the economy or whether he's going to change the course drastically towards the interests of the working people.

[Dimbleby] And you'll be alarmed if the consequence of this is a drastic economic reform of the kind that his advisers in the film were talking about.

[Shulus] Yes, I'm afraid of this.

[Dimbleby] Yuriy Boyars, from the Latvian perspective, do you welcome or do you dislike the acquisition of these powers by the president?

[Boyars] Well, in principle, neither am I against the presidency, but if you remember early any philosopher in the world, for example, Spinoza: If you give supreme power to any person, you never know how he will dispose with this power. And the most difficult thing in that aspect is—as Madison taught us—how to balance and counterbalance the supreme power of the president with the really high power of the legislative body and the supreme court or in our system, the commission of the constitutional control.

[Dimbleby] But does it hold within it the seeds of frustration for your urge for independence or not?

[Boyars] Well, it could endanger, to a very great extent, our independence, because according to the paragraph No. 127.2.15, the powers of the president—in extraordinary powers—would to a very great extent impede on the powers of the... on the legislative powers of the supreme... of sovereign republics.

[Dimbleby] Can you imagine circumstances, Academician Velikhov, in which the president would exercise those supreme powers that he has to prevent the Baltic Republics—or indeed, other republics—from going absolutely independent? Could you imagine those circumstances?

[Velikhov] No, I think not.

[Dimbleby] Not even if they said: We want to do it much faster than is being recommended by the president? You would still say: "Okay, you do it"?

[Velikhov] Of course, it is not so simple process.

[Dimbleby] No, I know that: That's why I asked the question.

[Velikhov] But, I think it is not the goal, and my feeling is—as I know Gorbachev for many years—it is not his goal to use such type of power to prevent political developments.

[Dimbleby] Now, is that reassuring for you—that the academician says that?

[Boyers] Well, if nonuse of power is a case, so that's okay, absolutely okay, because our model is—or at least my model is—a free person, a free human being in a free society in a free republic; a free republic in a free union; a free union of republics. That would be the model. Okay, union of free republics.

[Dimbleby] Now this debate about the presidency is happening in the context of another even more complicated question, which is the emergence, potentially, of multiparties in the Soviet Union at a rate much faster than many people had ever imagined. Can I ask you, Sergey Stankevich: What one can see as an outsider is the possibility of a series of entirely incoherent political parties emerging—a nationalist party here and there, varieties of social democratic party—none of which would be able to combine together to form a big enough grouping to have an adequate mandate to say, "we can now take power in the Soviet Union." Do you recognize that that is a likely prospect?

[Stankevich] Yes, I think that the process of creation of new parties will be accelerated during this year, and I think that one of the most important parties in the nearest future will be the social democratic party. And maybe we can anticipate that a green party, peasant party, and new working class party can appear in maybe two or three years.

[Dimbleby] But my point is that it could also bring great democracy but considerable political chaos.

[Stankevich] Yes, I think that they can bring new level of democracy, but until they have enough experience, they can produce some difficulties. But it's inevitable. Let us learn the democracy—and the only reliable way to learn democracy is to practice democracy.

[Dimbleby] Professor Shulus, were you struck by what Ligachev said when he said... when he didn't like the idea of the extension of the free market to the point where one person would be able to hire the labor of another: If I lose this debate—and he recognized it was going to be a real battle—I'll fight from outside the party. Were you struck by that comment?

[Shulus] No, frankly I was not struck by this because I agree with Yuriy Afanasiev, who is my political opponent, that there is no such a single party now as CPSU, that is, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. I view...

[Dimbleby interrupts] There is ... let me get... there is no such party: People will remember what Afanasiev said—there is no such party except in the form of a shell.

[Shulus] Yes, yes. Formally it still exists, but actually within this party, we have at least two wings, two major wings...

[Dimbleby interrupts] And you're speaking now as a Marxist-Leninist who believes absolutely that the free market in the Western sense is unattractive; that the Communist Party ought to have the guiding role—and you're saying that you expect the party to split in two with all the social democratic consequences that we we're just hearing about?

[Shulus] Yes, so just... I want to say that I don't deny the very important role of the market within our economy, so the point I am trying to stress is that we must find the right combination of the plan guidance economy and the market mechanisms integrated into this plan market economy. And... but the problem is: So should the priority be given to the plan or to the market? I think this is the line where the division is between the two wings within our Communist Party now.

[Dimbleby] Now let us suppose that the Party—as you imagine it will do—does split this summer, which is when the next, the 28th Congress is, that it does split because these are irreconcilable differences, and you get a combination of a Communist Party and a social democratic party. You can conceive that the consequence of that could be the emergence of the social democratic party, with your version of the leading role of the Communist Party disappearing into the dustbin of history?

[Shulus] Yes. So I'm against paragraph 6 of our constitution: I think that the leading role should not be constitutionally...

[Dimbleby interrupts] But it's... but that's already gone, that's already gone?

[Shulus] Yes, yes. No, not yet. So the... it was decided in the last plenum of the Central Committee that this question would be presented to the...

[Dimbleby interrupts] People's Congress.

[Shulus] People's Congress, yes...

[Dimbleby interrupts] But there's not much doubt about what's going to happen there, is there?

[Shulus] Yes, yes, I'm sure, but formally this article still exists.

[Dimbleby] But what you're recognizing is that you could end up absolutely in the minority, that you may not be able to stop yourself as a traditional communist ending up—I don't say it of you personally, but politically—in the dustbin.

[Shulus] Well, what I want to say is that I really agree that the social democratic party is going to be formed, yes. So, for me, personally, there is no difference between the reformists, let us say, within the party and the so-called radicals: I think they are the single block, and all these quarrels over the presidency, I just don't view them as serious ones. I think it's like a family quarrel which won't last long.

[Dimbleby] But that's very interesting, because what I read that to mean—and I'm going to put... ask Academician Velikhov about this—what we're hearing here is in effect what President Gorbachev is going to do down the road, is become part of the social democratic party that will be created after the break in the Communist Party. Is that what you imagine happening?

[Velikhov] First of all, I think is from my point of view, we need... it is very good if we have... very important to have some stable situation. In which case I am very afraid of 60 parties, like you say, and the division of party by worker, peasant. It is not the... I think it's much more important to have two strong parties like, and divided by some very...

[Dimbleby interrupts] Now, which of these two... now, you say you're a close friend of the president, and everyone knows it's true...

[Velikhov] No, I am... No, excuse me. First of all...

[Dimbleby interrupts] A good friend...

[Velikhov] It's too much...

[Dimbleby interrupts] A good friend...

[Velikhov] I work for him, but he has the same connection with many scientists...

[Dimbleby interrupts] Right, but my question to you is: Given the views held by that wing of the party, as represented by Professor Shulus, and the views of the social democrats which might emerge from the split, into which side do you reckon President Gorbachev will step?

[Unidentified voice] A serious question.

[Velikhov] Yes, it's not easy. You know his status, and in the party platform... you see, the democratic platform is in many cases very close to the official party platform, which is—maybe it is better wording, better language—but it's very close. And I'm looking for what is happens after all this discussion and development of platform and party before the 28th Congress.

[Dimbleby] We are at an extraordinary...

[Stankevich] We hope to have Gorbachev on our side.

[Dimbleby] And you don't expect to have him on your side, do you?

[Shulus] Well, frankly, it's a mystery for me where Gorbachev will be, because at the second Congress of People's Deputies, he pledged he was a real communist.

[Dimbleby] Let me ask you briefly—because we are at an extraordinary moment five years on: Do you think Gorbachev is going to be there in five years' time? Briefly, Professor Shulus?

[Shulus] Well...

[Dimbleby interrupts] In a word...

[Shulus] Though I'm an atheist, I pray God Gorbachev turn the perestroika towards the interests of working people.

[Dimbleby] Do you expect him to survive, Yuriy Boyars?

[Boyars] Well, I expect so, but you know, for example, in our republic, situation is other: We have canceled paragraph No. 6 already.

[Dimbleby] Which means that you reject that...

[Boyars interrupts] We have created a multiparty system already. It functions.

[Dimbleby] Is he going to still be there, Sergey Stankevich?

[Stankevich] Yes, I think that in five years we shall see Gorbachev as head of a coalition government.

[Dimbleby] And Academician Velikhov, what do you think?

[Velikhov] I'm from science: Science have nothing to do with the future—it's a religion.

[Dimbleby] You're not a futurologist, and you're not going to predict?

[Velikhov] No.

[Dimbleby] Gentlemen, thank you very much for a piece of fascinating glasnost. And now for the end of the fifth anniversary of the first five years of President Gorbachev's rule in the Soviet Union, with our look forward to the next five years, from Moscow, goodnight.

#### Danish Paper Interviews Boris Yeltsin

PM2302152490 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE  
SONDAG in Danish 18 Feb 90 p 5 (MAGASIN section)

[Report on undated interview with USSR Supreme Soviet Deputy Boris Yeltsin by Flemming Rose: "The Soviet Union's Lonely Frontline Fighter"]

[Text] Moscow—Boris Yeltsin is a busy man. He has not had a single day off in the last five months. At present he is involved in a tough election campaign to become the

new president of the Russian Soviet Republic. Immediately after the Central Committee Plenum last week he traveled to Leningrad where he held 15 election meetings in three days. Once he was back in Moscow BERLINGSKE TIDENDE succeeded in catching him late one evening in his office in the center of Moscow. Yeltsin was just back from a meeting of the Supreme Soviet Presidium at which Gorbachev put forward the idea of a stronger presidency; Yeltsin did not hide his dissatisfaction with the proposal.

His aides explained that he was tired and in a bad mood. This was quickly confirmed by a concrete example. In the middle of the interview one of Yeltsin's aides appeared and said that the German weekly, STERN, had come to Moscow to interview Yeltsin. They had specially set aside space in their columns for Yeltsin's assessment of current political developments. However, Yeltsin peevishly refused to give an interview: "I am not a fireman, who comes running when the world press calls. I have to see to my work and I am in the middle of an election campaign. No, I don't want to," he replied.

Taken aback, the aide closed the door behind him. Yeltsin then asked me that the interview be as short as possible.

I gave the popular politician a copy of Zbigniew Brzezinski's latest book, "The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century." Brzezinski was security adviser to U.S. President Jimmy Carter. Yeltsin sat and leafed through the book with interest during our conversation.

[Rose] You were the only person to vote against the policy platform adopted at the Central Committee Plenum last week. Why did you do that?

[Yeltsin] The official press has portrayed the plenum as a new February Revolution. They say that a decisive step along the road to democracy has been taken. I do not share that kind of rose-colored view of the situation. There were many contributions to the debate from the conservative wing, and that is why people were forced to choose compromise solutions on a number of issues. I would describe the document adopted as a half-step forward and a half-step to the left.

I proposed 12 amendments to the policy platform, but only four got into the final version.

The document approves the government's economic platform, which was put forward at the second session of the Congress of People's Deputies in December last year. The program contains no radical provisions that can set the economy to rights. There is no formulation of a mechanism for the transition to a market economy. Instead it gropes in the dark, and this could lead us into absolute chaos. Also, it does not point to any way to raise the population's standard of living. I voted against the program in December, so how could I defend voting for it now?

I proposed that the party drop the democratic centralism which has caused so many misfortunes for us over the years. That did not find its way into the document.

I also proposed that there be scope for the formation of factions within the party. That was also rejected.

Another of my proposals was that the party drop the vertical structures in the party apparatus and that the delegates to the 28th congress in June be elected directly from grassroots organizations. This was not adopted either.

Finally, I proposed that the Central Committee be suspended, because of its conservative composition, and that an organizing committee be appointed instead, comprising representatives from party committees throughout the country who will have the task of preparing the 28th Congress. This too was not included in the final document.

Thus there were already reasons enough for voting against. The fact that there were no others who followed my example does not mean that I was alone in being opposed to the platform. But it is not easy to raise your hand and vote against when the whole Politburo is sitting there staring at you. Fear still sits deep in the stomach.

[Rose] You yourself and several other supporters of reform have several times called on Gorbachev to choose sides in the political struggle. Do you think that Gorbachev chose sides at the Central Committee Plenum, or does he still occupy a position in the middle?

[Yeltsin] Gorbachev is still in the middle of the political spectrum. But I believe that it has dawned on him that this is his last chance to extricate the country from the crisis, and if he does not use it things will go wrong both for the country and for himself. He has moved slightly to the left, but the catastrophe is approaching with rapid steps; it is an avalanche. And that is why a half-step to the left is not enough. There is a need for radical steps.

[Rose] On several occasions you have spoken out in support of the introduction of a multiparty system in the Soviet Union. What sort of party would you support?

[Yeltsin] At present it is difficult to say what political parties will arise in a situation of full political pluralism. It is my view that in the first round what is needed is a renewal of the party, so that it becomes possible to form different factions. If this happens we could well wait for a time and see how the situation develops. But if far-reaching changes do not take place at the 28th party congress, new parties will be formed immediately.

[Rose] Will you support a possible future social democratic party, for example?

[Yeltsin] I do not want to put labels on things; it is not the name that is the decisive factor. But there is no doubt that I will support a democratic, left-oriented party.



[Rose] Do you think it likely that the opposition can come together on a joint countermove against the conservative forces?

[Yeltsin] The coordinating council of the Inter-Regional Group in the Congress of People's Deputies will meet within the next few days and we intend to set up an organizing committee which will invite all liberal and democratic left-wing forces to a congress this spring. Each individual organization or group will have the opportunity to operate on its own political platform; there is no reason to form a united front. It is enough to have a few common ideas which can unite the whole opposition.

[Rose] If the opposition wins the March election, can we contemplate a situation in which Gorbachev is forced into roundtable negotiations like those we have seen in Eastern Europe?

[Yeltsin] I consider that extremely likely.

[Rose] The transition from a totalitarian, closed society to an open, democratic form of government has caused old ethnic antagonisms to flare up. Could the leadership have tackled things in a different way?

[Yeltsin] Unfortunately the country's highest leadership reacts too slowly the whole time. It jumps onto the steps of the last car of the train, by which time the ethnic bushfires have already spread. It would have been better if they had foreseen the situation and acted accordingly. Gorbachev's decisive mistake has been that he has not had a clear timetable for perestroika from the very start. He has tackled isolated problems without an eye to the whole. A simple example is economic reform. There has not been any foundation to ensure that it was implemented—there has been no adoption of a law on ownership rights, on the land; there is no thought-through tax legislation; no law on price setting, credit systems, local self-government.

All these shortcomings have therefore laid economic reform in ruins; it is not functioning at all as intended.

And the same applies to the ethnic problems. They should have given the republics their independence immediately and adopted a law clearly defining the relationship between the republics and the political center. Also, they should have adopted a new law on the structure of the state. If the independence of local areas had been a reality from the beginning, it is possible that the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia would not have developed so explosively.

We have not succeeded in adopting similar laws on a rule-of-law state. What is needed is a more dynamic legislative process in order to keep up with developments in society.

[Rose] What is your relationship with Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state?

[Yeltsin] ...On many points I have revised my relationship with Lenin. I do not think that we should make him into a saint figure or into a person who has a patent on the truth. He made mistakes, too, naturally. And it is also unrealistic to imagine that a human being is able to see a hundred years into the future. I am against the dogmatic recruitment [tilgang] of Lenin.

[Rose] Could you point to some serious mistakes in Lenin's policies?

[Yeltsin] ...Perhaps.... It is probably more a case of gross distortions of his ideas later in history, when Stalin and others deviated from Lenin's course. This was a worse mistake than those made by Lenin, and on the whole I am not interested in discussing this subject, because I support Lenin, although not dogmatically.

[Rose] At the moment we are witnessing a chain reaction in major Russian cities where one party committee after another has to resign after large-scale demonstrations—for example, in Sverdlovsk, Chernigov, Volgograd, and several other places. Could this develop into a bloody uprising such as that which we saw in Romania?

[Yeltsin] Yes, if Paragraph Six of the Constitution on the leading role of the Communist Party is not suspended as soon as possible. But I think that will happen when an extraordinary session of the Congress of People's Deputies is called.

[Rose] What literary books have you read recently?

[Yeltsin] Even though I have used most of my free time in the last five months to write a book of my own, I have had time to read occasionally. I read the books which produce a resonance in society: Andrey Platonov, Mikhail Bulgakov, Daniil Granin's "The Bison," and Anatoliy Rybakov's "Children of the Arbat."

[Rose] In your book you write that you sleep a maximum of four hours per day. Where do you get all energy from?

[Yeltsin] It must be something in my genes, and I also play sport. I play tennis twice a week to get the accumulated stress out of my body.

[Rose] You are a member of the Supreme Soviet Presidium which decided to send troops into Baku in December and introduce a state of emergency. What are your comments on this?

[Yeltsin] I was in Japan when the decision was made, and if I have been present in Moscow I would have voted against the decision. I issued a statement on this. I do not think that you should deploy troops against the civilian population.

**Gavriil Popov Interviewed on Presidential Role**

PM2802121090 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian  
25-26 Feb 90 p 13

[Interview with People's Deputy Gavriil Popov by Fiammetta Cucurnia; date, place not given]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Cucurnia] Gavriil Kharitonovich, the country is on the brink of a disaster, with its stores empty, spreading dissatisfaction, fierce ethnic conflicts, and the looming specter of a right wing dictatorship. Why, under such conditions, are you waging war on Gorbachev?

[Popov] We are not waging war on Gorbachev. On the contrary, the fact is that the option of an enlightened monarch cannot be put forward for the Soviet Union—not even if the king were to be called Gorbachev. Try to understand: The problem is not him; he enjoys all our respect and support as a man and as a political leader. The problem lies precisely in the power system that the draft law on the presidential republic proposes to us.

[Cucurnia] Basically, do you refuse to grant Gorbachev the powers that he is requesting?

[Popov] We do not want to create the conditions for a dictatorship. We will have a president—probably Gorbachev—but with substantial limits on his powers. Presidential power constitutes a specific mechanism for the country's leadership that must not be created for an individual, expressly and solely for Gorbachev himself. There must be a legal and regulatory framework that will protect us against authoritarian temptations, come what may. There must be a strong parliament to counterbalance a strong president. There must be a constitution that guarantees his supervision.

[Cucurnia] Do you believe that Gorbachev would be elected if he were to call a vote now?

[Popov] I believe that it is neither possible nor opportune to call a direct presidential election in the country now. The USSR is torn by too many splits. This is why I am in favor of the president's election in parliament—but only as long as the legal and constitutional conditions that I mentioned are respected and only for an initial temporary period.

[Cucurnia] What exactly is your group's proposal for extricating the country from its impasse?

[Popov] Actually our program is very similar to Gorbachev's. It is merely a matter of clarifying the meaning that each of us attaches to the same words. For instance, the center says it is in favor of abolishing article six on the party's leading role, but it carefully avoids drawing the most elementary conclusions from this, such as the need to eliminate all party control over the army and the factories, for instance. Gorbachev's reform speaks of derestricting ownership, but it does not want private ownership. And so forth. We, however, believe that the

time for small partial reforms is over forever; now we need real and thorough changes.

[Cucurnia] If it comes to a trial of strength, could Gorbachev wrest a presidential reform from parliament without your approval?

[Popov] To introduce the constitutional changes requires a majority of two-thirds of congress deputies. On the basis of past experience and of the votes most favorable to us, I feel I could say quite responsibly that he cannot do it without an agreement with us and the republican deputies. [passage omitted]

**Interregional Deputies' Group Discusses Presidency**

PM0103121490 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
1 Mar 90 Morning Edition pp 1-2

[Report by parliamentary correspondents V. Dolganov, A. Stepovoy, under the rubric "Third Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet": "Deputies for an Extraordinary Congress"]

[Excerpts] ...Listening to the heated debates that raged at the plenary session of the two chambers of parliament on 27 February, sometimes going beyond the bounds of parliamentary behavior, it was difficult to predict how the vote would go on the important question of the establishment of presidential power in our country.

However, the result turned out peacefully enough and did not, perhaps, reflect the heat of the dispute. But perhaps the debate itself helped some of the deputies better to understand the draft law on establishing the post of president of the USSR and making corresponding amendments and additions to the USSR Constitution. And to decide their own position more clearly. [passage omitted]

Immediately after the plenary session a session of the interregional deputies' group was held, under the chairmanship of B.N. Yeltsin and Yu.N. Afanasyev. There were attempts to formulate their own program for the congress and an alternative draft law on the presidency, and there was talk of nominating alternative candidates for the post of president.... Many questions were raised, in fact far more questions were raised than answers found. [passage omitted]

**Joint Venture Conflicts of Interest Pondered**

PM0803165390 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA  
PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 90 p 3

[Report by own correspondent Yu. Popov: "A Magical Name Does Not Always Help Joint Ventures' Activities"]

[Text] Vienna—The other day I read the contract on setting up the "East-West Project" joint venture, whose main participants are the USSR Academy of Sciences Commission for the study of production forces and natural resources (KEPS for short) and the Belgian firm

"East-West-Marketing MB." The complete document is only a few pages of typewritten text. Signed and sealed, it signifies the establishment of a joint venture, one of whose aims is the reciprocal exchange of economic information on Soviet and Western enterprises.

In conversations with Austrian businessmen you often hear about the difficulties involved in studying the Soviet market, about the lack of practical information on our enterprises and their partnership potential. That is probably one very good reason why there are only 1,200 registered joint ventures in the USSR at the moment, of which only around 100 are actually functioning. The foreign currency part of the joint ventures' capital is only (only again) R1.5 billion. It is even more saddening to learn that only 30-35 percent of them are producing actual products that we can eat or wear.

The obvious question is: Why does this situation exist?

There are many reasons. There is the doubt about the irreversibility of the changes in the USSR; the fact that the Soviet partners are a long way away and, it has to be said, ill-educated; Western businessmen's habit of dealing only with Moscow; the commercial risk, inadequately backed up by state guarantees, which only the big concerns and firms dare take; the inconvertibility of our ruble; and, of course, the same old ignorance of the Soviet market's potential.

That is why there is no doubt about the need for the existence of such joint ventures as the "East-West Project." Despite everything. The joint venture's board is headed by the universally respected Academician A.G. Aganbegyan, whose signature, authenticated by the substantial seal of the USSR Academy of Sciences, is also on the contract.

It is easy to understand why. The aforementioned KEPS commission is a shareholder in the joint venture, and Comrade Aganbegyan, as is known, is directly involved in it.

The point is, however, that the primitive nature of our legislation, as Professor Kvint [name as transliterated], "East-West Project" joint venture representative in Vienna, admitted in conversation with me, does not even make it possible to control and regulate the nature of the information that is being transmitted to foreign partners. In this sphere, all one can do is rely on common sense and basic human decency. Out of fairness, it should be said that there is a section on keeping secrets in the contract on setting up the "East-West Project" joint venture, although, in my view, it is purely for show.

There is something else that perplexes me—the fact that Academician Aganbegyan, who until recently was an adviser to party and state leaders, immediately set himself up as a consultant to foreign businessmen on leaving his post. Here we have yet another paradox of our legislatively defective society: An academician, who, by the very nature of his activity, is well acquainted with state secrets, is allowed to do many things. Whereas a

demobilized soldier, who served in a missile unit fire-fighting team, is not allowed under any circumstances to travel abroad for several years, even as a member of a tour group. Why, one wonders.

"Caesar's wife must be above suspicion"—this is an axiom applied in the West to relationships between senior advisers, official and unofficial, and state employees and their bosses. There are laws—written and unwritten—to punish those who contravene it.

Here is a very recent example from neighboring Switzerland. The trial of a group of officials who have abused their official positions began in Lausanne on 26 February. Elizabet Kopp [name as transliterated], vice president and also head of the justice department, gave her husband, director of the "Shakarchi Trading" [name as transliterated] joint-stock company, some information that was a state secret. His wife's information helped Mr. Kopp to clinch a deal that benefited him and the firm. The result was a trial.

A West German representative of a joint firm, who asked to remain anonymous, once complained, with a degree of irony, that by some strange coincidence one encounters too frequently among Soviet partners the sons, nephews, and other relatives of senior party and state apparatus officials. Of course, in this case you cannot really reproach anyone on legal grounds, although I think my interlocutor was being crafty: The "magic name" obviously played a significant role for the Western partners when they were recruited for the joint venture. After all they are "close to...."

Perhaps we should also think about devising "business game rules" and clearly defining ethical norms for the behavior of those whose names everyone knows? And also decide where to draw the line between professional and commercial information.

#### Gdlyan Commission Hears Reports, Answers Queries

PM2602165990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
24 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[A. Stepovoy report: "From Congress Commission Sitting"]

[Text] A scheduled sitting of the congress commission for checking materials associated with the activity of the USSR Prosecutor's Office investigations group headed by T.Kh. Gdlyan was held 22 February with USSR People's Deputy R.A. Medvedev in the chair.

A.M. Rekunkov, former USSR general prosecutor, A.F. Katusev, USSR chief military prosecutor, and O.V. Soroka, former deputy USSR general prosecutor, who were invited to the hearing, delivered reports to the commission members. They offered explanations and answered numerous questions put by deputies.

The sitting analyzed mistakes committed by members of the investigations group headed by T.Kh. Gdlyan and by former and current leaders of the USSR Prosecutor's Office.

R.A. Medvedev, cochairman of the congress commission, announced that the hearings will continue.

### **Frolov Cites 'Agonizing' Process of Debate**

*LD1102022190 Moscow Television Service in Russian  
1800 GMT 10 Feb 90*

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] As we have already reported, Comrade Frolov has been in Vinnitsa taking part in the party and economic aktiv of the oblast. Here is an excerpt from an interview he gave to a correspondent of the Vremya program:

[Frolov] What we now need is a very calm and careful analysis of what is happening. I think the main thing needed at the moment is perhaps a higher understanding, and the need to work calmly and analyze, among other things, what our leadership is doing. I think the last plena have clearly shown that here there are now secrets with seven seals, that we can analyze everything [as heard]. We have seen disputes and debates.

You know the attitude Mikhail Sergeyevich took toward this in his concluding speech at the plenum. He said this is a normal process, and it is this we must now confirm by our activities. We must be calm about the fact that there are our views and other approaches. Of course we can dispute, but on no account must we take the line of the people who think they have the ready-made truth in their pockets. It is a very complex and very difficult process, and I think judging by the materials of the plenum, which PRAVDA printed in full, enable us to see what a difficult and agonizing process this is. [video of interview]

### **Deputies Attend MVD Session on Law Enforcement**

*PM1402104790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
11 Feb 90 Second Edition p 3*

[A. Chernenko report: "In the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs"]

[Text] It has become accepted practice for people's deputies and members of the country's Supreme Soviet to take part in the work of enlarged sessions of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Collegium. Thus, People's Deputies G.S. Tarnavskiy, A.V. (Ziemska), and I.V. Sorokin took part in yesterday's collegium session together with A.S. Pavlov, chief of the CPSU Central Committee State and Legal Department; Supreme Court Chairman Ye.A. Smolentsev; USSR General Prosecutor A.Ya. Sukharev; and F.D. Bobkov, deputy chairman of the USSR KGB. The conversation covered problems regularly encountered by the law and

order services whose solution is unimaginable without society's support, without the elaboration of effective and viable programs.

This was probably the first occasion when such an event did not begin with the "reading of a report," since it was distributed in advance by V.V. Bakatin, USSR minister of internal affairs, to all interested persons; it began with speeches from people who encounter unlawful occurrences daily—in the sphere of criminal offenses, nationalist phenomena, the shadow economy. This set the tone for the collegium session's work.

The crime situation still remains critical; criminals are quite flexible in changing their tactics and regrouping. Criminal elements find great help here in interethnic conflicts, which in turn they undoubtedly fan with skill. Something else is important: Conversation at yesterday's collegium session centered primarily on the operational introduction of work experience already accumulated by law enforcement organs in the conditions of perestroika. Such experience does exist. This was convincingly described by V.P. Trushin, RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] minister of internal affairs, who is setting up the country's largest republican ministry and is striving to introduce the best possible models of work into the law enforcement machinery.

Let me note once more the undoubted usefulness of having people's deputies, who work in Supreme Soviet commissions associated with legislation, attending events which were pretty much secret until only yesterday. Accurate information and direct links with the USSR MVD will undoubtedly help the Supreme Soviet in its legislative work.

### **Party Dues Donated to Chernobyl Victims**

*90UN0928A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA  
in Russian No 6, 10 Feb 90 p 2*

[Article by SOVETSKAYA KULTURA correspondent T. Abakumovskaya: "Decisions Contrary to the Charter"]

[Text] A small article was published in the "Let Us Discuss" column of the ZVYAZDA party newspaper of the republic which caused quite a big reaction there.

It was decided to send 50% of party membership fees to the fund for the children who are victims of the Chernobyl disaster. The decision was adopted by the meeting of the primary party organization of the repairs and maintenance shop of the S.I. Vavilov plant and it was adopted by a majority vote.

What was the reason for the decision, which contradicts the present charter of the CPSU? Here are the comments of V. Zhalnerovich, the party organization secretary:

"We are tired of being just the observers when the decisions are made for us by those on top. A communist of today does not have the right to be just an observer. We are losing our prestige because the perestroika in the



party is lagging behind the one in society. Our charter is obviously outdated and needs improvement. And the information on the distribution of the party finances in practice does not exist. Otherwise, how could it happen that a decision to considerably increase the salaries of party officials was made in complete secrecy, but simple workers had to learn about it from the leaflets of the informals?

"Chernobyl is our most serious wound. However, the program to eliminate its consequences is progressing with great difficulties and the children suffer especially much."

The workers' action uncovered our sore spots and displayed the fundamental issues which should be discussed in anticipation of the congress and at the party forum.

### **PRAVDA Reports Contents of Other Journals**

#### **Reviews KOMMUNIST No. 3**

*PM2202152390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
16 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4*

[Unattributed report: "Journal's Latest Issue"]

[Text] KOMMUNIST No. 3 opens with an editorial in which, in particular, the journal suggests to all those who are impatient to destroy the wall of order to consider the question: What will happen if what we find there, behind the wall, turns out to be dictatorship, and not freedom?

Diametrically opposite views of the party's social base and of the causes of the problems that have to be overcome at the upcoming congress and during the preparations for it are represented under the "CPSU in the Runup to the Congress" rubric.

The journal continues the debate about the new face of socialism, about M.S. Gorbachev's article "The Socialist Idea And Revolutionary Perestroika."

Representatives of the middle officer echelon express themselves under the headline "Defending The Defender." They talk about what is being done to safeguard the social and other rights of the military and about their vision of perestroika in the Soviet Army.

N. Rimashevskaya, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences and USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems Institute of Socioeconomic Problems of Human Population, and N. Gritsenko, chairman of the Soviet of the Union Commission for Labor, Prices, and Social Policy Questions, participate in the "All For Man?" dialogue.

There is a detailed account of an editorial office round-table debate on the issue of "Freedom of Conscience and the Rebirth of Humanism."

"Politicization of statistics and the practice of making them serve power structures have dealt a heavy blow to their prestige.... The country can no longer afford to seek

the right road in the 'realm of distorting mirrors'." USSR State Committee for Statistics Chairman V. Kirichenko writes in his article. The historian V. Sogrin considers the current political debates. Problems of university education and of the upbringing of adolescents are analyzed in a conversation with Latvian University Rector Yu. Zakis and in an article by Candidate of Psychological Sciences L. Alekseyeva.

The rubric "The Modern World: Trends and Contradictions" is represented in this issue by an article by Ye. Bogatova on the 60th anniversary of the activity of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the theses of T. Mayer [name as transliterated], explaining West European social democrats' notions about models of future world organization.

#### **Reviews IZVESTIYA TSK KPSS No. 2**

*PM2302122190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
22 Feb 90 Second Edition p 3*

[TASS report under the rubric "Just Published": "The Latest Issue of IZVESTIYA TSK KPSS"]

[Text] Issue No. 2 of the journal IZVESTIYA TSK KPSS has been published and is being sent to subscribers. It opens with information on the work of the party Central Committee plenum in January 1990 and publishes a schedule, approved by the Central Committee Politburo, for the reception of citizens by members and candidate members of the CPSU Central Committee at the CPSU Central Committee General Department Information and Reception Section.

It also carries resolutions by the Central Committee Secretariat on holding an all-Union scientific and practical conference on problems of the management of scientific and technical progress and on the congress of representatives of numerically small peoples from the North, Siberia, and the Far East. It also reprints the first resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee Russian Bureau—on the concept of Russia's economic sovereignty and on the course of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] election campaign for the election of people's deputies to republic and local soviets, as well as reports on the course of fulfillment of decisions adopted earlier by the CPSU Central Committee.

A report by the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Commission describes the examination of cases concerning the shortcomings which have come to light in the assimilation of imported equipment by Uzbekistan's processing enterprises and an analysis of the course of the restructuring of party work in a number of Smolensk Oblast party organizations; there is also an announcement on the results of an inspection of the work of the USSR Ministry of Railways party committee, and on the hearing of 38 appeals.

Materials from the CPSU Central Committee Politburo Commission are devoted to the case of the so-called

"antiparty counterrevolutionary group of Slepkov's right-wingers and others (the 'Bukharin school')." "

The section "In Preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress" reports on proposals for the new CPSU Statute that have been received by the Central Committee and the course of debates in the Ukraine's party organizations, and publishes extracts from letters sent to the CPSU Central Committee.

The journal publishes statistical data on RSFSR party organizations as of 1 January 1990, a report on the results of report and election meetings in party organizations, information about the CPSU Central Committee newspapers and journals and about institutions under the CPSU Central Committee, reports on changes in the party's cadre corps and on subscriptions for the journal IZVESTIYA TSK KPSS in 1990 in the country's republics, krais, and oblasts and abroad, a chronicle of the CPSU's international ties, material for a political portrait of N.A. Uglanov, replies to readers' questions, and rare photographs.

The section "CPSU Central Committee Mailbag" includes a selection of letters from workers, peasants, and engineering and technical personnel on questions of perestroika and the country's socioeconomic development, as well as material on the examination of working people's applications to the CPSU Central Committee General Department Information and Reception Section.

The latest issue's archive section publishes a chronicle of the Central Committee's activity in July-September 1919, including three protocols of RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (bolsheviks)] Central Committee plenums, which are published for the first time. It continues the publication of material under the rubric "From the History of the Great Patriotic War." This rubric includes resolutions adopted by supreme party and state organs between May 1940 and 21 June 1941 and a series of documents reporting Germany's preparations for war. The section closes with a review of two issues of IZVESTIYA TSK RKP(B) in March 1920.

The March issue, No. 3, of IZVESTIYA TSK KPSS will carry stenographic transcripts of the 7 February 1990 sitting of the CPSU Central Committee plenum which discussed a report by the plenum's editorial commission on the additional work done on the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th party congress.

Subsequent issues of the journal will publish stenographic accounts of the CPSU Central Committee plenums held 9 December and 25-26 December 1989.

Subscribers to IZVESTIYA TSK KPSS are being sent a supplement to issue No. 12 for 1989. It contains the full text of IZVESTIYA TSK RKP(B) issues for 1919.

### Frolov Takes Part in Journalists' Discussion

PM0103094490 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
27 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Guests of the Editorial Office"]

[Text] On 26 February a meeting of journalists specializing in international affairs took place at PRAVDA's editorial office. Assembled in the conference chamber were current affairs commentators and observers from Soviet television, from IZVESTIYA and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA newspapers, and from weeklies NOVOYE VREMYA, ZA RUBEZHOM, and MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. The discussion was about coverage of international problems and life abroad in contemporary conditions. I.T. Frolov, CPSU Central Committee secretary and PRAVDA chief editor, took part in the discussion.

The desire to hold such meetings regularly was expressed. A detailed account of the discussion will be published in PRAVDA.

### Stepping Up Fight Against Organized Crime

90UN1006A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
19 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Report on an interview with Leading Research Associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of State and Law Doctor of Legal Sciences Aleksandr Larin by Nataliya Gevorkyan; date and place not specified: "Ethical Means Legal"]

[Text] The resolution "On Stepping Up the Fight Against Organized Crime" adopted by the Congress of People's Deputies in December of last year presupposes that lawyer-theoreticians and lawyer-practitioners will take part in its implementation. Certain differences of opinion emerge in the course of developing a legal foundation for this struggle (scientists and employees of law-enforcement departments are involved in this). The practitioners rebuke the scientists for being too much into theory and being detached from life. The scientists are apprehensive about our noble impulse prompting us to set forth in the law an opportunity for arbitrariness and violations of human rights. Nataliya Gevorkyan discussed what the scientists propose and why with Leading Scientific Associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of State and Law, specialist in criminal investigation issues Doctor of Legal Sciences Aleksandr Larin.

[Gevorkyan] How do you and your colleagues respond to this unprecedented jump in the crime rate?

[Larin] To begin with, let us be specific about the issue of "the jump." Indeed, investigative organs have revealed the operation of secret criminal communities associated with the shadow economy, with corrupt elements in the party and state apparatuses and in the law enforcement system—what is referred to as organized crime. However, it has not sprung up all at once, in recent years.

Organized crime has been picking up steam for many decades. This was facilitated by the autocracy of party and state functionaries, private and nomenklatura-type promotion of the cadres, the lack of glasnost, persecution for criticism, and universal window-dressing. This is why financial and ethical-psychological losses due to organized crime are so great. With the advent of glasnost, organized crime became better known but not more extensive. To the contrary, we may suggest that it has diminished somewhat as a result of the resolute measures already taken. Of course, a lot still has to be done in this sphere. Economic restructuring also entails some "growth diseases." Still, I would not support the statement on "the unprecedented jump."

[Gevorkyan] How are we to regard the crime statistics which have shocked us so much?

[Larin] Statistics are not necessarily reliable. Crime statistics depend not only on the objective state of affairs but also on how complete the detection of crimes is. This, in turn, depends on the strength, professional level, technical outfitting of the law-enforcement cadres and, alas, on compulsory instructions. At one time, "crime reduction targets" were set forth by directives every year; hence the mass concealment of crimes and a precipitous decline in statistics. On the other hand, the renunciation of "targets" has become one of the components of statistical "growth." Besides, the investigative organs are simply not in a position to tackle many of the most common crimes. I am convinced that if, say, the staff of the PKhSS [Combating the Embezzlement of Socialist Property] organs were doubled the detection (and this also means the statistics) of theft and speculation would also double. Still, there are types of crimes which are reported more or less completely, for example, premeditated murder. This statistic may be an index of growth rates for violent crime. So, in 1989, 21,467 murders and attempted murders were reported which is almost the same as in 1980 (21,273). To be sure, these are frightening statistics. More Soviet citizens fall victim to murderers each year than in all the years of the war in Afghanistan! However, it is impermissible to manipulate these numbers for unworthy purposes, as an argument in favor of the need to make punitive practices harsher and reduce requirements for the standard of operations, investigative, and court work thus neglecting the rights of citizens. It is no accident that the resolution dated 23 December 1989 which you have mentioned stresses that "...operations aimed at combating crime should be based on the USSR Constitution, constitutions of union and autonomous republics, and should comply strictly with the socialist law."

In the sphere of combating crime, the employees of our institute work on the issues of criminal law and criminal policy, criminal justice, and the execution of criminal penalties along with scientists from departmental scientific centers and colleges and practitioners. Various versions of the draft Basic Criminal Regulations and Basic Regulations on Criminal Procedure, as well as relevant codes, have already been prepared. The Basic

Regulations on Executive Criminal Law are being prepared. We hope that the legislators will consider and adopt these laws simultaneously, as a single package, because they are interconnected.

[Gevorkyan] Certainly, it is necessary to renew the legislation; however, the law should be really in effect.

[Larin] This is exactly why I believe that measures of an organizational nature are the focal point. Even the most perfect laws will remain a dead letter in the absence of a sufficient number of people who are willing and able to apply them and in the absence of financial and material-technical resources. Determining the need for cadres, financial and other resources, training the cadres and assigning them to the republics are the tasks of organization and management specialists rather than lawyers. Otherwise, combating crime efficiently is out of the question. Unfortunately, what has actually been accomplished to this end is negligible.

[Gevorkyan] Still, certain organizational steps have been taken: Temporary committees for combating crime and workers' public order detachments have been set up. The KGB has become involved in combating embezzlers and bribe-takers.

[Larin] Our institute was not involved in preparing these measures. I find some of them questionable. The unification of a prosecutor, a judge, and a militia chief in a committee headed by the chairman of the soviet executive committee, even if temporary, is not compatible with the principle of separation of powers. This principle is one of the cornerstones of a law-governed state. The chairman of the soviet executive committee who is responsible for trade and housing, transportation and landscaping, education, health care, and many other things is simply not in a position to manage fighting crime on top of this. He will try to shift this work to the chief of the internal affairs department of the same executive committee. Meanwhile, the subordination of the judge and the prosecutor to the chairman of the executive committee, or, even worse, the chief of the internal affairs department, subverts the constitutional principle of the independence of judges and prosecutors. After all, we cannot fight crime by violating constitutional foundations of the law!

Workers' public order detachments (ROOOP) enlist members of labor collectives who have taken a special 32-hour training course for between 10 and 30 days (please note that the minimal time for training a militiaman is 4 months); their wages are paid but they do not work. They have a number of powers of militia members. However, we certainly cannot expect of them the professionalism and responsibility of representatives of the authorities.

Perhaps, professionalism needs to be mentioned separately. A rank-and-file physician definitely needs a diploma from a medical school. Our minister of health care is an academy member. It would not occur to

anyone to nominate for this position, say, a party functionary who has proven himself and who has a degree from a teacher or a civil-engineer college by correspondence; after all, this way all of us could just drop dead during some epidemic. Meanwhile, it is common for the chiefs of oblast and superior administrations to have no legal degree and no experience in combating crime, and this has been the case for decades. Perhaps, if some imaginary enemy had set out to make a mess of militia work he would have found no better way.

Now for the KGB. The state security organs have highly skilled operations and investigations apparatuses; they have shown that they are capable of handling both common and uncommon money-grabbers. However, it would be better for them to engage in their own business. After all, the law charges the KGB with preventing the infringement of ethnic and racial equality and illegal border crossings. Proceedings instituted in the cases of these crimes and the neutralization of the ringleaders of extremists in a timely manner could have prevented the pogroms in Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, and the violation of the state border. Impunity encourages aggressive anti-semites in Moscow and Leningrad. Indeed, let the KGB do what it must do by law.

[Gevorkyan] Do the draft criminal-procedure laws provide for using modern scientific-technical methods of gathering evidence?

[Larin] Recording the course and results of investigative actions by taking pictures, filming, or on audio equipment is also envisaged by the legislation currently in effect which was adopted almost 30 years ago. However, holography and videotapes which appeared in the investigative practice somewhat later do not fit within the enumeration of the means of recording evidence set forth in the law. It is possible that other, as yet unknown means will be created. In view of this, the scientists propose to introduce in the law a generalized statement permitting the use of all kinds of technical means of recording objective phenomena provided they are reliable and verifiable rather than an enumeration.

[Gevorkyan] Recently, the law-enforcement departments have been raising the issue of codifying in the law on criminal procedure what they refer to in the West as electronic surveillance or electronic spying with a view to stepping up the fight against organized crime: Eavesdropping and peeping through the use of modern technology and subsequent use of the information obtained as evidence. They say that it is impossible to fight, for example, racketeering in the absence of this. What is your opinion?

[Larin] Perhaps, it is impossible to respond by an unambiguous "yes" or "no." Any decision depends on emergent circumstances. Racketeering, or, to use a Russian word, extortion is a crime in its own right, as well as an aggravating circumstance in taking a bribe, which has long been known to the Russian law (Articles 148 and 173 of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist

Republic] Criminal Code); recently, it has become quite common. Within the framework of the existing law, militia operatives, investigators, or prosecutors use a phone tap, frequently at the request or with the consent of the injured party, or a secretly installed microphone in order to record the demands of an extortionist. Audio recordings of such demands may be used as evidence. There are no obstacles of either legal or moral nature to this. Anyone has the right to record the demands addressed to him and subsequently report them to an investigator or the court, all the more so if these demands amount to an infringement upon the rights and legitimate interests of the victim. The situation does not change if the latter uses the advice or cooperation of an employee of the investigative organs.

Like any citizen, a militia or state security operative is entitled to record on pictures or movies, audio or video tapes the events occurring in a generally accessible location—in the street, in a park, at a club, and so on. Many people have seen on TV a videotape of the Tbilisi events on the night of 8 April 1989 made by state security employees. I hope that nobody has come to doubt the legitimacy of their actions as well as the opportunity to use the videotape as evidence in a criminal case.

No formal permission or sanction is necessary in such cases, as well as for monitoring a phone conversation with the consent of one of the parties. This is how this issue is resolved both abroad and in our country. If misunderstandings arise in this matter nonetheless they can be eliminated by instructions from the USSR prosecutor general or a binding clarification by the USSR Supreme Court. There is no need to amend this law or add to it. However, they have something else in mind when they insist on updating the law on the use of technology in criminal cases.

Thus, a proposal is in circulation to urgently add the following to the Basic Regulations on Criminal Procedure: "In cases of grave crimes, conversations conducted from the phones of the defendant, the accused, as well as other persons associated with the crime, may be monitored by virtue of a resolution of an investigative organ or an investigator only with the permission of a prosecutor...." The consent or request by a participant in the conversation is no longer an issue. The scope of such cases is very broad: In the Criminal Code, the enumeration of crimes classified as grave takes up an entire page. There are crimes which are very common among them, such as, for example, malicious hooliganism. Besides, the defendants and those accused of grave crimes are usually detained, and so far there are no telephones in prison cells. Therefore, in reality the phone conversations of an indefinite circle of "persons associated with the crime" which are not accused or even suspected of committing a crime will be monitored. To my mind, this is incompatible with Article 56 of the USSR Constitution: "The private life of citizens, the secrecy of correspondence, telephone conversations, and telegraph communications are protected by law."



[Gevorkyan] However, in the opinion of the proponents of monitoring phone conversations, this does not essentially differ from the confiscation of correspondence envisaged by the law in effect, that is, invading the secrecy of correspondence by virtue of a resolution of the investigator.

[Larin] This is a poor argument. It would be more logical to drop the confiscation of correspondence from the criminal procedure proceeding from the supremacy of the Constitution over partial laws. Incidentally, for more than 40 years now, I have been studying criminal cases, and I cannot recall a single instance in which an intercepted letter served as weighty evidence.

Besides, confiscating correspondence and monitoring phone conversations is not one and the same. In the first case, correspondence addressed to a particular individual is held and inspected. In the second case, the conversations of not only "the person associated [with the crime]" but also of many others will be monitored—members of his family, in a communal apartment—his neighbors, from an office phone—his coworkers, office visitors, and so on.

[Gevorkyan] However, it is proposed to perform the aforementioned operations and detective measures only with the permission of a prosecutor.

[Larin] This is not at all a sufficient guarantee. The prosecutor is an organ of criminal prosecution along with the investigator and the militia. All of the arrests of innocent citizens which we have heard enough about were sanctioned by the prosecutor. One may imagine the ease with which some prosecutors will authorize a "trifle" such as the monitoring of phone conversations. Meanwhile, this is no trifle at all.

[Gevorkyan] They say, however, that in our country the secret monitoring of phone conversations is practiced without the consent of one of the participants in the conversation as well. Is it better to do this beyond the law than within the law?

[Larin] Nothing is known about this for sure. At any rate, there is no foundation for referring to this practice as widespread to any degree. However, if eavesdropping and peeping are going to be codified as regular methods of collecting evidence this may become widespread and turn into a social phenomenon.

[Gevorkyan] What about foreign countries? After all, in the United States the society is also concerned about civil freedoms which does not rule out the monitoring of phone conversations and other methods of electronic surveillance in fighting crime.

[Larin] This is surprising.... The introduction of democratic institutions which are common abroad, such as the defense attorney joining the case from the moment the suspect is apprehended, jury trials, and court control over arrests, into our criminal procedures is given a hostile reception by many employees of the internal

affairs and the procuracy. At the same time, the import of "now-how" such as handcuffs, tear gas, rubber sticks, and the electronic surveillance in question is welcome. In the course of it, they do not take into account the fact that "over there" many other things are different from what they are here.

For example, in the United States 98 percent of the suspects are released until their trial on bail or on one's own recognizance. The police sometimes resort to all kinds of devices in order to ensure the control of behavior of these persons at large. Nonetheless, the monitoring of phone conversations is practiced very seldom: Several hundred operations a year are a drop in the bucket in terms of the US crime rate.

The ethical stand of influential jurists counteracts the spread of this practice. Former US Attorney General Ramsey Clark writes: "Eavesdropping on phone conversations is not just a loathsome occupation; this is also a manifestation of the unconscientious attitude toward the very foundations of personal inviolability."

A quite complicated procedure in the court in the absence of whose permission the monitoring of phone conversations is impermissible is another restrictive factor.

The financial aspect of the issue is also quite important. The cost of monitoring just one telephone (mainly the wages of employees listening to and analyzing the recordings) in the practice of US police amounts on the average to \$35,000—an amount comparable to the annual budget of a rayon prosecutor's office in Moscow.

Finally, foreign experience suggests that the efficiency of monitoring is low.

[Gevorkyan] Do you believe that the introduction (or legalization) of electronic surveillance in our country will bring about negative social consequences?

[Larin] A society in which everyone assumes that they are eavesdropping on him loses its normal human countenance. Reticence, suspicion, and nervousness mount. This fuels social tension.

[Gevorkyan] What do you think about the proposal to interrogate the witnesses and victims who are afraid to appear in court under assumed names?

[Larin] Academy Member V. Kudryavtsev likened this to inquisition trials at which witnesses appeared wearing masks (PRAVDA, 11 January of this year). I would like to recall that not only **what** a victim or a witness says but also **who** he is important in order to verify and evaluate the testimony. In the event a person is interrogated under an assumed name, the defense is deprived of this opportunity. This would promote the spread of false accusations in courts. As far as protecting the witnesses and the victims from being induced to give false testimony is concerned, we should steadfastly apply the law which provides for criminal penalties for such actions (Article 183 of the RSFSR Criminal Code).

[Gevorkyan] How are we to proceed against organized crime?

[Larin] It is easier to say how we should not. We should not set fire to the house in order get rid of the cockroaches. We should not write laws which are more dangerous for honest people than they are for the violators of the law. We should not think up methods which can jeopardize the rights and freedoms of hundreds of those not involved in a crime in order to snare one criminal.

As I see it, something else is necessary. We should seek, prepare, and assign cadre, material-technical, and financial resources on a regular basis, with scientific justification, taking the present time and the future into account. We should improve the professionalism of employees, and this should be done by professionals. Specialization in investigative subdivisions and the introduction of network planning may be expected to bring considerable results. We should verify execution diligently, rewarding the people for success and holding them responsible for flaws. We should purge the system of those inept, dishonest, or, worse yet, corrupt. We should get rid of useless, parasitic subdivisions and positions which accumulate especially in the managerial echelons. I know that it is much more difficult to do than sit at a desk in a warm, brightly lit room and write draft laws. However, I believe that otherwise it is impossible to subordinate the law-enforcement activities to the only worthy goal—protection of the citizens, society, and state against crime.

### 130,000 Registered Drug Addicts in USSR

PM2702110190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA  
PRAVDA in Russian 25 Feb 90 p 3

[Unattributed reply to reader's letter: "Harmless Hemp?"—first paragraph is reader's letter]

[Text] How many drug addicts are there in this country? How are we combating them? O. Bolevin, Sverdlovsk

According to figures obtained from the Criminal Investigation Main Administration, over the past year administrative proceedings have been instituted against 48,960 people for sowing or growing oil poppies and hemp. More than 100,000 such sowings have been discovered. During operation "Poppy" illegal crops of opium and oil poppies were destroyed over an area of 290 hectares. Almost 10,000 hectares of wild hemp has been mown, and 27.2 tonnes of drugs and raw materials have been taken out of illegal circulation.

There are currently more than 130,000 registered drug addicts in the USSR.

### Figures Cited for Accidental Deaths

PM2202135190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA  
PRAVDA in Russian 18 Feb 90 p 1

[Unattributed answer to reader's letter under the rubric "Send Us Your Questions!": "Safe Technology?"—first two paragraphs are reader's letter]

[Text] How many accidental deaths are there in our country?

[Signed] Yu. Blinov, Sverdlovsk

In 1988 alone there were 790 major accidents in industry; there are some 1 million cases of group injury in the country every year. Approximately 250,000-260,000 people die every year as a result of road accidents, poisoning, and injury—equivalent to the population of a whole city! In 1988, more than 668,000 people suffered injury in industry alone and 14,400 died.

In addition to this, some 6.6 million people in the country's national economy are working in unfavorable conditions, and almost 2 million perform heavy manual labor.

### Plant Secretary Urges Party Unity, Discipline

PM2802112190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
24 Feb 90 Second Edition p 3

[Article by A. Baburin, secretary of the "Kommunar" Truck Plant party committee, under the "Plain Talking" rubric: "The Ship Must Sail Ahead"]

[Excerpt] Zaporozhye City—[passage omitted] At the moment our ship is still afloat. The majority of members are behind the party. We understand the difficulties, but communists expect resolute, fundamental measures to unite our ranks. After all, I am convinced that the worst thing of all is disunity. Various factions, groups, and party clubs are already appearing. All this is evidence that the party's upper echelons have not ensured the holding of a nationwide, partywide discussion in a spirit of unity and have not kept ahead of events. But glasnost is being actively used by those who benefit from disunity within the party. Why was the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum not broadcast live? In which dark offices was the platform itself produced? Why was all this done without consulting primary party organizations? As it emerged at the Plenum, this was a revelation even for CPSU Central Committee members. How can an answer be given communists' legitimate question: Why is everything kept secret?

But now the draft platform has been published. We are going to build a humane, democratic socialism. There's nothing wrong with being humane but I don't see anything inhuman in the socialist principle enshrined in the CPSU Program adopted at the 22d Congress: He who does not work shall not eat. Even though in the present economic crisis everything is inverted: Those who eat—

and very well, too—are the ones who skillfully take advantage of the anarchy and lawlessness in our great state.

Now for democratism. I consider that, come what may, the party decided without due analysis to switch to democratic principles of management. Democracy introduced chaos into people's consciousness. With our inoperative and, worse still, imperfect laws on the cooperative system and the enterprise, social injustice and illegal wealth have flourished. With our frozen wages there has been a tremendous rise in prices for the most essential items and empty shelves in the state trade system. The country has been crying out about the harm that the new bureaucratic laws will do to the common cause but they are still not being changed. And the fine phrase that "everything not prohibited by law is allowed" has done an "excellent" job.

Labor collective councils were created quite separately from life and no one knows what to do with them. So far all that they have done is reduce the administrative influence on the course of production and its productivity. At best the labor collective councils distribute the benefits that have been earned. Many honorable people recall with great respect and gratitude the period when Yu.V. Andropov was at the party and state helm. Under him total license stopped. Party functionaries did not build private homes or misuse official transport and other privileges. What a positive influence the strengthening of discipline in society had. After all, many of those who did well on the fringes of production actually went to work.

So in political life should a panacea be sought in democracy? I support democratic centralism and high responsibility. All the party's failures should not be pinned on the executors. We were fulfilling orders from above. Let the top leaders personally and honestly admit their own mistakes. It is time to see that all appeals not supported by practical action merely create disillusionment and uncertainty in the future and that office "revolutions" will not help. Unfortunately, the draft platform also abounds in words such as "yes" and "necessary." But what is necessary? There is a lack of specifics.

...The ship is still afloat. It has merely listed in the face of verbal demagoguery, the debunking of our ideals, and the extolling of social democracy. It will sail ahead if every communist and every member of our socialist society knows how to help it out of the state of crisis and how to raise the working people's living standard at least high enough to satisfy people's basic needs.

The vast majority of communists of our plant party organization work honestly. Working in conditions of modernization we are producing two types of vehicle. The January plan was fulfilled. This year 140,000 vehicles will be produced, including 40,000 Tavrivas. By their joint efforts communists are ready to do everything to eliminate the deformations of socialism that have occurred and to successfully build a just society.

### 'New Relationship' With Eastern Europe Urged

PM2802190690 Moscow NEW TIMES in English  
No 8, 20-26 Feb 90 p 9

[Leonid Mlechin article: "A New Relationship Is Needed"]

[Text] "Our buffer zone has been destroyed," a member of the party's central committee said at its recent plenum in Moscow. Angry and frightened voices could be heard at this plenum. It was stated that the Soviet Union was selling itself and its allies to the West, that Russia had been broken up and the postwar peace and order in the continent upset. The terrible danger of a united Germany calls for an immediate answer.

Speakers were unusually outspoken, and they should be thanked for their frankness. They trotted out a whole range of charges against perestroika and the initiators of current reforms in home and foreign policies. The criticism of Moscow's foreign policy may seem rather strange to people inexperienced in politics. The situation in domestic policy is clearer: The country is in crisis, and there are things to be criticized. It is a different matter from what positions and for what purpose criticism is made.

As regards foreign policy, real successes have been achieved in it for the first time in many decades. Soviet diplomacy today fulfils its main task, ensuring good relations with those who had been considered enemies in the past and creating the necessary conditions for the country's progress. Nevertheless, Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and Yakovlev, who deal with international questions in the central committee, came under attack from party leaders of the country, republics and regions. What are they displeased with?

Newspapers recently carried excerpts from the memoirs of Zdenek Mlynar, secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party's central committee during the "Prague spring," describing the last meeting between the then Czechoslovak and Soviet leaders.

"In January (1968)," Brezhnev told Dubcek, "I sent you my remarks on your report, warning that some of the formulations in it were wrong. Nevertheless, you have not changed these formulations. Is it possible to work in such a way?" Brezhnev considered it a great sin that Prague did not ask for the Kremlin's consent on every occasion.

This precisely expresses the Brezhnev concept of "limited sovereignty" which meant that East European countries were free within the limits set by Moscow. The critics of Moscow's present foreign policy have learned this doctrine too well. The degree of their respect for neighbouring countries was expressed by a second secretary of Kazakhstan Communist Party's central committee who called them "a buffer." He spoke about "Mazowieckis and others of their ilk" in mentioning the head of government of an allied state. How can people show open disrespect for constitutionally approved

heads of government express surprise at anti-Soviet sentiments in other countries? These sentiments, it should be noted, are directed not against the Soviet people, but against the system which enabled its leaders to treat neighbouring countries as vassals.

Such an attitude also found expression in the appointment of ambassadors to socialist countries. Top party officials were sent there instead of career diplomats. Some of these leaders failed in their previous jobs. Evidently, it was believed they would find it easier to boss the show in a neighbouring country than to run a region or a republic.

It becomes clear that the purifying storm which broke over Eastern Europe has been received by such ambassadors with irritation and fear. First of all, they had not been prepared for such a turn of events. Dealing only with high party leaders, they did not take trouble to establish contact with people who did not belong to the higher echelons, namely, with intellectuals and progressive-minded citizens. That is why they were unable to forecast the course of events. The next day after the overthrow of the party regime the embassy staff woke up without any contacts and ties with new leaders of the country. For till the last moment TASS correspondents, following embassy instructions, wrote about the rebellious people as "extremists" and "hoodlums."

The heavy burden of the past will influence the emotions of our neighbours for a long time. It is very simple to dispatch to Moscow desperate cables about anti-soviet sentiments, pronouncements and demonstrations. It is much more difficult to get along with the people and leaders of the country of residence, as diplomats say. Can our present ambassadors in East European countries do that? Not all of them have openly stated their views, as this was done by the Soviet ambassador to Poland.

His speech is indicative enough: if the ambassador does not accept democratization at home, how can he like the same process in Poland? How can an ambassador opposed to such a process help to bring our countries and peoples closer together and to overcome the past?

There is also another aspect of the matter. Will the new leaders of East European states want to deal with ambassadors who only recently openly praised the party leaders now overthrown and brought to trial?

Of course, Moscow can keep such ambassadors in Warsaw, Bucharest, Prague or Berlin on principle. But what will this demonstration mean? The unwillingness to reckon with the changes in Eastern Europe? Displeasure with the will of peoples? This does not seem to be the intention of Moscow.

The Foreign Ministry was one of the first departments to renew its staff after perestroika had been started. Only the ambassadors to East European countries have remained, apparently because they are appointed and replaced by the Party's central committee, not the Foreign Ministry. Eastern Europe has put paid to the past. In

nearly all East European countries the communist parties are now in the opposition. In view of this, the appointment of "party" ambassadors loses any sense.

We need skilful diplomats in Eastern Europe, because very difficult problems, from the withdrawal of troops to a restructuring of economic relations, will have to be tackled there. In East European capitals our country should be represented by Ambassadors capable of being partners of Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa, by persons on whom the public attitude to the Soviet Union depends to no small extent.

### Slyunkov Defines Path to Scientific Progress

PM2602111990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
22 Feb 90 Second Edition pp 1, 2

[Unattributed report: "New Approaches to Scientific and Technical Policy"]

[Text] About 1,000 scientists, VUZ [higher education establishment] representatives, engineers, designers, party officials, and jurists attended an all-union scientific and technical conference which ended yesterday.

The debate lasted three days. In the course of section sittings and "round table" sessions, participants were given an opportunity to express their views on the state of Soviet science, its future, the factors which hinder its development today, and the ways out of the prevailing situation.

The final plenary sitting was attended by L.N. Zaykov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; G.I. Usmanov and I.T. Frolov, secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee; N.P. Laverov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology; and G.I. Marchuk, president of the USSR Academy of Sciences. N.N. Slyunkov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, summed up the results of the conference's work.

The economic situation and the course of perestroika in the country prove time and again that the conclusion of the April plenum and the 27th party congress was correct: The radical acceleration of scientific and technical progress is a fundamental question of our economic policy, N.N. Slyunkov noted. The scientific and technical revolution which has swept the world is transforming—in the full sense of the word—people's entire way of life. There is no doubt that its positive results are also to be seen in our own country. Specific decisions have been made and are being implemented to transform the material base of a series of most important national economic complexes and sectors. Collaboration between science and production is being stepped up, the developmental and experimental base for research and development along priority avenues is being strengthened.

On the whole, however, it is still too early to talk about tangible positive developments in the acceleration of



scientific and technical progress, the country's existing scientific potential is not ready to fully perform the tasks facing the country.

It was noted in the report and speeches that the USSR has drawn nearer to the United States in terms of the general scale of scientific activity (over 1.5 million scientific workers and science teachers), but there is a gap in terms of the quality of the scientific potential, its structure, and the availability of technical equipment. A serious gap.

For many years the national economy was unreceptive to scientific and technical innovations, there were imbalances in structural and investment policy and omissions in the development of the material base of science, and these resulted in barriers both between science and production and between academic, VUZ, and sectorial science.

With the exception of some scientific collectives headed by outstanding scientists and organizers, our science is reminiscent of a run-down organism which needs not only assistance but also radical treatment.

N.N. Slyunkov noted that the organizational structure is now at odds with both the logic of the development of science and the specific nature of scientific activity. There has been a decline of the scientific community's role as a self-developing and self-organizing structure. The objective result of the absence of a social monitoring mechanism and the secretiveness of science has been to turn science into a closed department with all the typical features—orientation toward its own internal interests, standards, and criteria, and an urge for extensive growth. The prevailing economic and management mechanism has given the scientific-administrative personnel excessive powers as regards the allocation of resources and the definition of research topics. The planning and shaping of scientific structures largely comply with the interests of individual scientists or sectors involved in leadership. There is a certain amount of conservatism in topics being investigated and the laboratory network. There is also a certain stagnation as regards cadres.

We failed to take prompt notice of the growing role of microelectronics, biotechnology, and energy- and resource-saving technologies, and missed an entire stage of scientific and technical transformations. This largely determined the level of the country's economic and social development and resulted in the accumulation of a mass of problems.

It is almost five years since April 1985, but the mechanism for managing scientific and technical progress has simply failed to function properly. It is not geared to making scientific and design organizations and enterprises interested in developing and introducing equipment which is up to world standards. One can understand that a certain amount of time is needed before the potential of science starts producing real economic

results. But the world and domestic situation allows us only an extremely limited amount of time to get things going.

The course of the economic reform proved the need to seek new approaches to the shaping of a highly efficient economy, to the shaping of our socioeconomic, scientific, technical, investment, and structural policy.

The party has taken a clear-cut course toward the economy's social reorientation and the solution of immediate questions: Food, housing, health care, education, pensions, consumer goods, the ecology. Expenditure on a vast scale is needed to solve just the aforementioned problems, and I have listed only the most urgent ones, N.N. Slyunkov noted.

It is impossible to find a way out of this situation on the basis of the economy's traditional development. Emerging difficulties can be resolved only along the paths of accelerating scientific and technical progress and of radical economic reform. There is no other choice, there is no other approach. We need more than just a change of technology and production standards and higher return on assets (ours are scandalously worn-out and obsolete), we need a qualitative replacement of the country's productive forces based on the new and advanced achievements of Soviet and world science.

N.N. Slyunkov went on to note that the conference produced a businesslike critique and a sound exchange of opinions. The debate and the constructive proposals made in the reports and speeches at plenary sittings and during the sections' work offer an opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of the problems facing us, to take another major step toward the creation of a system for the management of scientific and technical progress. The conference confirmed the need for organic unity in the management of socioeconomic and of scientific and technical development. This task ought to be solved through a close combination of plan and market methods for regulating scientific and economic activity.

The most serious attention must be given to the elaboration of new approaches toward planning so as to ensure a concentration of manpower and resources on the solution of major tasks which determine the strategic avenues of scientific and technical progress. Planned centralized leadership must be exercised primarily through prices, a flexible taxation and credit policy, interest rates, payments, the depreciation system, and forms of labor remuneration.

It is very important, as emphasized in a series of speeches, to elaborate a system of preferential taxation and credits for advanced avenues of science and technology. Conditions must be created for faster depreciation of fixed assets. A network of innovative commercial banks must be created. Differentiated prices must be introduced—higher during the initial period of manufacture of new products, with subsequent systematic reductions. The wages of all participants in the innovative

cycle must be linked to the end result of labor (profit, technical standards of output, its quality and competitiveness).

First of all, it is necessary to develop new-generation technology capable of effecting a severalfold increase of labor productivity and resource savings. This can be achieved only on the basis of faster development of fundamental and applied science. Attention must focus mainly on developing the latest scientific and technical output, but equal efforts must be applied to ensure that the economy is receptive toward it. Our task is to place the national economy as a whole and each individual enterprise in conditions whereby their development would be impossible without the introduction of new elaborations.

It is necessary to ensure that each element of the new economic mechanism that is taking shape is geared to the acceleration of scientific and technical progress. This is why we are profoundly convinced that economic levers should play the main role in the acceleration of scientific and technical progress. This is primarily a question of the proposals aimed at ensuring unity in the management of the national economy's economic and scientific and technical development.

The time has come to work out a progressive scale for taxing the manufacture of output and the use of technologies which pollute the environment, N.N. Slyunkov said. These proposals could be incorporated in the relevant laws and in the economic mechanism for rational utilization of the environment and ecological safety.

The economic system must make flexible use of methods for state influence on the development of science and technology through the implementation of a uniform scientific, technical, investment, and structural policy. The main element of the new strategy must be the selection of priorities on the basis of socioeconomic and political objectives, of an analysis of long-term trends in the development of world science and economy. We ought to abandon the flawed frontal practice, the artificial substitution of sectors' priorities for the genuine priorities in the development of science and technology. It is necessary to put together an efficient mechanism for singling out these avenues and offering them comprehensive organizational and economic aid and support at centralized level.

Investment policy must be fundamentally reoriented, it is necessary to pursue a course of rechanneling resources away from the traditional avenues of research and obsolete production units and into new ones whose development would result in the economy's in-depth restructuring. State budget finance must be concentrated on priorities. Appropriations on a competitive basis must become the norm. Decisions on allocation of funds must be made not on the basis of the individualized opinion of

the state apparatus but with participation by public organs and scientific councils. This will make it possible to overcome monopolism.

The Union of USSR Scientific and Engineering Societies and the All-Union Society of Inventors and Rationalizers are functioning in the country, and the scientific community is forming new associations, N.N. Slyunkov went on. Why not build a system of collaboration and consolidation of public forces and state organs on a democratic basis?

It may be worth while giving some thought to setting up a Science and Technology Council under the head of state or headed by the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, as it is done in some other countries, and including in it representatives of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, the USSR State Planning Committee, and the USSR State Committee for Education, the president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the USSR minister of finance, major scientists, designers, and public figures. Not a single fundamental decision on the elaboration and implementation of the state's scientific and technical policy should be made without this council's recommendations.

N.N. Slyunkov went on to analyze in detail the proposals made at the conference. They touched upon the entire package of problems facing Soviet science.

We have to create a new complexion of Soviet science meeting the highest international criteria, and its development should be included on the list of the state's top priorities, N.N. Slyunkov said. The main line is clear—faster development of fundamental science. In parallel with strengthening its base, it is necessary to change many of the forms and methods of work by research collectives and management organs, to eradicate monopolism.

Science, just like society, needs democratization and structural reforms. They are needed as much as the boosting of investments channeled into the scientific sphere. Some of the Academy of Sciences academicians and corresponding members enjoy exceptional powers in science. This may be correct. But this group of scientists is actually not elected by the broad scientific community. Many scientists believe that we need a new organizational structure for the country's scientific potential, that any reorganization of science, unless accompanied by democratization, could degenerate into a redistribution of power between existing groups of scientists. The fundamental restructuring of the organization of science must actually do away with the monopoly on scientific truth. It is necessary to introduce a system of competitive financing for research projects. Evidently, it is necessary to create a multicomponent structure of sources of finance for science and technology so as to have competition not only between ideas but also between investors.

The structure of the network of scientific organizations must gain mobility, enabling it to respond to the emergence of new functions within the structure of scientific activity. Obviously, the creative collective working on a problem must become the basic link. This will make it possible to channel resources not into the maintenance of institutions but into the solution of major scientific and technical tasks.

It is necessary to seriously work out forms and methods for the transmission of knowledge and of scientific and technical achievements in the national economy. New economic mechanisms are needed in the scientific sphere itself.

The draft concept lays down the Basic Principles of the mechanism for economic management of sectorial scientific organizations. But this mechanism should not depend only on an organization's departmental subordination, it ought to be determined by the scientific and technical program, project, or topic as the basic organizational-economic elements of management.

Basic research must uphold the system of state priorities based on the scientific community's forecasts and opinions. It must enjoy solid backing by the state and a multitude of sources of finance, and must correspond with society's economic potential. In this context, it is worth noting the idea of a USSR Basic Research Foundation.

Flexible organizational structures are needed. They will make it possible to expand the autonomy of scientific organizations, to overcome the departmental fragmentation of science, and to maneuver more quickly on the research front.

Voluntary associations and centers for joint elaborations and the implementation of their results are a promising form for the integration of scientific, educational, and production collectives. They must be given a well-defined legal normative base.

Special attention must be given to research in areas where sciences and scientific disciplines overlap, and in all sectors where it is possible to achieve revolutionary breakthroughs which could change the nature of scientific and technical development.

It is worth backing the proposal about national centers for basic research using the base of our world-renown scientific collectives which fall under the jurisdiction of various ministries and departments. These centers must become objects of state concern. In order to achieve real positive changes in the development of science quickly enough, it may be worth considering that, in parallel with a solicitous attitude toward existing productive scientific institutions, it could be possible to create alternative organizational structures with a new technological base and new production relations.

We ought to create a mechanism encouraging a sensible relocation of cadres within the sectors of science and

between science, higher education, and production. It would be expedient to expand the utilization of competitive, contractual, and other forms of attracting research and development workers [razrabotchiki], and to lift the restrictions on multiple employment [sovmestitelstvo].

N.N. Slyunkov said that there is a pressing need to take stock of the research now being done in the country, to appraise its state along every scientific avenue, and to make a principled decision about the impossibility of maintaining laboratories which have no chance of concentrating the minimum resources necessary or creating work places fitted to an acceptable technical standard. If the collectives which are way behind the advanced frontiers of science and have lost contact with the world's research community are not brought up to world standards, it might be expedient to disband them and utilize their manpower and resources in viable collectives.

Success could be ensured by creating organizational and legal conditions for competition between scientific schools and avenues. When organizing research under scientific and technical programs, provision must be made for competition between scientists working on similar topics. Evidently, there ought to be support for the USSR Academy of Sciences proposal to amend its statute and gear it toward enhancement of the scientific community's yield.

Another important task is to create an economic mechanism for encouraging science in higher education. When VUZ's copy economic accountability models from sectorial science, this results in contradictory and at times even negative processes; there are cutbacks in fundamental and basic research and a growing number of research projects which do not call for high scientific qualification. Students are driven away from VUZ science. The best teachers leave to join "profitable" science.

I assume that it is really possible to complete in 1990-1992 the basic shape of an economic mechanism for the management of scientific and technical progress and to incorporate it in legal norms. N.N. Slyunkov said in conclusion. Taking the discussion of the conference's results into account, it is necessary to submit, to the Supreme Soviet, proposals for additions to the draft USSR laws on ownership, the socialist enterprise, taxation, general principles of economic management in union and autonomous republics, and on local economy and local self-management. They should also be taken into account in the draft laws on the state bank, the bank system, investment activity, and foreign investments on USSR territory. It is also necessary to adopt specific laws, to solve the questions of scientific organizations' activity, and to define legal norms.

There is no doubt that reliance on economic methods, creation of a market for scientific and technical output, and a clearly defined legal base for intellectual activity will in the very near future become determining factors

of the acceleration of our society's scientific, technical, and socioeconomic development.

The CPSU Central Committee Commission on Questions of Socioeconomic Policy will carefully examine all the proposals made during the conference and will report to the CPSU Central Committee Politburo on any decisions made, N.N. Slyunkov noted. I think that the provisions presented in the concept will lay a sound foundation for the preparation of material in the sphere of scientific and technical policy for the 28th party congress.

The all-union scientific and technical conference concluded its work. But the discussion which began there will certainly continue—after all, this is a matter of the basic paths of our society's development. We invite contributions to PRAVDA's pages both from conference participants and from our readers who are worried about the future of science and the acceleration of scientific and technical progress.

#### Government Resolves Price Issue With Trade Unions LD1102065490

[Editorial Report] Moscow television service in Russian at 1800 GMT on 10 February in its "Vremya" newscast carries a three-minute video report by O. Bobin on a meeting held with trade unions to discuss the 1 January decision to raise diesel fuel and electricity prices and charges for carrying freight. The meeting is attended by Aleksandra Biryukova USSR Council of Ministers deputy chairman, and Finance Minister Pavlov. Bobin notes the decision to increase prices put many enterprises in a difficult financial position. He says the trade union commission of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions demanded the decision be reversed.

Bobin continues, "The difficult conflict situation with the government was resolved in favor of the trade unions yesterday at the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium. Biryukova, the USSR Council of Ministers deputy chairman, and Finance Minister Pavlov today answered questions on how compensation will be paid. In the framework of a report it is impossible for us to tell you now what difficult work the government has to do. The country's economic situation is not an easy one, but it contains a good lesson for the future."

There follows an interview with K. Turysov, head of an unnamed Supreme Soviet commission. Condemning labor disputes, Turysov says, "Well, from the very beginning, looking at it from the organizational aspect, we wanted to show that the new law passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet last year on resolving collective labor disputes is effective and that within that law any conflict can be settled. Now for the first time the demand has been made publicly and openly that the government should sit down at the conference table and find a solution to these matters. The greatest cause for satisfaction is that the government deemed that decision to be

unfounded and erroneous and has suspended its operation until 1 April, and will during that time devise machinery for full compensation to the labor collectives in connection with the introduction of the new wholesale prices and tariffs." The video shows Turysov being interviewed.

#### February, October 1917 Events Examined

LD2502230690 Moscow Television Service in Russian  
1530 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Correspondent M. Osokin report from the "Seven Days" program, presented by Eduard Sagalayev]

[Excerpts] [Sagalayev] Now, from the seven days of this week to eight days 73 years ago, to the February revolution of 1917. It took only eight days for the collapse of a monarchy that had held sway for centuries. This alone shows how obsolete it had become, and how general was the aspiration for a new life. Even in the 1920's, the Day of the Overthrowing of the Monarchy was one of the main holidays, alongside Proletarian Revolutionary Day. Later, however, only the October holiday was left, and the memory of February was considered unnecessary, as it were. Now the situation is reversed; it is the February revolution many people are talking about. There are the most diverse assessments, from the repetition of Solzhenitsyn's words about a caricature of democracy, to statements that it was the only moment of true freedom and accord in Russia's history. Calls for a return to February sometimes are heard at mass meetings, but a return to what? Let us take a look.

[Osokin—identified by screen caption] It was a fine start, but it was not possible to achieve either peace or happiness. [passage omitted]

Initially, the Bolsheviks made a peaceful, gradual struggle for the socialist idea their aim, but as the repression intensified, they hardened their position, too, and now advanced the slogan of overthrowing the Provincial Government. The country was whipped up by a wave of general intolerance. Both right- and left-wingers no longer spoke of democracy, but rather of dictatorship. The generals were preparing a coup, drawing in military units from the front. The Bolsheviks were preparing an armed uprising of workers.

The February Revolution had no chance. It was not this republic that was the real alternative to October, but a dictatorship by the generals and a sanguinary mutiny. The people had already arisen, and the Bolsheviks, who had come to head the movement, most probably averted the worst. A complete collapse, and the triumph of anarchy.

Now one If: If the revolutionary renewal had held at the level of democratic development in the summer of 1917, the socialist idea still would have been victorious in the parliamentary struggle. The Bolsheviks obtained 24 percent of the vote at the elections to the constituent



assembly, and the socialist revolutionaries won 40 percent, but this would have been a completely different socialism: The sum total of the views of the left-wing parties. It possibly would have been a socialism in which social justice was combined with the values of humanism and equal rights for all. Such a program was already beginning to acquire a real outline in the election campaign of the Social Democratic Party of Bolsheviks: democratic elections, self-management at factories, the transfer of land to those who work it, the destruction of inequality based on estate and nationality, the recognition of the right to secession of any people in Russia.

However, the peaceful development of events was obliterated in mutual bitterness. The socialist ideals that already had been asserted by the October Revolution were transformed into war communism in this continuing atmosphere of bitterness and in the chaos of the Civil War. Lenin still continued to speak about a multi-party system and about elections, but the logic of the harsh struggle was already passing this by: Past democratic freedoms, past a constituent assembly, and further and further away. The light at the end of the tunnel proved to be a train rushing head on from the other direction. All in all, it is a story of how impatience and intolerance can destroy democracy. Russia proved not to be ready for it then. What about today? [Video shows more archive pictures of 1917 events: General Denikin with his troops; Bolshevik militia units; provisional government in session; demonstrations; Lenin addressing a crowd; Lenin, Trotsky, and Dzerzhinskiy saluting Red Army units on Red Square]

### Military

#### Officers, Deputies Discuss Professional Military

LD0803123690 Moscow World Service in Russian  
1030 GMT 8 Mar 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program]

[Text] A roundtable meeting of officers, USSR people's deputies, representatives of the General Staff and military science, on the problems of reform in the Army and Navy, has been held in Moscow. Arguments revolved around the idea of creating a professional Army in the country. In the view of its supporters a hired army would be cheaper and more effective, it would be easier to exclude interethnic problems and to conduct more democratic procedures in such an army. Many in the military believe society lacks the funds to pay for a hired army. At the same time, they do not reject the idea itself. General Nikitin of the general staff reported that the Navy has already prepared an experiment in which some of the sailors will serve by contract.

#### Yazov on Issues Confronting the Armed Forces

90UM0334A Moscow SOBESEDNIK in Russian  
No 8, Feb 90 p 4

[Report on interview with General of the Army D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, by Sergey Romanovskiy: "Dmitriy Yazov: 'In the Army Since the Age of 17'"; on Eve of Soviet Army and Navy Day]

[Text] When I asked General of the Army D.T. Yazov, the USSR minister of defense and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, for an interview, honestly, I had little hope of success at the time. But, nonetheless, I heard over the telephone: "Come right over, now." Instead of the appointed 30 minutes, I talked with the minister for almost 2 hours.

[Romanovskiy] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, SOBESEDNIK receives a lot of letters from servicemen and members of their families in which people write about intolerable living conditions. "The landlady of the house is chasing us out onto the street," writes Margarita Astashonok, the wife of an officer from Moscow Oblast. "We are saved only by the fact that it is winter now: The law prohibits the eviction of lodgers at this time of the year. But, you see, it will soon be March... So, what will you order my husband to think about: military service or about our adversities at home?"

[Yazov] The Ministry of Defense annually applies R4 billion to construction, of which R1.2 billion is for housing. But we could build a lot more.

[Romanovskiy] Well, what is preventing it?

[Yazov] Resources. There is not enough timber, cement, and metal.

[Romanovskiy] In other words, everything rests on the government?

[Yazov] No, on capabilities. What is the government? I am the government, and Ivan Nikolayevich is the government, but there is still nowhere to get cement. Just the repair of the old inventory eats up almost one-fourth of all the material means produced. The housing question is very critical today. First, even before the reduction, there was not enough housing for tens of thousands of military families. Second, it was necessary to provide apartments to families of officers who fell under the current half million reduction. Third, additional difficulties will arise in connection with the forthcoming withdrawal of troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, when another several thousand "apartmentless" officers and warrant officers will be added in this country. Altogether there are more than 170,000 servicemen who do not have apartments. We are not in a condition to provide housing for so many people without the help of other ministries and departments. That is why at the February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev proposed the preparation and ratification of a

special purpose program for the social support of servicemen and members of their families, and also for officers and warrant officers discharged into the reserve.

[Romanovskiy] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, you gave the current half million reduction in the Armed Forces as one of the main reasons for the lack of housing. But it is one thing to make a political decision, and it is quite a different matter to implement the reduction in practice. I am a former regular military man, and I know that our commanders cut back not so much living persons (as it was, there were not enough people to fill authorized table of organization positions) as... vacant, unoccupied positions. So, is it necessary to incite such passions about housing, when the Army actually is not being reduced?

[Yazov] It is necessary to make things clear on this question. In the course of unilateral reduction of the Armed Forces, their numerical strength is still being reduced. For example, in 1989 our Army was smaller by 265,000 persons. We eliminated the commands [upravleniye] of two military districts, two combined arms corps, and four army corps, and we reduced the numerical strength of the central apparatus. Moreover, 21 combined arms divisions (13 motorized rifle and eight tank), and also a number of large units [soyedineniye] and units [chast] of other services and branches of troops. But, you see, it was not phantoms that served in these organs of command, large units, and units, but real people. We did not call up anyone to replace them. All told, we have now discharged about 70,000 officers who have served their established terms of service. Incidentally, some young officers who just barely started their service tried to leave the Army. I think that some of them decided simply to earn more. Because the Army has quite a few first class specialists, for example, in electronics and computers. And some of them, unfortunately, preferred the sheepskin coat of a cooperative worker to the Army overcoat...

[Romanovskiy] You anticipated my next question. While previously we gave the name "refusenik" only to dissidents who were not permitted to go to the West, today this title is quite applicable to officers who are not permitted to be discharged into the reserve ahead of schedule. Here, for example, is what was reported to us by Lieutenants Lashuk and Radomyselskiy from the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]: "One officer of our squadron who was denied a discharge decided to commit suicide. He was saved only by a miracle. But the commander announced before a formation: 'You can poison yourself, hang yourself, and shoot yourself. We will not discharge you no matter what. But there are instructions on how to bury.'" It will soon be a year since a secret order under your signature was issued that it is necessary to work individually, without haste, with young officers who want to be released into the reserve. However, they played it safe in the units, and they interpreted your order as a ban on discharges.

[Yazov] Actually, there was such a directive. But "to work individually" is one thing, and to ban—quite

another thing. There was a period when a rather substantial number of young officers wrote reports concerning discharge. This alarmed us. It was necessary to look into the situation and to analyze what motivates young officers to take as serious a step as getting out of the Army. I will tell you that, after each one was talked to individually, and after the sore points were resolved, many took their applications for discharge back. As it always happens, one wrote a report to keep company with his comrade, and another was simply frightened by domestic squabbling. But, tell me, who did not have these domestic squabbles?

In 1956, I graduated from the Academy Frunze with a gold medal and went to serve in the Leningrad Military District. And it started: one month without an apartment, a second... And my wife, who lived with her mother at that time in Borovichi (this is not far from Bologoye) was always saying: Go, find a private apartment, I am here alone. Back at that time, 30 years ago, it was a little easier to find housing than now. I walked and walked, searched and searched, and I was bitten by a dog in one yard, as I now recall. Finally, I found a little room...20 kilometers from my place of service. But it was at least something. The little house was wooden, and we had to have our own firewood and our own coal. And then the owners brought in one more family. And so we lived cooped up for a year. And I had all kinds of thoughts at that time...

[Romanovskiy] Admit it, you thought about getting a discharge?

[Yazov] No, I did not think of a discharge, but I did want to move to Moscow to enroll in a graduate course at a military school, to get into teaching, and to receive an apartment in Moscow. In short, to serve in one place. But it did not matter, I managed somehow... And after this, I served in a lot of places. I was with my regiment in Cuba during the Caribbean crisis, and I served in the Far East, in the Transbaykal, in the Ukraine, in the Transcaucasus, Moscow, the Central Group of Forces, Central Asia, and again in the Far East... So, estimate how many such private corners and apartments had yet to be changed since those days, and how many feelings, good and bad, changed over the years that have passed. Therefore, before leaving the Army, I advise the young officer to weigh his decision not seven but seventy-seven times. And so that you would not think that we are putting pressure on people under the guise of "individual conversations," I will cite specific figures: Up to the present, the Ministry of Defense has already discharged more than 12,000 junior officers who were eager to part with the Army.

[Romanovskiy] After the withdrawal of the 40th Army from Afghanistan, soldier-internationalists remained in the Turkestan Military District to complete their service until "dembel" [demobilization]. And as the procurator of the Dushanbe garrison told me, a large part of the desertions and absences without leave were precisely by those soldiers who had to serve in Afghanistan

(SOBESEDNİK No 42, 1989). We wrote "a large part" at that time in order not to shock the readers. Actually, practically all "pobegushniki" [deserters] were "afgantsy" [Soviet veterans of the Afghan war]. "There in Afghanistan," they admitted, "we ate with the officers from one mess kit, and we did not have exercise drills. But in the Union we once again have to salute officers and live according to regulations." Many held a grudge against their former commander Boris Gromov, who promised that they would be discharged into the reserve immediately after the withdrawal.

[Yazov] I do not think that officers in Afghanistan fraternized with soldiers that much. I myself am a front-line soldier since 1942, and this is what I would like to say regarding the "same mess kit." This was soon after I arrived in the forward area, and our regiment was occupying a position not far from the railroad station of Pogostye on the Volkhov front. One day I went out with my platoon to the kitchen. And there I was met by the commissar: "And where are you going, Comrade Lieutenant?" "To the kitchen," I answer, "together with everyone to eat." And he: "You are an officer, and you are supposed to eat separately. Let a soldier bring your supper to you at the forward post; you are not supposed to leave the forward post." This was the procedure at the front.

As for discharge ahead of schedule... I know that Comrade Gromov is a very thoughtful, serious, and responsible person, and he knows the scope of his authority. It is hardly likely that he would promise someone something that was impossible.

[Romanovskiy] I would like to ask you somewhat of a frivolous question. It is difficult for a soldier to serve two years far from home, but it is even more difficult to see women only from afar. There are even rumors that a bromide is added to dessert as a palliative. And when they go on pass, they are in formation. Is it not time for the Ministry of Defense, all the same, to remember the natural physiological needs of the defenders of the motherland and to beautify their modest leisure somewhat?

[Yazov] You know, we do not prevent meetings of soldiers with women. Collective passes are usually conducted in the groups of forces. But on the territory of the Soviet Union there are no "collective passes" of this kind. A lot of the soldiers have girls...

[Romanovskiy] In a report to the February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev for the first time talked about anti-Army propaganda in the press. Could you comment on this statement?

[Yazov] Actually, when anti-Army attitudes are talked about, it is the press that is in mind first and foremost. Unfortunately, some of its organs contribute their prattle to the formation of such attitudes. I look through SOBESEDNİK regularly, although I will tell you frankly that it is not always pleasant to read your newspaper. There was, for example, this kind of an issue last year: The first page showed a soldier's boot with a hole in the

sole and a caption: "I will serve as needed and will return." If this is humor, then it is rather strange; if it is satire, then it is dismal, and if it is an allegory, then it is immoral. Who serves whom in the Army. That, let us say, I have an orderly who polishes my shoes? I have been in the Army since I was 17, and two of my children grew up in garrisons. And not one soldier ever rocked a cradle or had a carriage with them. I did not hear anything like this with other officers either. But, you see, someone brings up a version of soldier-nannies on the pages of the press! Or Voynovich wrote about soldier Chonkin. It was neither a novel, nor a joke... The matter comes down to the fact that this Chonkin drinks moonshine from morning until evening and has fun with his Nyurka. And everyone around him is a fool. And why write about this with such sensuality? Or take Polyakov's story "One Hundred Days Until the Order." Unfortunately, it has a lot that is made up. And the "Stroybat" [construction battalion] of Kaledin? He should have thought before taking to the press. And, in general: Is it good or bad that we have a construction battalion? What do you think, who built Komsomolsk-na-Amur?

[Romanovskiy] They say that prisoners...

[Yazov] No, not only. At first, an Army construction corps of six brigades was set up. Soldiers laid the foundation and erected the first homes and streets, and the prisoners also built something. You did not ask yourself this kind of a question: Who will be the first to go to Chutkotka or to the taiga to master uninhabited places? Of course, our indispensable construction battalion. It will pitch the tents, it will begin to set itself up, and it will erect facilities. And this is generally typical of Russian history. It has been determined that the first one in Khabarovsk was a soldier, the first one in Vladivostok was a warrant officer. The prince's bodyguard laid the foundation for Moscow's Kremlin. Therefore, as a rule, those people swear at the Army who do not want to know the history of their country. Is it necessary to criticize that which is sacred to the national memory?

You can mock the name of soldier as much as you like, but no one, other than he, will hurl himself into fire at the first word of the motherland. As was the case, for example, not long ago in Baku, when our officers and soldiers, at the price of their own blood, and often their lives, prevented a catastrophe.

[Romanovskiy] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, what would you like to wish servicemen and the readers of SOBESEDNİK on the eve of Soviet Army and Navy Day?"

[Yazov] I would like sincerely and wholeheartedly to wish them well on this remarkable date. It is difficult to imagine in what torment the Red Army was born. To redeploy a military unit, all it takes today, figuratively speaking, is to make a telephone call. But back then, in 1918? There were no communications, there were no plants that manufactured weapons, and there was no way to finance military programs. Therefore, I would like to

bow before those who stood at the origins of our Armed Forces. First of all—before Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.

I wish veterans and soldiers, who are continuing their work with dignity, and youths, who will come to stand in Army and Navy ranks, and all readers of SOBESEDNIK, a peaceful sky, and good health and happiness.

The editorial staff of SOBESEDNIK joins in this greeting.

### Stefanovskiy Views Perestroyka in Armed Forces

90UM0333A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*  
in Russian 23 Feb 90 p 2

[Interview with Colonel General G. Stefanovskiy conducted by N. Panyukov: "Prestige of the Man With the Rifle"]

[Text] There is no family, no individual in our country, most likely, who does not have a connection with the USSR Armed Forces. The fathers and grandfathers of some fought in the ranks of the Red Army during the civil war, defended the forward boundaries of the fatherland in the 1920's and 1930's and fought to the death in the Great Patriotic War period. Some have themselves fought or served. Some have had relatives who have served, with some they are about to embark on military service now....

It is for this reason, evidently, that there is such great interest by the people in the processes occurring in the Army and Navy currently. In letters to the editor people are asking a multitude of very serious questions, which merge into one, as it were: How is perestroyka in the Army going? This was the topic of our correspondent's interview with Col. Gen. G. Stefanovskiy, deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate.

[Panyukov] Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, a question from our readers: What will the Army of the future be like?

[Stefanovskiy] To be brief, we may put it thus: the Army of the immediate future will, as I see it, be fewer in terms of numbers but far better in terms of training and professional approach.

[Panyukov] The reference point being a professional Army?

[Stefanovskiy] The modern level of the development of warfare and combat hardware and equipment and their operation are becoming so complex that they must demand, primarily of the officers and Army and Navy warrant officers, high professional skill.

This applies fully also to the compulsory-service soldiers, sergeants, sailors and petty officers. The entire system of their training has to be revised in the sense of increased professionalism. This is a difficult issue. The concerted efforts of military scholars, field workers and specialists of all disciplines will be needed here. But the further upgrading of the Armed Forces is impossible without its

solution. It should also be noted that an essential condition of the success of this work is precise determination of the functions of the Army, its qualitative condition and its place in society.

[Panyukov] There should evidently in this connection be a fundamental change in the preparation of the youth for service also?

[Stefanovskiy] Unquestionably, an important task in this connection is the elaboration of a uniform official policy designed to unite the forces and resources of the Armed Forces, the All-Union Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy, various military-patriotic associations, schools and physical culture societies in a fundamental improvement in the predraft preparation of the young men such as might facilitate their entry into the ranks of the defenders of the motherland. I believe that our whole society has an interest in this.

[Panyukov] Are the measures which are being adopted in the Armed Forces currently sufficient, in your view, for a radical renewal of the Army and the Navy?

[Stefanovskiy] Recent practice convinces me that they are not. Profound military reform undertaken on the basis of the new defensive doctrine and the principle of reasonable sufficiency, with regard for the development of the military and political situation in the world, is essential.

[Panyukov] And how soon should military reform be expected?

[Stefanovskiy] Haste is not an end in itself here. A search for approaches to the reform is not under way as yet. Combat and political training programs are being changed, the organizational-manning structure of the units and formations is being revised, the draft law on the defenses of the USSR is being discussed and laws on the military service obligation and military service and the status of the serviceman are being drawn up. The general military regulations and the regulations governing the Defense Ministry, the branches of the service, military districts and other control agencies have to be updated. There are approximately 70 such normative documents altogether.

Their realization in practice will contribute to the social protection of the servicemen and the strengthening of the legal foundations of their activity.

[Panyukov] There are a great deal of letters in the editorial mailbag which raise questions of military service. Specifically, a group of draftees from Lvov Oblast inquires: Will there be provision for alternative service?

[Stefanovskiy] This question is being studied within the framework of the draft law on the defenses of the USSR and the law on freedom of belief and religion. There are proposals for alternative service to be introduced for those who, owing to the state of their health or some



other reason, religious included, are not prepared to take the military oath and serve with weapon in hand.

[Panyukov] And one further question on service. It is put by A. Kopylov from the Moscow area, a participant in the Great Patriotic War. He is disturbed by the instances of draftees evading Army service. Is there not a need for a change in the legal status of the draft, the veteran asks, to ensure that at the time he is drafted, the young man enter into a legal relationship not with the Ministry of Defense but with the state?

[Stefanovskiy] Military service is not a caprice of the Ministry of Defense but the constitutional duty, the honorary and sacred duty, of every citizen. But for complete clarity it would probably indeed be more correct were the functions of the draft handed over to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the republic and local authorities.

Another aspect of the question is the prestige of military service. It has been seriously undermined with us at the present time. There are many reasons here associated with the specifics of the development of the political situation in the country. But is this not the result also of the fact that the Army had begun involvement in functions which are not its province, including the solution of many economic problems?

I believe that a most important condition ensuring the prestige of military service and the increased quality of the training of the Armed Forces is that the personnel of the Army and Navy be given a real chance to perform the direct duties which are characteristic of them.

In addition, the prestige of the Armed Forces has always rested on loyalty to traditions. And not only the traditions of the present but also the old Russian Army and Navy. The appeal to traditions should become a search for social values and the acquisition by the military man of social and moral reference points and ideals. Take, for example, such a splendid tradition of the Russian Army as officer meetings. It is now being consolidated and developed. An all-Army officer meeting was held last December, and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA recently published the text of the provisional regulations governing an officer meeting in the USSR Armed Forces and also the Soviet officer's honor code for the extensive discussion of these documents by the Army community.

A respectful attitude toward the exploits of the older generation is more necessary than ever today. Such an approach makes it possible to maintain high morale and pride in service in the USSR Armed Forces.

It is also necessary to adopt a more attentive attitude toward an analysis of the Afghan events. Granted all the criticism of the attitude toward them, we must not confuse two concepts: the evaluation of the decision to commit our forces to Afghanistan and the evaluation of operations of Soviet soldiers in performance of their international duty. The majority of them displayed heroism, selflessness and genuine humanism in respect of

the peaceful population. That is, the qualities which have always distinguished Soviet soldiers, who have served as moral reference points in the inculcation of patriotism and love of the motherland and our great people. Afghan veterans are today also in cooperation with Great Patriotic War veterans participating actively in the preparation of the young people for service and their heroic-patriotic and physical education.

[Panyukov] The restructuring processes in the Armed Forces are taking place under conditions of a reduction therein. This, naturally, is adding to the difficulties and engendering concern among Soviet people for the country's security.

[Stefanovskiy] The disquiet and concern indicate that our people are not indifferent to the fate of the country and its security. As far as the Soviet Government's steps pertaining to a reduction in the Army and Navy which are being taken specifically are concerned, I believe that it is a question of new times and a new understanding of the role and place of military resources in the solution of international questions. This is the first point.

Second, the reduction in the Soviet Armed Forces presupposes an enhancement of the qualitative parameters of the training of the personnel and of the arms and equipment. That is, less quantity, but the quality should be higher.

The steps which have been outlined today for the qualitative development of the Army and Navy and an analysis of the state thereof are reason to say that we are capable of accomplishing assignments within the framework of the defensive doctrine and reliably defending the security of our motherland. This should be understood by everyone: from the senior commander through the private, and he should treat very seriously preparations for defense. I refer to all aspects of the problem: military-scientific, military-technical, organizational-manning, economic and social.

[Panyukov] Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, in conclusion of the interview one further problem from the letters of our readers: a group of officers of the reserve from Ulyanovsk expresses concern at the fate of the regular servicemen who will shortly, in units, be withdrawn from Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

[Stefanovskiy] The concern is understandable. The task which the Ministry of Defense and our whole state (and I emphasize this) have to tackle is not easy. Approximately 30,000 officer and warrant officer families will be returning home. It will be necessary to provide them with apartments and jobs; and the children, with pre-schools and schools. We will simply be unable to cope here without a specific official program of social support for the servicemen and members of their families, about which M.S. Gorbachev spoke at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum. And so on all issues: the Armed Forces simply cannot survive today without nationwide, statewide support. If this support is forthcoming, the security of the fatherland will be surer and stronger.

## Baltic Republics

### Further on Brazauskas-Gorbachev Meeting

LD0803114790 Vilnius in Lithuanian to North America  
0100 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Text] In his interview with Lithuanian TV today, Algirdas Brazauskas, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, has confirmed yesterday's Vilnius Radio report that he met Mikhail Gorbachev Monday to discuss future relations between Lithuania and the USSR. The talk lasted one and one-half hours and was held in the Kremlin, not in M. Gorbachev's office at the CPSU Central Committee. The talk was between two state leaders; M. Gorbachev stressed that he was receiving A. Brazauskas on an official level as chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Presidium.

One of the main issues discussed was the economy, which today plays the main role when we speak about the independence of Lithuania and the structure of the Soviet Union as a state. M. Gorbachev pointed out that economic relations should be made clear [word indistinct] relations of the two states. It was stressed that future trading accounts will have to be made in convertible currency only. Having in mind that money turnover of Lithuania with other Soviet republics is nearly 8 billion rubles [R], which makes up about one-third of our national product, it is unrealistic to set an account in convertible currency. Lithuania's debt for the produce that had not been delivered was also counted in. This is expressed in the difference in the balance of imports and exports. According to the currently existing prices, Lithuania imports R400 million more than it exports to the Soviet Union. When converted into world prices this sum significantly exceeds the sum of 3 billion convertible rubles. It was stressed that he meant convertible rubles. The specific amount of the state debt was not given by A. Brazauskas because these figures could change during the process of negotiations. Information obtained from other sources indicates that while seceding from the Soviet Union Lithuania would be asked to pay R17 billion of the state debt.

It has become clear during the talk with M. Gorbachev that besides the economic issues that are labelled Lithuania's Debts to the Soviet Union, a very important political issue was also raised—specifically, the borders of Lithuania, which were defined by the treaty of 10 October 1939 while returning Vilnius to Lithuania. Borders with Belorussia were established by this treaty. Gorbachev stated that this treaty was violated by some voluntaristic decisions and each of them [words indistinct]. It was specifically mentioned that Druskininkai and other rayons were scheduled to be left in Belorussia; the Klaipeda port and the Klaipeda area were also problematic because there were no official documents to indicate that the Klaipeda area was handed back to Lithuania. One more aspect in the negotiations with Moscow has become clear: It is now clear that the centre has acquired far-reaching plans and this talk which took

place at the initiative of M. Gorbachev, according to A. Brazauskas, indicates that the USSR Government is seriously getting ready for future negotiations with Lithuania and, of course, would try to use all possible opportunities.

### Sajudis Wins Two-Thirds of Supreme Soviet Seats

LD0803164190 Moscow TASS International Service  
in Russian 1603 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Kazis Ustila]

[Text] Vilnius, 8 Mar (TASS)—The elections to the republic's Supreme Soviet are continuing in Lithuania. They are being repeated in eight constituencies.

According to preliminary data, another seven candidates received mandates as deputies at the repeat elections, which took place yesterday in seven constituencies. Thus, 123 out of 141 deputies have already been elected. "Sajudis" representatives have already received more than two-thirds of all the deputies' mandates for the new parliament, which will assemble for its first session on the evening of 10 March.

### Sajudis Meeting With Matlock 'Not Quite Friendly'

LD0903102490 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian  
0100 GMT 9 Mar 90

[Text] Yesterday five Sajudis representatives met U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock. This is the fifth such meeting since last July. All five Sajudis representatives are USSR people's deputies, and four of them are deputies to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. They were Vytautas Landsbergis, Romualdas Ozolas, Mecys Laurinkus, Vaidotas Antanaitis, and Egidijus Bickauskas.

Romualdas Ozolas told Vilnius Radio that the meeting took place in the ambassador's residence and lasted about 10 minutes. Conversation with other officials at the embassy lasted about one and a half hours.

According to Mecys Laurinkus, the meeting, which was planned in advance, almost did not take place, because Mr Matlock said that he did not feel well and could not [word indistinct].

Romualdas Ozolas agreed to comment on the meeting somewhat longer. I asked him what was the purpose of the meeting.

[Begin recording] [Ozolas] We do not know what was planned. We only think that something was planned, but we were not told about it. The meeting took place on the initiative of the U.S. ambassador. Such meetings have taken place more than once. It may be said that this was the continuation of our mutual cooperation in discussing the main stages. This time the ambassador stated that he would be glad to talk, but when we arrived the conversation was obscure. It was repeated to us that the United

States will recognise Lithuania only if the present borders are agreed with the Soviet Union, although we have spoken quite clearly about the inviolability of the borders and this is the foreign policy principle of both the Soviet Union and the United States. There is no need to talk about it. We should hold all state power on our territory, that is, economic, political, and social. This is also quite clear, and we have talked about it more than once in the past. In this context, when this is said on the eve of the session of the new Supreme Soviet, one may understand this as a not quite friendly conversation.

[Presenter] Maybe, the U.S. ambassador has been influenced by some circumstances?

[Ozolas] Undoubtedly he was influenced and we regard this as a means of exerting pressure by Moscow. The ambassador, it seems, visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before our meeting—we established this later unofficially—and it is obvious that pressure was put on him. At the end of our conversation with the embassy officials we stated that everything we have planned will be continued, bearing in mind the desire for everything to be carried out carefully, but we know ourselves that everything should be done very carefully, wisely and constructively. Thus we parted, one may say, at a dead end, but we will move from this dead end in the very near future. [end recording]

### Sajudis Votes for Unilateral Independence

OW0903061090 Tokyo KYODO in English  
0525 GMT 9 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, March 8 KYODO—Lithuania's Sajudis Party voted late Thursday to call for a unilateral declaration of independence for its Soviet Baltic state, a senior Sajudis official said.

The measure is assured passage in the Lithuanian legislature in which Sajudis holds over two-thirds of the seats.

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has warned the Lithuanian Republic against the move, which is expected to fuel ethnic independence movements elsewhere in the country.

The senior Sajudis member said in a telephone interview with the KYODO NEWS SERVICE that party members had passed the measure in a conference late Thursday evening.

The passage of the measure would signal the first time a Soviet republic has exercised the constitutionally guaranteed right to leave the Soviet federation of 15 republics since its founding in 1922.

Sajudis plans to submit the declaration to the republic's assembly March 10. Members of the minority Lithuanian Communist Party, which split from Moscow last year, are also expected to support the move.

The party hopes the early passage will thwart moves against the measure by Gorbachev, who is almost

assured of assuming a new presidential post with greatly increased powers March 12.

### Quest for Independence Explained

LD0803151090 Vilnius LITERATURA IR MENAS  
in Lithuanian No 6, 10 Feb 90 p 2

[Text of speech by Vytautas Martinkus, entitled "I Am—The Way, The Truth And The Life," given on 11 Jan at the Lithuanian intelligentsia meeting with M. Gorbachev]

[Text] I am going to discuss a subject that is giving much thought and causing much anguish to all those who treasure their Fatherland and to whom, according to one Russian philosopher, it represents "the sacred secret of every individual."

Lithuania is the embodiment of this sacred secret for everyone of its inhabitants. It is—an ontological as well as, a metaphysical concept. It is, however, sufficiently real. It is a concept which cannot be replaced by any other more abstract concepts such as, the Soviet Union, Europe, the Earth and the Cosmos....

I am firmly convinced that an individual who was not born in Lithuania, but has not yet become aware of the phenomenon of his birth, his individuality and his destiny as a reflection of Lithuanian destiny, will today or tomorrow, begin to view the fatherland in like fashion, since he will only be able to grasp through the window of my country and through Lithuanian spiritual culture, the space of his ancestors, who perhaps had lived far from Lithuania.

I am certain, even one who was not born in Lithuania, but has just recently arrived in our country, has brought with him a great secret—a line of births and deaths, the genealogical tree of his family and his relatives; moreover I could not find a better—brighter and more spacious—spot for this tree than one in the sacred forests—oak-treed and becoming famous not as hunting ground for yesterday's and today's rulers, but as a shrine and altar of the forbears of my fatherland, my land.

Let this be a reminder to everyone that I dare to speak on behalf of all those Lithuania's inhabitants, who know what their historical and cultural roots are and how intertwined they are with the roots of their neighboring countries, who know what they seek and who are thoughtfully, and with great responsibility, determined to retrieve their economic, political and spiritual pulse.

It goes without saying, free speech is the only real victory of restructuring, for the time being; yes, free speech is the only shield and sword in the hands of a people that are free, and does not become acquired instantly and naturally. This is why journalists, philosophers and scientists are essential for a nation during a period when it has not yet formed its social and political goals with sufficient precision.

Currently, however, the basis of the most secret and concurrently, of the most open goals for the majority of Lithuania's inhabitants—is simple and clear: A sovereign, independent Lithuanian state. That is—the goal and means of historical rebirth and of current and future labors. I could describe it in another way: A political slogan, an international law and justice question, a psychological frame of mind and—finally—a faith or prayer and a panacea from spiritual estrangement—from the vacuum in our souls.

(I am stressing this point because our guest, Academician Velikhov has expressed his amazement, on republic television, on what he referred to at that time, as an almost religious attitude on the part of Lithuanians, toward the problem of Lithuania's statehood).

I understand how this appears "one-sided" and that it may be labeled as "nationalism."

Yes, indeed it is the opinion of **one half**. The other half—rests with the position of those who wish to maintain the status quo. Truth however, is such that there is not and cannot be a "one side" where a two or even "three-sided" balance could dominate without any contradictions. Our dialectical thinking is currently so ambiguous or even degenerate, that even self-evident matters can not be proven: A phenomenon, after all, remains a phenomenon only because its existence as a whole, is actually its existence as a half of some **other** phenomenon.

Lithuania's self-determination and the renewal of its independence—also enter into a complex and **defined** phenomenon. It contains enough "sides" in itself.

I have no intention of actually demonstrating the necessity of such a political step for Lithuania. (The right to national self-determination belongs to those rights however, for which currently, at least!—arguments—need not be presented).

I will only recall the reason why we have decided on this. (Let the analogy force us to reflect....)

Success in doing away with God, "once and for all", has not been attained in so many decades, after all." The fact that currently, we ourselves are issuing invitations not to God's, but to "militant atheism's" funeral, is indicative of our return to normal relations with this, one of the oldest sources of our spirituality.

Thus, permit me to ask: Does not the same fate await (or will await) the national states? It is impossible "to bury" that form of society's political organization, while it continues to be historically vital for nations.

Our spiritual vacuum and the illness or drama of our spiritual political thought, can be expressed as follows: We have fallen under the temptation to "create" a state, for which we ourselves have prophesied non-existence and "death renewal," while at the same time, we have renounced all that is most vital and most human i.e., we

have renounced democracy and the defense of inherent human rights. Thus, the path leading us to the funeral of such a state is very natural.

I am deeply convinced that the conflict between the Lithuanian Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a crisis of a formal political system, that is already disappearing. The conflict provides strength for the future. This is dictated by life itself: Our economy has not seen an improvement in almost five years time and our national and political questions have not been resolved.... The process is this: Along with restructuring and new economic cooperation ("economic association") conditions—other sovereign states—must be formed beside our renewed Lithuanian state—by means of national self-determination!

The Lithuanian Communist Party is—on the right path. It stands for—those ideas and programs that inspire and unite today's entire Lithuanian nation and all of Lithuania. (The abstract—removed from the will of our nation—political dream has sapped itself excessively). Let us look truth in the eye: Life has sternly reviewed and rejected those goals of "building communism," and the paths that have seemed utopian but were blind. This is why the Lithuanian Communist Party supports and must support, without any doubts, the new stage in our political development—Lithuania as an independent state.

Thus, as political party interests can never be placed above the the nation's will, so it seems to me the question, "What is the truth?," raised during the 10th Lithuanian CP Congress and the CC CPSU Plenum argument, can only be correctly answered with an answer we recall from the Bible: "I am—the way, the truth and the life."

This answer, however, can only be given by one, who is accorded this by nature.

It is Lithuania itself.

#### **Lithuanian Economist on Problems of Independence**

LD0803162290 Moscow TASS International Service  
in Russian 0500 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Text] Vilnius, 8 Mar (TASS)—TASS correspondent Aleksandras Budris writes:

The eminent Lithuanian economist Bronislav Zaykauskas thinks that in the event of talks being conducted between the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] and the Soviet Union on the restoration of an independent Lithuanian state issues of settling scores, of paying out any kind of compensation for secession from the USSR, should not be raised.

In a conversation with a TASS correspondent the adviser on economic issues of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet (parliament) Presidium noted that during the period that Lithuania has been part of the union, the funds invested in the development of its economy had



been repaid, and many of the enterprises set up have long been making a profit. On the other hand, Lithuania can "tend a bill for the damage inflicted on it during the years of Soviet power," particularly for the repressions that its citizens were subjected to.

The issue of restoring an independent Lithuanian state worries everyone without exception in this Baltic republic today. In the 7 February decision of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet proclaimed Lithuania's entry into the Soviet Union illegal. The parliamentary commission for drawing up the plan for restoring the republic's independence has published a conception of setting up an independent Lithuanian economy.

In the opinion of Zaykauskas who has taken part in the work of the commission, the process of attaining Lithuania's juridical and factual independence depends on many factors: The development of events in the Soviet Union, the position of other countries, their recognition of the future Lithuanian state, and last but not least, economic reforms. Since Lithuania's economy has been developing for a long time as an organic part of the USSR's national economy, at this stage the republic needs to preserve existing economic ties with the Soviet Union.

At the same time the data on mutual economic accounts should be rechecked. Thus the USSR State Statistical Committee asserts that Lithuania imports from the Soviet Union goods worth R1.5 billion more than it exports. Zaykauskas believes this is not logical, that the Soviet republics that are the most developed from an industrial point of view, the Baltic republics, have a negative balance in trade with the remaining part of the USSR. At the same time, since Lithuania is still not ready to trade with the USSR at world prices, the existing prices should be retained in mutual trade for some time and a mechanism of gradual transition to world prices and currency computations should be worked out.

The councillor of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Presidium noted that without the relevant foreign investments the republic cannot improve its technological and economic level rapidly. Lithuania does have something to interest foreign partners. Since it does not have reserves of raw materials, the republic's geographical situation can be used to advantage. For Western firms Lithuania can become something like a "trampoline" to the Soviet market. The cost of manpower in Lithuania is considerably lower than in many countries. Combined with a good economic basis and the sufficiently high qualifications of the working people compared with those in the rest of the USSR, this can provide an opportunity for producing sufficiently cheap output of a high technical standard. Western financial experts and banks, Zaykauskas thinks, are prepared to invest money in the development of the Lithuanian economy, if the republic is furnished with political, economic and social stability.

### Lithuanian Institute on Polish Instruction

90UN0990C Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA  
in Russian 8 Feb 90 p 1

[Unattributed article under the rubric "Around the Republic": "How To Help Polish Schools"]

[Text] Questions of training Polish educational cadres were discussed at the Vilnius Teachers' Training Institute in a meeting of leaders and teachers of the institute and representatives of the Lithuanian Council of Polish Scholars and interested bureaus.

S. Raema, rector of the institute; R. Brazis, chairman of the Council of Polish Scholars; and others talked about problems and plans for improving the training of educational specialists for Polish educational institutions and increasing the proficiency level of educational specialists and teachers, and they introduced proposals and expressed their wishes. G. Kobetskayte, chairman of the Committee on Nationalities under the Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], and R. Podagel, first deputy minister of Lithuanian public education, acquainted the meeting's participants with the government's activities regarding the resolution of educational problems of Lithuania's national minorities and the implementation of the concept of a school for nationalities.

### Problems Facing Go-It-Alone Lithuania Viewed

PM0703142590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
7 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent L. Kapelyushnyy report: "Alternative. Lithuania Faces a Choice. Where It Is Going And Where It Might Lead"]

[Text] Vilnius—Lithuania is schooling public opinion to accept that it is "pulling out." That is a fact. Appeals not to hurry, to wisely weigh things up, and make sober assessments bounce off the small republic's political leaders like water off a duck's back. You get the impression that the more Lithuania is admonished, the more desperately and madly it strives to escape from its present position. We want freedom and will pay any price for it.

There is no need to pale with immediate indignation and anger. Let us after all be reasonable and calm. Do Lithuanians have the constitutional right to determine their own future themselves? They do. There is no use objecting that this people, like all of us, moreover, have suffered from repressions, that collectivization took place under pressure, that their sovereignty existed only on paper, and that the economy slid into some kind of monstrous dead end.

All that is so. The Lithuanians are not on their own.

Slogans calling for "withdrawal from the USSR" can be heard from Moscow to the borders. They have become

almost as familiar to us as the previous slogans proclaiming "the five-year plan in four years." For instance, far away—but nonetheless in our country—the idea of reviving the Far Eastern republic is looming. There are natural resources galore, we will trade and live a wealthier life than they do in the Emirates. It is another matter when the following questions arise: Who will extract these resources and how, to whom will we sell them, and how long will they last...?

Of course, Lithuania and its immediate neighbors are another matter. They are not simply stating their aims, they are acting. Legislative acts severing vessel after the vessel, nerve after nerve from the all-union organism like a lancet are being adopted one after the other. Skillful use is being made of clamps, plugs, modern materials, devices, and instruments—the operation is proceeding bloodlessly and apace.

Self-determination has become part of public (it would be more correct to say national) consciousness. Some day political specialists will study the mechanism that shapes this consciousness and give credit to the mass media and the vigorous skillful methods employed by so-called informal associations' propagandists. They have literally demoralized the apparatus of soviet and party bodies. Accustomed to the masses' unquestioning submission and obedience, this apparatus, which had never seen sight nor sound of enemies in the home political arena, succumbed to fever and palsy at the slightest draft. As a result the most able people were won over to its side, while others were expelled, eliminated, or compromised.

Is Lithuania pulling out? It is a pity. There is also a desire to find the culprit instead of analyzing the reasons precisely and objectively. But let us return to summer 1988. Let us describe in a little more detail the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau sitting, which only merited a few sentences of press coverage at the time.

R. Songayla, then first secretary of the Central Committee, who had been appointed to this post less than a year before, reported on the situation. Events in the republic were taking a drastic turn, primary organizations were demanding the resignation of the first and second secretaries, passions roused by rallies were heating up day by day. R. Songayla, a supremely composed and cultured man, was not only unsettled but also did not look at all well.

The bureau members were unanimous. They said that the Central Committee had lost its head and lost the initiative, that the situation was threatening to become unmanageable, that the republic's leadership was being attacked by "Sajudis," and that things were reaching the point where people were demanding the removal of individual leaders. In the summer of 1988 the call for resignation was still seen as scandalous irresponsibility, provocation, and nonsense.

Approximately 40 people were invited to this sitting. Everyone was instructed to express an opinion. Many

people took advantage of this opportunity. Including S. Lisauskas, minister of internal affairs. A spirited man with a sincere love of the cause, he spoke of increasing disobedience of the militia, insults directed at his personnel, public attacks on authority, anti-Sovietism, and distortions of historical truth in the press. "What are we to do in this situation?" the minister asked.

"Stick them in jail!" a bureau member retorted tersely.

It was already noisy enough in the small hall. But a truly deathly hush set in after this rejoinder. "We have already been there..." came the answer, heard throughout Lithuania.

I remember this because "sticking them in jail" with all its attendant consequences is the only alternative to democracy.

Why Lithuania is going to "pull out" and what it is renouncing is another matter for discussion (and this is long overdue). Not a general discussion but one that analyzes the economic and political situation naming the responsible parties who have not been called to account. But it is even more important, I believe, to ponder: Where is Lithuania going? How will its sovereign right to self-determination affect its own position and the interests of the other republics? I would very much like to urge the reader not to take umbrage but to contemplate this with me.

In order to avoid incompleteness, we must also when seeking an answer to this question touch on ancient history—how did Lithuania enter the USSR? Today the prevailing conviction in the republic is that this happened against the will of the people as a result of communists' crafty actions and Stalin's pact with Hitler. The role of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact has been comprehensively studied and assessed by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, we will not touch on it. Yet there is no harm in recalling the people's mood in 1940....

Since the newspapers, newsreels, eyewitness evidence, and even documents have now been tainted with suspicion and mistrust as "Red propaganda," "fabrications by the occupying regime," and so on, an outsider's opinion is interesting.

I was flicking through a slim "samizdat" book, a translation of a work by the American journalist Anna Louisa Strong printed in New York in 1941 and entitled "New Lithuania." A name that may only be known to specialists, yet Strong is the author of about 15 books of political commentary popular in the thirties and forties; she was clearly anathema to the Stalinist regime and was therefore deported from the country in 1949 "for espionage."

In 1940 Anna Louisa Strong left Berlin for Moscow and made a stopover in Lithuania. She was interested by the "parliamentary" revolution that was taking place. She had the normal ambition of a professional reporter: "I

was the only foreign correspondent in Lithuania... observing the processes there at close hand."

So, in A.L. Strong's book the Lithuanian people rapturously welcome Red Army soldiers, curse Smetona's dictatorship, and proclaim the slogan "Lithuania Is the Thirteenth Soviet Republic." I cannot resist a long quote.

"The culmination of the election campaign was a large meeting of workers and peasants 10 July in Kaunas. Throughout the day peasants came into the city, along with groups of women in national dress and young people on bicycles from remote villages. Ancient melancholic Lithuanian songs saddened by the hopelessness of peasant life were intermingled with the new cheerful songs of the Red Army sung by the workers of Kaunas. I stopped near a truck belonging to the 'Penotsentras' dairy cooperative.

"Where are you from? What do people in your home town say about the elections? Are you in favor of a Soviet Lithuania," I asked.

"We are in favor of a thirteenth Soviet republic," the girls shouted.

"Is everyone?" I asked. They shook their heads in denial.

"No, not all the old people are. They don't know what they want. But we do."

"Toward evening everyone gathered in a large field on a hill near Kaunas. Long lines of peasant carts reeking of horse manure followed by vehicles decorated with garlands of flowers stood there. Here, too, there were bearded men, women in shawls, soldiers in high boots, and peasants with bare suntanned feet wearing rough wooden-soled shoes.

"Crossing the vast field, the column of people came out of the city bearing portraits of Stalin, Voroshilov, and President Paletskis...."

It is difficult to suspect Strong of wanting to join in the Soviet propaganda chorus of that time. Rather, she was reflecting the real picture; Lithuania did actually rush to join the USSR, carried by the sails of a euphoria born of rallies—how similar to today's moods! Economic and political calculations, forecasts for the next 10 years, an understanding of the danger of losing sovereignty—where was all that then? You can understand the naive ignorance of peasants and workers carrying portraits of Stalin, Voroshilov, and Paletskis. But for the government of bourgeois Lithuania, which is so highly respected in the republic today, the true nature of Stalin's regime was no secret. Yet for some reason it chose as its ally the Red USSR rather than brownshirted Germany. The communists were not even present at the time, they have an irrefutable "alibi"—they were all in Smetona's jails and concentration camps.

And now, 50 years on, hundreds of thousands of people are gathering in the green fields and hills to hold rallies,

tricolor banners are waving, popular songs are being sung. Like a prayer the people at the rallies intone the slogan "Freedom for Lithuania!" Like an oath they say "Lithuania without sovereignty is a Lithuania without a future!" Do they have a precise scheme? A prediction? Is there a guarantee that some time later the politicians, ensnared by economic and political consequences now unforeseen, will not begin seeking a "culprit" among the present leaders of the rallies and movements?

Some 18 months ago, the calls to leave the union were regarded as adventurist and provocative, something which only the League for a Free Lithuania did. In recent months, particularly at the height of the election campaign, they were the common stuff of political propaganda. We are pulling out—period! If we had the time and space we could quote the most interesting comments of the present-day leaders, the new-wave politicians. But as for the word "integrate," it all comes down to one thing—the people do not want to be in the USSR, remaining in the union is impossible, delay is almost like death.

The people's opinion, meanwhile, has still not been sought by anyone. Because even the most enormous rally is still only a small section of the people. The experience of 1940, the bitter experience of Lithuanian history, teaches us that decisions produced by rallies, when turned into economic and political realities, then leave people wondering for decades. Does every citizen of Lithuania today know where Lithuania is going to and how much "freedom without the USSR" will cost him personally?

I have already told readers about the conference at the Lithuanian Council of Ministers where the concept for the functioning of an independent Lithuanian economy was examined. Ministers and leaders of major enterprises went to the rostrum not with slogans but with questions and proposals. These did not include a single question—I emphasize, not a single one!—about where they were going to sell their output. All the questions were about where they would obtain items. In the republic's fuel and energy complex the territory's own freely available raw materials—peat and wood—account for three percent. In 1989 the republic used 4.8 million tonnes of fuel oil, 1.1 million tonnes of gasoline, 1.2 million tonnes of diesel fuel, and 138,000 tonnes of liquefied gas.

Can this monopoly dependence on the USSR for oil and gas be avoided? Or for coal? For metals and cotton? Of course. The world market is open to all. But anyone who knows the prices on that market will smile bitterly: 1,000 cubic meters of natural gas cost \$97 (currently 28 rubles [R]), while one tonne of oil costs \$110 (R30). Coal, needless to say, can also be bought from Poland. Timber can be bought from Finland, which draws this raw material in particular from us. Metals can be obtained from Germany. The question is—why buy them? Currently the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]

obtains more foreign currency and foreign-currency goods than it produces foreign-currency output.

Glasnost in the economy is perhaps more important than glasnost in politics. For instance, this year Lithuania plans to use 2 billion cubic meters of gas more than last year (7 billion as against 5 billion). Pressure from the "Greens" has brought a halt to the development of hydroelectric and nuclear power. And there are even shortcomings in agriculture—the most prosperous sector: There is a shortage of home-grown feed. In 1989 1.3 million tonnes (37 percent) of concentrates were shipped in, and around 400,000 tonnes of grain for food purposes were obtained from the USSR. No, this does not mean that Lithuania would lack feed for its own needs. It does not live at the country's expense. Around 40 percent—169,000 tonnes—of all meat and milk production in the republic is sent to all-union stocks. We need to know that, too, not just the price of oil and timber.

But there is another side to the problem. A number of enterprises in Lithuania have a monopoly when it comes to meeting the needs of the USSR. Domestic electricity meters, deflection systems and remote controls for television sets, vehicle compressors [avtokompressory], fuel apparatus for tractors, and so forth. Can you imagine the chaos caused in the handover of new housing if there were no meters? What wave of irritation would rear up if Lithuanian matches were to disappear from the stores?

We are interdependent. It is a different kind of dependence for each side. Lithuania, lit up by the spotlight of political passions, accounts for 0.3 percent of the country's territory, 1.3 percent of its population, 1.4 percent of the national income, and 1.5 percent of the industrial and 2.2 percent of the agricultural output. Even in today's very serious economic situation the loss of these percentages would add little to the pain.

It is a bad thing that we in the union have not yet calculated who produces what and how much and who owes what to whom. After all, those who remain will certainly want to know what is going to happen to their share—during the years of Soviet power around R50 billion have been invested in the development of the republic's economy, and in other regions they somehow accepted it, considering it a matter of course that the investment growth rate should be higher in the Baltic republics. What's the difference, they thought. We all live in the same house—so they developed the machine tool building, shipbuilding, electrical equipment, electronics, chemical and petrochemical industries in Lithuania and reestablished the fishing industry. They were created not just for Lithuania, but for everyone. So we did not count the cost.

A good thing we did not count the cost! Now we are in a fix, we have started to.... But everyone—everyone in every republic—must do his bit.

Lithuania stands at a crossroads. Groups of leaders, waving flags of various colors, raising (who's is the

highest!) slogans of various kinds, are urging it to follow them. Each has his own morality, his own truth, his own mathematics and methods of proof. As has happened many times before (not only with Lithuania, not only in Lithuania), they have already decided everything for the people. What, are we trying to attain that sort of life in the old way?

If you think seriously about it, the Lithuanian people are being told to make a choice that is very important for their future, for the future of their homeland, on the basis of what slogans are the most attractive. Of course, any people will choose freedom, sovereignty, and independence, but true democracy, it seems, is not a matter of thousands of people gasping the sweet word "Freedom!" at a rally. Democracy is the people's obligatory involvement in decisionmaking. Alas today both the advocates of secession and the defenders of the acquisition of freedom and a renewed federation are all using their own sets of figures while citing the opinion of the people—without asking the people. The situation is so serious that to postpone a thorough analysis and evaluation of the situation with economic studies and the involvement of all parties, public forces, and currents and all strata of the population is intolerable and disrespectful toward the people. Sometimes it seems to me that both sides simply do not want to know the truth, they are afraid of it. The center: What if, after a simulation exercise has been conducted, secession from the USSR turns out to be an advantage? Lithuania: What if the republic, on obtaining sovereignty, ends up being racked by taxes, debts, and poverty...?

Politicians, as they say, are only human, they are not devoid of passion and they are subject to emotions, too, but it is no accident that epithets such as sober-minded, sensible, cold-blooded are used to describe politicians.... In politics emotions recede or rather are pushed into the background, while cold calculation, accurate prediction of the possible consequences of decisions that are made, and a focus on gain, not personal gain of course, are paramount in the making of serious policy.

No matter how hard the ideologists of secession are claiming that Lithuania does not owe anything to anybody, they will have to take account of the conditions which the center sets, just as the center will have to take account of the demands of the republics. I am not an economist nor an expert in international law and therefore I will ask questions—probably not the most important ones, but questions which have surfaced in one form or another in various articles or public speeches. What is to happen with installations in nationwide ownership? After all, these are common assets created through the efforts of the entire nation and it is not very likely that if Lithuania walks out, slamming the door, the other republics will disinterestedly wave goodbye to them in order to tighten their belts and start from scratch. It will be necessary to count the cost and do the sums, just like among strangers now, alas. It will be necessary to dismantle some installations in order to transfer them to the territory of the union, some assets may be bought up by



the republic and others leased, while at some enterprises joint production will have to be organized and the finished output divided in agreed proportions. In the case of leasing of enterprises, the republic will inevitably have to repay all the investments made by the union, including investments in hard currency. In the event of secession the introduction of world prices for all goods and raw materials is inevitable, as is the settlement of all questions relating to Lithuania's share of the internal and external debt, the introduction of customs services on the border and of licenses and declarations—in short, mutual relations will have to be organized on the lines of those with any other foreign country. Then there is another series of questions which cannot be side-stepped—the ports, the continental shelf, the railroads and highways, the communication and power lines which stretch toward Kaliningrad Oblast (incidentally, a whole package of measures will be needed to protect the interests of the union in that oblast which belongs to Russia).

Then there is another, a living, a human chain of questions. The state has an obligation to safeguard and protect the interests and rights of those who will wish to retain Soviet citizenship and also to ensure, at the expense of the republic, the compensation of the property rights of those who decide to move to other republics....

Lord, have we any idea with what pain, torment, clashes, and grievances this separation is fraught?

Anna Luisa Strong wrote with enthusiasm in 1940 that prominent writers, spiritual fathers of the nation, were represented in the new Lithuanian Government. Who will deny that without intellectuals, scientists, and high-class specialists progress is impossible? However, it is equally obvious that the interests of the workers, peasants, and craftsmen need to be protected with great understanding and skill by representatives of precisely these social strata. What does this mean applied to the current situation? In the just elected Lithuanian parliament it is possible to count on one's fingers the workers and agricultural workers—representatives of the main mass of the republic's population. The mass, that is, which will have to implement any decision....

Lithuania will pull out, they repeat almost habitually at every meeting and conference. But here is food for thought. The recent plenum of the Lithuanian Communist Party provisional Central Committee (CPSU platform) was addressed by a delegate from a Polish rayon, who stated: Our population will remain within the USSR. He was echoed by a delegate from Klaypeda—we won't leave, Lithuania will remain as it was before 1945, without the Klaypeda region. Not to mention the fact that hundreds of citizens from the so-called Russian-speaking population are bombarding the center with letters demanding the introduction of migrant status and they do not want to be found themselves left outside the country either suddenly or as a result of a "parliamentary revolution."

Democracy is not just the victory of the majority, it also means observing the interests of those who now form the minority, isn't that what deputies, including those from Lithuania, called for so avidly at their first congress?

Once I found myself on some drift ice with members of a polar expedition. The ice floe was none too sound and cracked one night during my tour of duty, forming a fissure, a fantastic zigzag which split the settlement and the food and salted meat store into three islands. I sounded the alarm to escape. Kir Gobi, an old polar hand, who was stretching, half asleep, heard me and called out: "Where do you think these islands will go?" he asked. "There is nowhere for them to go, there's nothing but ice in the Arctic Ocean."

No one is going anywhere. There is nowhere to go. We are destined to live together for ever on a single earth. Destined to be neighbors, to mix with one another, to trade, and to help one another. Mutual interest in coexistence, whether within the bounds of a single state or across a border, should be determined by mutual benefit. In our present old home of the USSR, economic and moral laws of social development have replaced the cult of the directive. Its day is over. Leaving it behind is a historically objective necessity. Perestroika has flung the doors wide open. So what is the point of forcing those open doors? The demolition of the old home marks the beginning of the building of the new one. Indeed it is not very farsighted to leave even a communal apartment to wait outside while a comfortable detached house is built.

#### **Zile Addresses Latvian Plenum 6 Mar**

*LD0803185790 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian  
1228 GMT 6 Mar 90*

[Speech by Lubova Zile, director of the Latvian Communist Party History Institute, at the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee plenum in Riga—live]

[Excerpts] Respected participants in the plenum: The rapidity and extensive scope of the changes taking place in the present-day world force absolutely everyone to ask: Why is the totalitarian barracks socialism collapsing, and are the parties, which have had a monopoly of power, disintegrating? [passage omitted]

Already it can be said that the Communist Party of Latvia is no longer, after changing Article 6, the vanguard, but only one of the parties which, in a bitter competition with other political forces, must win its authority; I underline, must win its authority, and not the leading role. [passage omitted] The party would be more dangerous if people like Comrade Klauzens, who feel that restructuring is a modernization of the administrative system. With their action they will then destroy the party entirely. [passage omitted] Before restructuring, for such ideas all kinds of labels would be attached, and this is being done today by many party functionaries: Some are accused of a retreat from Marxism-Leninism, but in Stalin's times they would have been declared enemies of the people.

Precisely this was repeated at the city of Riga party plenum of 3 March, when the results of the 24 February Communist Party of Latvia conference [as heard] were discussed. Actually, this was a session of swearing, about which many are ashamed.

We were called splitters, traitors to the teaching of Marxism-Leninism. It was demanded to expel us from the party, to dismiss us from work. Where is our pluralism? Where is our multiparty system? [passage omitted] Also, the attitude toward the situation in Lithuania could not be one incomprehension. This situation must not be adjudged by anybody outside Lithuania; it can be assessed only by their own people and communists.

Today our society's purification, getting rid of dogmatism, of mendacious assessments, of false comprehension on everything we have quoted is taking place. Under the new conditions of restructuring, life is changing, and societal relations are changing. Therefore, do not rush to accuse others if you think differently. You yourselves have not yet arrived at a clear understanding of the essence of our society's restructuring, on the new which arrives to replace the old, totalitarian socialism imposed in its time. It is to be wondered at, those party functionaries and also communists who are incapable of taking in the new phenomena, the necessity of ownership's diversity in our society. In the first place this concerns private property.

Many comrades—I am putting comrades in quotation marks—are explaining on various rostrums that private property would create the danger of exploitation. But what they do not see is that socialism until now has created danger and misfortunes difficult to comprehend.

There is no need to dramatize either on one side or the other. We are making a turn which will change our society to the right side. We are appealing for learning to discuss under the conditions of a multiparty system, to listen to opponents, and not to condemn and to search for enemies.

What are we giving up; that is, the Communist Party of Latvia? Building a communist society, the party's monopoly on power, the single party system, the dogmas of Marxism-Leninism, the monopoly of ideology. We deny the claim of any class to the leading role. [We are giving up] the methods of violence, making the means of production public, and administrative/bureaucratic socialism.

What are we taking a stand for? For the well-being of man, for a diversity of the forms of ownership, for a law-governed state, for a sovereign Latvia, for a multiparty system, for the freedom of man, for the cooperation of various political forces. I want to underline this especially: For the cooperation of various political forces. For political pluralism, for a national respect for the feelings of citizens, for the development of culture, for Latvia being the only territory where the Latvian nation is able to live and develop freely.

The territory of the republic of Latvia is indivisible; that is, for those who wish to establish autonomies.

At present, a great unbelief is to be seen among the communists regarding the possible actual transformations. I am speaking in the name of many thousands of communists, on the basis of a great many of discussions in which we have participated. Most important of the communists demand is to form an independent Communist Party of Latvia with its program and rules. The desires of these communists are expressed in the drafts of the communist party of Latvia program and rules. The demand for a restoration of the communist party of Latvia has no nationality character. An expression of this is found in the opposite opinions of supporters of society's democratization and of the defenders of the administratively [word indistinct] centralized system.

If we are talking about national communists, as it is being frequently used in the press now, that is, about Latvian communists, concerning our party organization, then it must be stated that at present there are 39 percent of them in the party; i.e., according to old information, which we in fact do not possess.

We are greatly concerned that the ranks of national communists are beginning to diminish, by Latvians leaving the party. But neither Comrade Klaučens nor the Central Committee secretaries are alarmed. Does it not concern you who, in the sovereign Latvia, in the republic, is in the party? If soon there are no Latvians in it, then what kind of party will it be? What kind of republic will it represent?

The independence of the communist party of Latvia will depend on the unity of the communists of the republic, on the support of all the inhabitants. Moreover, the policy of the party must be changed in order that the forces of the party cooperate with the People's Front of Latvia, with the LNNK [Latvian National Independence Movement], with the Social Democrats, and with other public formations of new movements.

Last of all, it appears that after the reduction of the party apparatus, the present house of the Central Committee [where the plenum is meeting] could become the (?republican) house of all parties.

Thank you for your attention.

#### Latvian Communist Party Congress Noted

PM0803163790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
9 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent Aleksandr Protchenko report under the rubric "Direct Line": "What Path Will Latvia's Communists Choose?"]

[Text] Riga—The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee plenum has decided to bring nearer the date for convening the 25th republic Communist Party congress. It will meet in one month's time, 6 April.

The chief question to be submitted to the congress is essentially this: Will the republic Communist Party remain within the CPSU, become totally independent (following the Lithuanian example), or find its own form of link with the Communist Parties of other union republics and the CPSU as a whole? Opinions on this question were divided at the plenum. This was manifested particularly graphically in the vote on the final point in the resolution, for which very different wordings were proposed: "The plenum advocates an independent Latvian Communist Party that does not break off ties with the CPSU," "On the platform of an independent Latvian Communist Party in an alliance of equal Communist Parties of sovereign union republics," "For an independent Latvian Communist Party within a renewed CPSU...."

As a result, this paragraph was simply struck from the resolution, and it will be up to the congress to decide what the Latvian Communist Party will be like. However, a split cannot be ruled out there.

An interesting detail. It was decided at the previous plenum to elect 25 congress delegates from the so-called list—from leading organs. The grass-roots organizations opposed this. As a result, the Central Committee members revised their decision: The congress delegates will be elected directly in primary party organizations. Thus, communists now have an opportunity to send to the congress only those delegates whom they trust, and the congress itself can adopt decisions reflecting the will of the majority of the republic party members.

### Tallinn Council Curbs Food Privileges

LD0703152590 Tallinn Television Service in Estonian 031900 (Tentative)

[From the "Aktuaalne Kaamera" program]

[Excerpts] As we already announced in yesterday's "Aktuaalne Kaamera", the Tallinn council has adopted a resolution ending the preferential shopping service to special groups of the population starting from 6 March. Preferential certificates are still owned today by nearly 34,000 Tallinn people.

[Begin recording] [Feliks Undusk, member of the council—identified by caption] I believe that yesterday's resolution by the Tallinn council has evoked different reactions, depending on the viewer. So an explanation would do very nicely. Let us then allow Ants Vasar, the self-same man who yesterday also provided the explanation to the council on this point of the resolution, to repeat to viewers how many individuals were there in Tallinn who were allowed preferential treatment, and who exactly they were.

[Ants Vasar, head of the Tallinn trade administration—identified by caption] Well, 7,263 people in Tallinn were getting a preferential service in respect of shopping for food. There were 589 party veterans, 490 Afghan veterans, 200...[corrects himself] 2,304 personal pensioners,

580 members of families of those who perished in the war, etc. Those 7,263 people amount to 1.4 per cent of the population of Tallinn. Well, and of the certain foodstuffs available in Tallinn stores the following went to those people: Boiled sausage—10.2 percent, frankfurters—29.5 percent, smoked foods—48.5 percent, and fish delicacies—88.9 percent. [passage omitted]

[Undusk] So in respect of some goods this 1.4 percent of the Tallinn population obtained nearly 80 percent of the volume of goods?

[Vasar] Well, only a few amounted to 80 percent, others were 20 to 30 percent, for example....

[Undusk interrupts] In addition to this, there were also consumer goods. [passage omitted] [end recording]

### RSFSR

#### Most RSFSR Election Races 'Far From Over'

LD0903104690 Moscow TASS in English 0835 GMT 9 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Lev Akseonov]

[Text] Moscow March 9 TASS—Last Sunday, more than 100 million voters in the largest of the 15 Soviet Union republics had to choose 1,068 deputies from almost 7,000 candidates.

A battle was launched among candidates in the majority of constituencies. In some the number of contenders for a seat in parliament exceeded 70. In 33 electoral districts voters were offered only a single candidate.

Slightly more than 110 people are now known to have won the election battle. About 30 are senior executives of regional government agencies and party organisations leaders. According to available figures, there are only two workers among the elected deputies. But the number of the elected senior managers is large. Three high-ranking military leaders and four expert lawyers won seats.

The winners confirmed so far include Russian Federation President Vitaliy Vorotnikov, Russian Prime Minister Aleksander Vlasov, and Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Secretary Yuriy Manayenkov. Boris Yeltsin, who ran for a seat in the Russian Federation Parliament in Sverdlovsk, was also elected.

For the overwhelming majority of candidates, however, the election race is far from over. A run-off will be held in 893 constituencies, as none of the contenders there won the majority of votes. New elections will be called in 24 districts. In one constituency, which includes the city of Norilsk in the far north of Russia, elections did not take place because of the low turnout—less than half of the prospective voters turned out.

The four-month election race was marked by high emotions and fiery debates, especially in its final stage.

Although only one party—the Soviet Communist Party—exists in the USSR now, candidates represented a great many diverse political associations.

The main plank in the election programme of many candidates was the rebirth of Russia.

Once elected, the majority of candidates promised to do away with what they view as an infringement upon Russia's sovereignty. The range of the "recipes" to pull the republic out of crisis is very wide. But the first results of the elections demonstrate that voters have not decided as yet to whom they give preference. The battle is continuing.

### Secretary of Russian People's Front Interviewed

90UN0978 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY  
in Russian No 7, 17-23 Feb 90 p 8

[Report on interview with V. Ivanov, secretary of the Russian People's Front and candidate of technical sciences, by A. Uglanov; place and date not given]

[Text] In response to numerous requests we are continuing to familiarize the readers with the ideological principle of the informal organizations that are hoping to become parties. Let us point out at the outset that we share far from all the views of the informal group members. But pluralism is pluralism.... Our correspondent A. Uglanov met with the secretary of the Russian People's Front (RNF), Candidate of Technical Sciences V. Ivanov.

The Russian People's Front was formed at a constituent meeting on 15 December 1988. Representatives of 24 cities attended. All the official documents were submitted to the authorities, but the RNF has not yet been registered. During this time, two all-Russian conferences and two conferences of the Moscow federation have been held.

Currently the RNF has organizations in more than 60 cities and has about 9,000 active members, 40,000 supporters, and a large number of proponents.

All local organizations of the RNF are autonomous and independent. They have various organizational structures and are united largely on the basis of common ideas and goals. The main goal of the RNF is nonviolent change of the existing totalitarian sociopolitical structure and a changeover to a democratic society of the Western type.

The violent Bolshevik revolution of 1917 is considered by RNF members to be a national tragedy which violated the natural course of development of Russia, which after the Stolypin reforms had every chance of achieving a level of development no lower than that of any modern highly developed country. In Marxism they see only an analysis and criticism of capitalism that is 100 years old. In general, they consider the Marxist construct to be a flawed idea for constructing a totalitarian state which is in essence a mixture of neofeudalism and slavery, and it

is covered on the outside with a demagogic and false sign saying "freedom, equality, and fraternity."

The RNF has a large comprehensive program entitled "Toward national wealth." The concepts "communism," "capitalism," "socialism," and other "isms" are not used. Wealth is understood as multifaceted: in the economic, cultural, spiritual, and moral sense. The RNF thinks that only a person who owns property, a person who is the master, can be really free and sufficiently independent of society and the state. The rights of the individual are placed higher than the rights of society and the state. The RNF relies significantly not only on economics, politics, and the power structure, but also on the culture, spiritual principles, and the system of upbringing and education.

The front has its own noncommunist symbols: the flag of St. Andrew the apostle, a disciple of Christ—a white panel with a blue diagonal cross symbolizing the primacy of human values, chivalry, and nobility. The stars have eight points and are blue.

Currently the RNF has two main factions which can be conventionally designated by the names of their leaders. V. Skuratov's faction considers itself to be centrist. While not recognizing Marxist communism, it still considers the communist ideal to be quite acceptable. It is continuing its attempts to rely on the healthy forces within the CPSU. Its economic model is close to the Swedish variant.

V. Ivanov's faction consists mainly of confirmed anti-communists who consider the communist idea in any of its variants to be flawed and leading to degradation and decay of the individual. It tries to rely on healthy forces outside the CPSU. Its economic model is close to the Austrian variant. Factions of the Christian Democratic and green types are also beginning to take form.

The strongest RNF organizations are in Moscow, Vorkuta, Krasnodar, Rostov-na-Donu, and Vladivostok.

The most ideologically close organizations to the RNF are the Democratic Union (DS), the democratic faction of the Moscow People's Front (MNF), the Cadets, the Christian Democratic Union, the People's Labor Union, and the Social Democrats.

The ideological opponents of the RNF are the partocracy, the Pamyat Society, the United Workers Front and Neosocialists, and Marxist-Leninists from the MNF. The RNF does not share anarchist ideas but it is tolerant of them.

The RNF considers the most promising direction for the country for the next 10-20 years to be social democracy, although in the long-range future it is oriented toward a bourgeois democracy.



**Results of Ecology 'Referendum' Reported**

LD2702110890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian  
1000 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Text] From the Bashkir town of Neftekamsk, we have a report on the outcome of an ecological referendum. The issues were the nuclear electric power station being built on the borders of the three autonomous republics of Tatariya, Udmurtiya, and Bashkiriya and the raising of the water level in the Nizhnekamsk reservoir above the 62-metre mark, something that would lead to the flooding of productive land.

The results of the referendum are as follows: 99 percent are against the construction of the Bashkir nuclear electric power station; and 98 percent of those who voted are against raising the level of the Nizhnekamsk reservoir.

Thus, the people had their say. Now we will see what the government has to say.

**Ingush Autonomy Rally Continues for Second Day**

LD0803232290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian  
1600 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Text] An unsanctioned rally in the town of Nazran in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic is continuing for the second day. According to information from the autonomous republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs, about 10,000 people have already been taking part in it today. The main demand is the restoration of Ingush autonomy within the 1934 borders. Despite heated passions, the rally is taking place without excesses.

**Gidaspov Views Economic, Political Issues**

LD2702103690 Moscow TASS in English 1026 GMT  
27 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 27 TASS—The platform adopted by the Leningrad communists last December is 90 per cent similar to the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee platform for the 28th party congress, Leningrad party chief Boris Gidaspov said in an interview published in today's RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA newspaper.

Gidaspov said it was necessary to pay more attention to improving the country's economy.

"As a result of economic reforms we lost lots of time and failed to achieve our goals," he said.

The reorganisation of regional party committees and central committee structures has yielded little result, according to Gidaspov.

"In the course of this, we lost control over social processes, and are now bad in analysing and forecasting them. Regional party committees are giving away the power to local soviets, so far composed of people with old thinking."

Gidaspov said party leaders should maintain permanent contact with the people. He said they should rub shoulders with common people to "find out the temperature of society's organism."

"It is naive to divide people into radicals and conservatives," Gidaspov said.

A seasoned politician cannot be ambivalent, especially given pluralism of opinions, he believes.

**Kaluga Obkom First Secretary Retires**

90UN1085B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
1 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by Arnold Pushkar: "How a Leader Was Elected"]

[Text] On 27 February, a plenum of the Kaluga CPSU Obkom [oblast party committee] was held which considered a personnel issue.

G. Ulanov, first secretary of the Kaluga CPSU Obkom, approached the CPSU Central Committee and the obkom bureau with a request to be relieved of the responsibilities of first secretary in conjunction with his retirement. At the same time, he withdrew as a candidate in the elections of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputies.

The obkom plenum relieved G. Ulanov of the responsibilities of first secretary and expressed its gratitude to him for many years of work in the oblast party organization. V. Sudarenkov, a deputy chairman of the Uzbekistan Council of Ministers who previously worked as first secretary of the Kaluga City CPSU Committee, was elected first secretary of the CPSU obkom.

They anticipated this plenum in Kaluga and prepared for it as extensively as ever. More than 1,000 party organizations took part in nominating and discussing candidates to the post of oblast leader; this issue was considered at eight plenums of party rayon committees and city committees. Sixty-four candidate first secretaries were nominated. Thirteen of them were on the final list which was discussed at the plenum. However, all contenders, with the exception of V. Sudarenkov, withdrew easily and gracefully in the course of the discussion. Only at the insistence of plenum members were two more names put on the ballot for secret voting.

However, from the very beginning it was clear to me, as well as, apparently, many others present at the plenum, that V. Sudarenkov was going to get elected. This is why he was invited from Tashkent. I do not want to diminish the leadership traits of the new first secretary. However, this begs the following question: Why did 55,000 communists rally for almost a month discussing the candidacies heatedly?

At the plenum, they criticized in unison V. Oleynikov, second secretary of the obkom. The previous day, the oblast newspaper ZNAMYA published an article which

said that former CPSU Central Committee functionary V. Oleynikov, having failed to surrender his Moscow apartment, had been living with his family in Kaluga at a state dacha for six years now without a residence permit. So, it turns out that there is one law for a vagrant sleeping at a railway terminal and another for a luminary-apparatchik. After all, V. Oleynikov is a deputy of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, a candidate people's deputy of Russia. However, at the plenum they merely rebuked him without taking a clear stand on the fact which the newspaper reported.

### Kemerovo Party Leader on Miners Strike

LD0803233990 Moscow World Service in English  
1600 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Text] In Kemerovo, Siberia, the leader of the regional Communist Party organization, Aleksandr Melnikov, has told the workers' daily RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA that there are objective reasons for a new wave of strikes at coal mines in the Kuznetsk mining area where there are acute shortages of food and other essentials.

To further aggravate the situation, the government has recently turned down a program of measures which workers' committees had advanced to ensure economic independence for industrial enterprises. In response to the government's unwillingness to meet one of the basic worker demands, the council of workers' committees intends to urge labor staffs to shirk the control of ministries and other government agencies.

### 'Illegal' Arms Sale Thwarted in Novgorod

PM0803142390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
8 Mar 90 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Weapons Seized"]

[Text] Novgorod, 7 Mar—USSR KGB [Committee for State Security] Novgorod Oblast Administration personnel conducted an operation in conjunction with the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] internal affairs administration operations group to prevent the illegal buying and selling of weapons.

At the beginning of February it became known that several inhabitants of a certain southern republic intended to acquire weapons in Starorusskiy and Kholm-skiy Rayons. Bloody battles were waged there during the Great Patriotic War. The land retained a host of weapons. There were also so-called craftsmen, who collected and restored them.

The security officers had extremely limited time. But most of the weapons have been confiscated.

Criminal proceedings have been instituted against one of the sellers and collectors of arms, an inhabitant of Staraya Russa. This has perhaps also prompted other owners of weapons which were likely to have been destined for sale to voluntarily surrender them.

### Rumors of Money Reform Spark Rush to Banks

PM2502145790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA  
PRAVDA in Russian 23 Feb 90 p 1

[Dispatch by A. Kamanov: "Loading Up Train Cars With Money?"]

[Text] Novosibirsk—Novosibirsk has been disturbed by rumors of an alleged imminent monetary reform, expected any day. For the third straight week citizens have been paying into state savings banks "moneyboxes" full of savings that they had put by. The USSR Workers Savings and Credit Bank's receipts were three or four times greater than the norm.

Details such as these, for instance, could be heard during the past few days in the endless waiting lines at the precious windows of the USSR Workers' Savings and Credit Bank: Only 5,000 rubles [R] per person will be exchangeable; anything over that will also be exchangeable, but only at a rate of one new ruble for every three old ones. But on the other hand, the state will be obliged to exchange in full savings that had been paid into savings banks earlier. Hence the voluntary paying in of the "moneyboxes," which has been stirred up by "eyewitness" accounts of a special railroad car arriving from Moscow, full of already printed, newly designed banknotes.

"To be completely honest," said M. Chernoskutov, chief of the USSR Workers' Savings and Credit Bank oblast administration, spreading out his hands in an interview on local television, "I don't know anything..."

...In a conversation with me, Mikhail Nikolayevich again denied the rumors about a railroad car full of money.

The most acute of all the obvious shortages is perhaps intangible all the same—it is the shortage of people's trust in the state. The suddenness of the increase in the price of gold has made many people not just distrustful, but also easily frightened.

### Tataria Groups Seek Dialogue, 'Civil Accord'

PM0803161790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
9 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Alyans Sabirov under the rubric "Direct Line. IZVESTIYA Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "In Favor of Civil Accord"]

[Text] Kazan—Multilateral talks have begun regarding the creation of a "roundtable" for Tataria.

Participants in mass election rallies in Kazan and other cities have proposed forming a "roundtable" in the autonomous republic. So representatives of the party obkom [oblast party committee] and gorkom [city party committee], the "CPSU Democratic Platform," the People's Front action group, the Tatar Social Center, and the "Movement for the Radical Transformation of the Tatar ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]" met in

the Palace of Labor. Senior Tatar ASSR Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet Presidium officials took part in the meeting.

The participants coordinated the principles governing the formation and work of the "roundtable." Alas, there was no avoiding mutual recriminations and even attempts to issue ultimatums.

"The situation is tense," M. Mulyukov, chairman and coordinator of the Tatar Social Center, said. "That is why it is important to conduct dialogue and seek ways to civil accord together. We are now at a very important stage in our society's transition to people's power. People's desire to take part in political life must be exploited in the interests of perestroika, its deepening and development. Of course, we must avoid extreme manifestations, extremist outbursts, and any clashes whatsoever."

How soon the Tatar ASSR overcomes the crisis situation will depend to a considerable extent on the "roundtable." Motions are being prepared for the first session of the new republic parliament. In particular regarding the structure and activity of the future government. Now as never before it is important not to rely on central bodies but develop local initiatives and be bold in resolving pressing problems. After all, notwithstanding the broad spread of opinions and the diverse assessments and approaches, the participants in the talks unanimously acknowledged that they have one common task—to escape from the crisis, ensure strict order, and boost working people's standard of living.

### Western Republics

#### Kiev Conference Discusses Republic's Sovereignty

LD0803154390 Kiev in English to Europe  
1900 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Our main topic today is on foreign political sovereignty of union republics. And this very subject was on the agenda of an all-union conference which was held in Kiev during one-week time. Among its participants were diplomats, scientists, and experts on international relations.

The conference was initiated by the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Academy of Sciences, and nearly 200 representatives of the foreign ministries of the USSR and different union republics attended. The main aim of this conference was to liberate concepts of their external activities and realization of sovereignty in the sphere of international relations.

In his opening speech, Valentin Yepatov, deputy foreign minister of Ukraine, said:

[Yepatov in Russian, fading into English translation] Restructuring processes put to the fore an issue of broadening the participation of union republics in the foreign political activities and in developing versatile

foreign ties. Filling the sovereignty of the union republics with real content is today one of the most significant conditions for preserving and successful development of Soviet federation. We are building a new society, creating a new face of socialism and we are doing all that jointly, with all the republics taking part. And in this direction we must use more actively the diplomatic and scientific possibilities of the republics in the field of foreign policies.

[Announcer] Anatoliy Adamishin, USSR deputy foreign minister, said:

[Adamishin in Russian fading into English translation] I believe that the problem of upgrading the role of the constituent republics in the formation and conducting the Soviet foreign policy line is one of the main goals today.

[Announcer] Dwelling on the analysis of the current state of cooperation between the Soviet Union and foreign countries, he pointed out that it can be reliable and truthful only in case of closeness and coincidence of interests, good will, voluntariness, and mutual advantage both national and state one which may emerge as the result of the united efforts.

Anatoliy Adamishin said that this concerns our union as well. The federation will function successfully only when each republic in transferring its certain powers and rights to the center will know that it does all that of its own will and to better safeguard its own interests.

It was pointed out at the conference that the division of the union's and republics' powers in this field is an issue which has no precedent neither here nor elsewhere.

Yuriy Kuployakov, representative of the USSR Foreign Ministry:

[Kuployakov in Russian fading into English translation] However, it is clear even now that the new model of international relations of the USSR and the constituent republics requires the renunciation of the absolute concepts and seeking new approaches.

[Announcer] He indicated that in the focus of attention of the Soviet foreign political department is now work linked with the guaranteeing the rights and interests of the union republics in the field of foreign relations.

With this in mind, a department of union republics has recently been set up, headed by Yuriy Kuployakov. The (?theoretical) work has been completed for a special board of the ministry on a whole range of issues which is planned to have its sessions already this month. Also held on the same day will be the first sitting of the consultative council of the foreign ministers of all union republics. [passage omitted]

Anatoliy Zlenko, first deputy foreign minister of the Ukrainian SSR:

[Zlenko in Russian fading into English translation] The main idea is to outline in a clear cut way the place and role, the rights of the republics in relations with foreign countries as well as their participation in international ties. The idea of such a legislation stands on the national platform of the CPSU.

[Announcer] Anton Buteyko, Ukrainian diplomat, one of the authors of the draft:

[Buteyko in Russian, fading into English translation] The main thing now is to seek that representatives of the national republics should enjoy a legislatively registered right to be representatives of Soviet bodies which are in charge of international relations. Representatives of this republic are working at the Soviet embassies in certain countries; but that is insufficient for the present time. The republic must by all means have its envoys at the embassies in the states having common borders with Ukraine and with which it maintains relations as well as in the countries with the considerable amount of the population of Ukrainian descent. The draft envisages opening its own consulates and diplomatic missions.

[Announcer] Gennadiy Udovenko, Ukraine's permanent representative at the UN:

[Udovenko in Russian, fading into English translation] [passage omitted] The diktat of the USSR Foreign Ministry still has a negative impact on implementing into life the sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR. The mechanism of mutual relations must be improved with the aim of realising to the full extent its sovereignty.

[Announcer] Ambassador Udovenko pointed to the need of consular relations as well, in part with the U.S.A. and Canada, where the Ukrainian SSR should have its missions, taking into account a great number of Americans and Canadians of Ukrainian descent there. [passage omitted on relations with foreign countries in ecological matters and economic cooperation]

### Conference on Independent Ukraine Held

90UN1054A Riga ATMODA in Russian  
12 Feb 90 p 7

[Resolution of international conference convened in Yurmala: "Problems of the State Independence of the Ukraine and Ways to Achieve It"; first paragraph is ATMODA introduction]

[Text] At the end of January, an international conference, "Problems of the State Independence of the Ukraine and Ways to Achieve It," was convened in Yurmala [Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic]. We invite the reader's attention to the text of the resolution adopted by the conference:

In the current stage of national-state rebirth, Ukrainians are not faced with pursuing the goal of self-determination—after all, the process of self-determination of the Ukrainian nation was accomplished in January 1918 through proclamation of the

independence of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR) and the proclamation of the Conciliarism [Sobornosti] of the Ukraine on 22 January 1919. As a result of the elimination of the Ukrainian People's Republic through aggression on the part of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], the Ukrainian people to this day exist in the status of a colony and do not have their own state.

Forces exist today in the Ukraine and outside its borders which are striving to preserve the political-legal status of the Ukraine.

Having listened to the presentations of discussion participants, and taking into account the ideas they proposed, the conference has resolved:

- that the political-legal status of the Ukraine today does not afford conditions for the free self-development of the Ukrainian people and does not meet the basic requirements of international law, in particular, the right of nations to self-determination;

- that only a sovereign Ukrainian state can be the guarantor of freedom for the people of the Ukraine, and of their equal rights among the free peoples of the world;

- that, under conditions of increasing political tension in the Ukraine and the danger which exists of the use of force on the part of the authority, a democratic and peaceful path is considered the only acceptable way for the Ukraine to achieve its independence.

Taking into account the presence of various political organizations and movements in the current political life of the Ukraine and the absence of a unified approach regarding the future of the Ukrainian state, the conference considers it necessary:

- a) to conduct a conference in the near future on problems concerning the prospect of Ukrainian statehood, with the participation of the People's Movement of the Ukraine for Perestroika, Ukrainian Helsinki Group, Ukrainian Popular Democratic League, Ukrainian National Party, Ukrainian Christian Democratic Front, and other sociopolitical organizations;

- b) to propose that the conference examine the question of establishing a civic committee for developing the concept of achieving the state independence of the Ukraine.

The conference requests that all social and political organizations, all movements of the Ukraine, present their thoughts and ideas regarding the proposals it has presented and send them to the following address prior to 15 March:

67-19 Krivorozhskaya Street, Lvov, 290066.  
Grigoriy Prykhodko, tel: 359226.



### Kiev Party Clubs Express Support for Gorbachev

LD0703175690

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1300 GMT on 7 March broadcasts a three and one-half-minute report by correspondent Vladimir Sokolov on the call by the Association of Party Clubs of Kiev [Obyedineniye Partklubov Kiyeva] for radical changes. The report begins with the correspondent noting that the association embraces the party clubs set up in Kiev's higher educational and scientific establishments and enterprises during preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress.

Sokolov then interviews Pavel Alekseyevich Krasutskiy, member of the association's council and a professor at the Kiev Polytechnical Institute. He explains that the movement developed from the primary party organizations, in other words from the ground up. These party organizations are dissatisfied with the slow rate of perestroika and are alarmed about the fate of the country and party. The clubs represent the party's new lateral structure, suggested the professor. He goes on to consider the way party bodies are elected and calls for "new instructions" for the election of 28th congress members, without elaborating on his proposals.

Krasutskiy then says that "most of the participants in the Association of Party Clubs hold serious, radical standpoints, as a counterbalance to the conservative forces which exist; they exist in the CPSU Central Committee, too. The party clubs represent support for Gorbachev from the left." The paramount task is currently one of "holding report-back and election campaigns in order that radical forces should enter the party's controlling structures," he concludes.

### 'Officially Sanctioned Rally' Held in Kishinev

LD0803232490 Moscow TASS in English 2050 GMT 8 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Georg Mikhailin]

[Text] Kishinev March 8 TASS—Women with children and husbands in tow streamed to a sun-lit square near a cathedral in downtown Kishinev at noon today to take part in an officially-sanctioned rally.

Speakers at the meeting called for a five-hour working day for women working at plants, a five-day working week for women working in agriculture and special shops for mothers with three or more children.

Participants demanded that Moldavian young people do their Army service in the republic.

Those present observed a minute's silence in memory of their sons killed in Afghanistan and relatives who died during the Romanian revolution.

Participants included Lyubov Yurga, Moldavian poet and Soviet people's deputy, Rev. Petru Buburuz, also a Soviet people's deputy and others.

The rally was organized by a group of female activists who want to set up a league of Moldavian women.

## Caucasus

### Situation in Azerbaijan Starting To Improve

NC0803133290 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Report by "special correspondent" Zeyyad Mamedov from Stepanakert]

[Text] The republic's organization committee is continuing its work. It is true that tension continues, but it is a fact that the situation has started to improve. The same can be said for the other rayons in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.

I met with Mikhail [name indistinct], chairman of the Shushinskiy Rayon Soviet Executive Committee, today. He said the rayon is generally peaceful.

Meanwhile, the republic's organization committee's consistent and strenuous work is yielding results. However, extremist elements continue trying to strain the situation. For example, an explosive device was hurled at a bus traveling on the Shusha-Agdam motorway on 6 March. Luckily, no passengers were harmed. The military commandant's headquarters has been taking measures to find the criminal.

All the administrative establishments in Shusha are working normally at the present time. The overwintering of livestock is being carried out successfully. Necessary provisions for the people are being supplied. There is a water shortage due to the fact that artesian wells were not bored on time. The matter has been taken up with the pertinent organizations, and the rayon is expected to get water supplies in the near future.

### Azerbaijanis Discuss Armenian Conflict

PM0603164490 London MORNING STAR in English 6 Mar 90 pp 4-5

[Kate Clark dispatch: "More Questions Than Answers"]

[Text] Baku—People here in Baku are full of grief at the tragic events of the night of January 19, when Soviet troops moved into the Azerbaijan capital to restore order after several days of pogroms against Armenian residents.

Over 50 Armenians were killed in those horrific attacks. Over 100 Azerbaijanis lost their lives when tanks moved in to break through barricades placed on all approach roads and to impose a state of emergency.

It was the latest tragic episode of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict which is taking on all the characteristics of a protracted war.

A brief visit to the Azerbaijan capital, which I knew years ago as a beautiful hospitable city, left me with more questions than answers.

Conflicting reports abound. Practically none of the various organisations' spokespersons that our group of journalists spoke to were willing to talk about what had led up to the imposition of the state of emergency.

The Popular Front representatives, for instance, claimed that their supporters had no weapons.

Yet firearms are still being used to shoot at Soviet soldiers and military authorities told us that they had recovered 100 or so weapons from the population since the state of emergency was declared.

"The situation in Baku was becoming ungovernable," the city's military commandant Vladimir Dubinyak told us, in justification of the troops' intervention.

"We came to restore calm, keep the peace and defend innocent people," he said, explaining their role in helping 16,000 Armenians escape Baku by sea.

"If it had been Azerbaijani lives that had been at risk, we would have come to defend them," Mr Dubinyak stressed.

However, the local population, most of which seems to support the Popular Front which claims 200,000 to 300,000 members, were unanimous in condemning the state of emergency and the introduction of troops.

In terms of finding solutions and even facing up to the causes of the problems ordinary Azerbaijanis, especially women, seem to have a more sober view than most of their leaders, both official and unofficial.

Nowhere among the leadership could one glimpse a willingness to try to look seriously for a way out of the impasse, let alone a willingness to compromise.

All the officials we spoke to were unanimous in demanding that the Armenian side had to give up first all claims to Nagorno-Karabakh—the mainly Armenian enclave inside Azerbaijan, which is at the source of the present conflict.

"There can be no question of Nagorno-Karabakh being transferred to Armenia," popular front leader Yusuf Samadoglu said.

"The introduction of troops in Baku is a flagrant aggression against our sovereignty."

Eduard Arab ogly, a member of the editorial board of the soviet Communist Party's theoretical journal, KOMMUNIST, thinks otherwise: "The only way out I see at this stage is for the borders to be changed.

"There are precedents—the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Republic originally belonged to Kazakhstan, then it was transferred to Uzbekistan.

"And there are other examples of border changes here during the last 70 years."

Mr Arab ogly argues that central government has dragged its feet over the crisis.

If Nagorno-Karabakh had been upgraded from an autonomous region to an autonomous republic a year ago it would have enabled the territory to achieve more sovereignty within the Azerbaijan republic.

But now it is too late for that, Mr Arab ogly says. Attitudes have hardened on both sides and the conflict has practically spiralled out of control.

He claims that the Azerbaijan authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh have for years not only refused any autonomy to the mainly Armenian population there, despite it being officially an "autonomous region"—but actually pursued a deliberate policy of assimilation.

Azerbaijan's Academy of Sciences president, Eldar Salayev, has a different explanation for the cause of the conflict: "The Armenians," he says, "are a difficult people to live with, and this is why they have been oppressed at various times."

The use of troops was a show of strength for the benefit of the Baltic republics he claims.

Mr Salayev's openly anti-Gorbachev stand was typical of much that we heard during our visit. The recently-ousted Azerbaijan Communist Party leader Vezirov had been a "Moscow henchman," Mr Salayev alleged.

The Soviet leadership is biased against Azerbaijan because four of Mr Gorbachev's top advisers are Armenian or of Armenian descent, was the Academy of Sciences president's opinion.

Mr Salayev is particularly angry at the assertion that Azerbaijanis are under the influence of Islamic fundamentalism.

"For 70 years we have been educated in the spirit of atheism.

"I didn't believe in God, though in my soul I always believed, but I was not able to study my Arabic script. I was torn from my roots—and now I am accused of Islamic fundamentalism. It's a lie."

When asked what would have happened if the state of emergency had not been declared after the pogroms and mass exodus of refugees, the Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences president replied: "Nothing would have happened."

Many theories have been put forward in Baku as to who was behind the anti-Armenian pogroms of January 13 and 14. Some say it was the KGB, others the Azerbaijan "mafia," or "gangs of criminals let out of Soviet jails who arrived in Baku" or the Popular Front, and there is

even one version that blames Armenian extremists who urged pogroms on fellow Armenians in an attempt to worsen the situation.

The absence of any political appraisal of the first pogroms in the Azerbaijan town of Sumgait two years ago, when 32 Armenians were killed and thousands forced to flee their homes, plus the lack of publicity given to trials of those responsible "caused an atmosphere of all-permissiveness," Mr Arab ogly declares.

Azerbaijani Communist Party leader Dr Afrand Dashdamirov, who is in charge of the local party's nationalities commission, admitted that "several thousand" communists had handed in their party cards recently.

"The situation in Azerbaijan has to be seen in the context of the events in the country as a whole. The resignations from the party are part of the overall controversial political process going on in Soviet society at present."

Like the Popular Front, the party in the republic has come out strongly against the state of emergency and use of troops, and against any border changes.

"Unless the conflict is solved on the basis of the constitution, there will be no normalisation in the region," Dr Dashdamirov warns.

"The task of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, as we understand it, is the complete, all-round representation of the national interests of the Azerbaijani people.

"All the structures of Nagorno-Karabakh, the soviets, party etc., must be part of the structures of the Azerbaijan republic.

Azerbaijan was prepared to provide for the interests of the Armenian majority in the enclave, but success would depend on whether Armenia "stopped intervening in our internal affairs."

Obviously Armenian leaders also have to examine what their degree of responsibility is for the present state of affairs.

But surely it was not wrong under the new-found glasnost, for Karabakh Armenians to protest at injustices which prevented them from access to their national culture?

It is, perhaps, too early for courageous people on both sides of the conflict to be prepared to swim against the tide of current negative nationalistic feeling and be prepared to talk of compromise.

Yet without such willingness to compromise even a little, it is difficult to see how this conflict can be settled in the interests of the ordinary people of both republics.

### Yerevan Refutes Report on Operation in Artsakh

NC0803194690 Yerevan International Service  
in Armenian 1630 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] On 28 February, the central television reported that a large amount of hidden arms, ammunition, and Army uniforms were confiscated in the Armenian village of Kirovo in the Shushinskiy Rayon. A reporter of the KOMMUNIST newspaper has managed to phone the Berdadzor village in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and get accurate information about the incident.

The soldiers surrounded the aforementioned Armenian villages early in the morning on 27 February. Without any warning, the houses and subsidiary construction sites were searched starting at 0900. Meanwhile, the soldiers announced on the radio that passports were being checked and called on the people to hand in their guns. After some time, the soldiers uncovered a cellar of foodstuffs where foodstuffs from the Gtutyun Charity Organization were kept.

Contrary to television claims, there were no guns in that cellar. The only thing in the run-down building were a few homemade grenades and two hunting rifles. The soldiers confiscated a few training rocket grenades, which were not fit for combat, from the village school. The people of Berdadzor demanded that the confiscated arms and foodstuffs be officially displayed, but their demand was turned down.

The next day, the commandant arrived in Berdadzor from Shusha and ordered the local population to enter into immediate dialogue with the Azerbaijanis. In reply, the people of Berdadzor demanded that the Armenians who were expelled from Shusha be allowed to return there. Afterwards, Gozalov, chairman of Shusha city soviet executive committee, sent a vehicle loaded with provisions from Shusha, but the people of Berdadzor did not accept that pittance. They said that for the last two years, no provisions have been received from Shusha. All attempts to distribute these provisions to the Armenian population failed.

Developments indicate that it is possible to deport the Armenians from Artsakh itself.

### Armenian Leadership Asks for Economic Assistance

NC0803203490 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian  
1730 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] On 11 January 1990, the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee and the Armenian Council of Ministers had, through mass media, appealed to all the republican party, soviet, and economic bodies, to the scientific institutions, to the labor collectives, to public organizations, and to all the workers. They called on them to energetically participate in forming a national plan to extricate the republic's economy from its critical condition.

The drafting teams that have been established have formulated 43 major economic sectors within the plan. The republic's government has endorsed these sectors. The deputy chairmen of the Armenian council of ministers have been put in charge of the work to be carried out in these sectors. In preparing the economic sectors, the proposals from specific collectives, organizations, and citizens were considered. Leading scientists and technicians energetically contributed to this endeavor. However, the absence of proposals from large scientific and production collectives, scientific departments, scientific institutes, public organizations, and broad masses of workers is causing concern. Yet, they are in a position to contribute substantially toward forming and implementing the plan.

The Armenian Communist Party Central Committee and the Armenian Council of Ministers once again appeal to all organizations, collectives, and citizens. They call on them to contribute their share and energetically participate in the search for concrete ways to overcome the crisis in the republic's economy, to mobilize the entire social-political strength of the people, to improve economic relations, and to implement the radical measures aimed at fulfilling the basic requirements of the plan for the speedy elimination of the consequences of the earthquake.

#### Georgian Electoral Campaign Under Way

90US0608A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian  
16 Feb 90 p 2

[GRUZINFORM report: "At the Central Electoral Commission"]

[Text] At the beginning of this electoral campaign few could have predicted the high level of passions that accompanied the nomination of candidates for deputy. At the end of that important stage of the election contest, an unbiased computer produced the following figure: There were 2,947 nominations for the 300 seats in the deputies' forum for the republic.

Bringing that figure with him to the 13 February session of the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of Deputies to the GSSR [Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, the commission's chairman I. Zhordaniya immediately gave an explanation. He reported that the quantity of nominations exceeded, of course, the number of real candidates for deputy inasmuch as many of them immediately turned out to be named in several different electoral districts. The suddenly increased stream of nominations in recent days requires additional clarification. It was guessed that the final number of candidates may be around 2,500. In the meantime even this figure, resulting in an average of eight or even nine candidates per district, offers convincing proof that the people are engaging in an unprecedented level of social activity and that the processes of democratization are penetrating our life more and more thoroughly.

The "record holder" for the number of candidates for a deputy position was the Veriyskiy electoral district No. 23 of the Kalininskiy Rayon of Tbilisi, where 31 candidates were nominated. In 10 additional electoral districts, 20 or more candidates were nominated for a seat. Ten or more people were nominated in 118 districts. It is worth noting that there is a multicandidate contest in every single electoral district. As the preliminary analysis shows, the percentage of women is fairly uniform among the candidates for deputy. There are 350 women, making 12 percent of the total. In comparison with the initial stage of nominations, the number of young people under 30 years has increased from five to eight percent of those contending for the seat of deputy. There are also noticeably more representatives of science and culture, and of social organizations as well. The latter are not only from the central organs, but from the local level too. Judging by the general results, a fierce electoral contest for the seats in the deputies' body will develop in each electoral district immediately after the registration of candidates, which is already underway.

Of course, efficient organization of this and the following stages of the electoral candidate depends to a great degree on the district electoral commissions. At a meeting of representatives of the district electoral commissions, the following gave reports on the work being conducted in this direction: B. Ordzhonikidze of the Leninskiy electoral district No. 196 in Tkibuli, and N. Digmelashvili, N. Gurdzhidze, and V. Dzhaniasvili of the Patardzeulskiy No. 114, Sagaredzhoyskiy No. 145, and the Badiurskiy No. 146 electoral districts of the Sagaredzhoyskiy Rayon. It was noted that while serious work has been done by these commissions, the activities of each of them have also been characterized by rather substantial defects and omissions. These were pointed out by Z. Kvachadze, deputy chairman of the Central Election Commission. Taking part in the discussions of the reports were R. Shavishvili, chairman of the board of the social organization "Democratic Elections in Georgia"; R. Petriashvili, chairman of the commission on electoral affairs of the People's Front of Georgia; G. Rogava, a representative of the same front; and others. It was stated that the reason for many of the defects of these district electoral commissions is that even now, with the new Law on Elections of Deputies of the GSSR Supreme Soviet in effect, the commissions sometimes plan their work the old ways and do not fully use the rights and powers granted them. V. Kobakhidze, the republic's minister of communications, reported on what has been done and what is being done to provide and service the electoral districts and precincts concerned with elections to the GSSR Supreme Soviet with telephone communications. D. Lomtadze, GSSR deputy minister of culture, spoke about the participation of cultural and instructional institutions in the preparations for elections.

The Central Electoral Commission adopted a proposal of the soviet executive committees of the Batumi and Poti city soviets adding electoral precincts created in the



courts and located outside the bounds of the republic to the appropriate electoral districts in Batumi and Poti. A consultative legal group made up of 19 people and constituted under the Central Electoral Commission was approved. Incidentally, the majority of the members of this group took an active part at this very meeting in discussions on how to react to letters and personal addresses to the Central Electoral Commission.

It was a lively and candid exchange of opinions. T. Kulashvili, executive secretary of the commission, prepared the issue, and representatives of district electoral commissions, labor collectives, and social organizations as well as senior officials of the GSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Council of Ministers and the secretariat of the Central Electoral Commission were invited to the session and took part. The discussion was exacting and impartial. There were also some disagreements which required explanations and clearer interpretations by the lawyers concerning individual articles of the Law on Elections of Deputies of the GSSR Supreme Soviet. As they raised a broad circle of issues connected with the course of the election campaign, the speakers gave a principled evaluation of individual instances of deviations from the Law on Elections, emphasized the importance of a timely reaction to all signals received from the localities, and expressed specific proposals to guarantee the organized implementation of the elections in strict compliance with the new law.

### Georgian Party Tasks for Renewal Defined

90US0570A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian  
31 Jan 90 p 1

[Unattributed article: "On a Democratic Basis"]

[Text] There is no doubt that renovation must take place on a democratic basis, through the rejection of outdated structures and a renunciation of the command-administrative methods and principles which have failed to justify themselves. There are proposals—they are being expressed by the republic's communists—for a referendum on the most pressing questions of party life. Problems associated with the accelerated convening of a congress, determination of the status of the Georgian Communist Party and the removal or a new interpretation of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution come to the fore here.

As already reported, the CPSU Central Committee has prepared its platform for the upcoming 28th Party Congress. It will be discussed at the plenum in February. We do not yet have the opportunity to judge what this platform represents. The reasons are understandable: It has yet to be published. It is not clear why the republic Communist Party does not have its own platform for the congress. Or does it?

Was not the following appeal too late: "I believe it necessary for the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee plenum to be held before the CPSU Central Committee plenum. We should be presenting a collective

elaborated opinion there. A position formulated jointly would remove many questions and would undoubtedly exert a positive influence on the results of the elections to the republic parliament"? This opinion was expressed by a participant in the recent meeting with G. Gumbaridze, in which party officials, activists, and members of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Organizational-Party and Cadre Work Commission participated.

However, we will have to define our position sooner or later. What proposals are being expressed most often here? Let us try and bring them together, without, of course, claiming full expression of all opinions.

*The Georgian Communist Party must have sovereign rights and decide all basic questions of party life independently.*

*It is essential within the framework of a united CPSU to create an alliance of republic communist parties.*

*To make the first secretaries of the union republic Communist Party Central Committees members of the Politburo.*

*The republic Communist Party should concern itself with the national cause, that is, should fight for Georgia's complete sovereignty and independence.*

*One of the Communist Party's principal tasks is to consolidate around the national idea not only parties and movements but also representatives of all peoples living in the republic.*

*Renewal of the party is not only a renewal of ideas and forms and methods of work but also the essential replacement of cadres and the executive authorities.*

*The main thing now is stimulating the work of the primary party organizations, many of which have lost the initiative, receded into the background and, as a result, have lost their authority.*

*There should be no aspiration to the constitutional enshrinement of the leading and directing role of the CPSU—reality and people themselves will draw conclusions as to the significance and authority of the party in society.*

*The party must not cling to its monopoly. Its future lies in a system of the interaction of all progressive forces acting for the good of the people.*

The republic party organization is preparing for its 17th plenum. How? Primarily through discussion of questions of vital importance to the party and the republic. They cannot be separated, for Georgia's interests are the interests of its Communist Party. This is the point of reference and initial stimulus for any idea which is put forward.

One does not have to be especially observant to see that today it is thanks to the republic Communist Party that

propitious conditions have been created for dialogue with the public at large and for the formulation of joint actions and determination of the prospects for further development.

Everyone, of course, has his difficulties. Any movement has its problems. The republic Communist Party has these difficulties also, and considerable ones at that. And it is, moreover, doubly difficult for it: It has to jettison on the run the old load and rid itself of the shackles with which it was bound, it seemed before, fast. It is, perhaps, easier for others: There is no oppressive burden, they can write on a clean sheet of paper. This is not said by way of complaint. It is for the sake of objectivity. We are, after all, urging it; just as we are urging the truth, the whole truth, without opportunist excisions.

#### Comparison of Adzhar Obkom Plenum

PM0803143190

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 8 March 1990 carries in its Second Edition on page 2 a TASS report on an Adzhar Oblast Georgian Communist Party Committee Plenum held 7 March. Comparison of the PRAVDA item, under the general heading "Plenums Held," with the item headlined "Adzhar Obkom Plenum Releases First Secretary" published in the 8 March issue of the Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page 113, reveals the following variations:

PRAVDA begins: Batumi, 7 Mar—A plenum of...(adding dateline);

First paragraph, second sentence PRAVDA reads: ...other work Comrade T.S. Khakhva, who previously worked...(clarifying name).

#### Central Asia

##### Ryabev Says Kazakhstan Miners' Demands Met

LD0703124690 Moscow Tass in English 1151 GMT  
7 Mar 90

[by TASS correspondent Raisa Loffe]

[Text] Alma-Ata March 7 TASS—"The government will fulfill all commitments to speed up the socio-economic development of coal areas in Kazakhstan," Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Yakov Ryabev told TASS.

He headed the governmental commission that analyzed the situation in the region and the implementation of the protocol of conciliatory measures, signed as a result of last July's strike by Karaganda miners.

"The package of demands on wages is one of the issues that has already been resolved. Pay for night work and forced stoppages has been considerably increased. The first measures were taken to extend full economic autonomy to the mines, and we are beginning to see positive results, although wholesale prices for coal remain low," Ryabev said.

The development of the region's infrastructure remains problematic, prompting the governmental commission to adopt an additional program for socio-economic development.

It was planned, in part, to expand dramatically the construction and building materials industries in order to build more housing, social welfare and cultural facilities. New shops for large-panel house building and ferro-concrete articles will be built and old ones expanded.

"Today, we are moving from a dialogue with the miners to cooperation," Ryabev noted. "More efficient coal production is the basis for successfully implementing social measures. For instance, annual spending on technical modernisation in the Karagandaugol Association alone will amount to 100 million roubles.

"The commission focused on prospects for the development of the Ekibastuz coal-mining centre. The Soviet Ministry of the Coal Industry is expected to conduct extensive research in coal dressing here in 1990 and to launch the construction of a coal dressing factory."

##### Kazakh State Planning Chairman Replaced

LD0703001190 Alma-Ata SOTSIALISTIK  
QAZAQSTAN in Kazakh 23 Feb 90 p 1

[Text] The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet decrees:

To appoint Comrade Kalyk Abdollayev as first deputy chairman of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Kazakh SSR State Planning Committee; and to release him from his duties as deputy chairman of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Kazakh SSR State Planning Committee.

[Signed] N. Nazarbayev, chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, City of Alma-Ata, 22 February 1990.

##### Ust-Kamenogorsk City Raykoms Abolished

PM2302150790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
23 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Valeriy Mirolevich: "Party Raykoms Abolished"]

[Text] Ust-Kamenogorsk—A joint plenum of the Oktyabrskiy and Ulbinskiy raykoms [rayon committees] and the Ust-Kamenogorsk party gorkom [city committee] has decided to abolish the oblast center's raykoms.

People's deputies and the city aktiv were present at the plenum and took part in the voting.

The abolition of the raykoms is the result of the recent elections to the local soviets. The voters everywhere expressed the desire to eliminate additional links of management in the system of the city with its population of 300,000.

Naturally, a question has also arisen as to the expediency of the existence of the rayon soviets of people's deputies; an acute question, since the new rayon soviets have only just been elected. This problem must be resolved by a united session of the rayon and city soviets of people's deputies. It will determine how to make careful use of the released premises which these organizations used to occupy.

### **Afghan Rebels Mining Soviet-Afghan Border**

LD0103204190 Moscow Television Service in Russian  
 2132 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Excerpts] [Presenter Yuriy Rostov] We continue the series of reports on the Soviet-Afghan border. The question of its security is raised by the arguments of our correspondent.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent S. Milyanchikov] I do not think I will be wrong if I say that the Soviet-Afghan sector is now the tensest one along the entire length of the USSR state border. During the time that Soviet troops were located on Afghan soil, any conflicts along the border were halted by our border guards together with Soviet troops on the other side of the border. Since the withdrawal of Soviet units from Afghanistan certain sections of the border have fallen under the control of the armed opposition, while on the remaining sections the border is protected only in isolated places. As a result there are places where the border is being guarded only from our side. On the Afghan side various kinds of saboteurs and smugglers have free access to the line dividing the two states. [Video shows aerial view of frontier, a Soviet four-man foot patrol, a patrolling APC, armed border guards checking their weapons and surveying the area with binoculars]

The search for mines on our territory has become a normal activity for many of the frontier posts. Moreover most of the mines have been laid recently. What you see on your screens is no pretense but real life on the Soviet border. [Video shows border guard employing a mine detector, others probing with sticks, and finally guard's dog locating mine, guard carefully removing soil to expose top of mine, and mine being harmlessly exploded] [passage omitted]

[Unidentified border guard officer] Over the past year more than 40 potential blasts have been averted. The opposition is continuing to wage mine warfare against the Soviet border guards.

[Correspondent] This is Sergey Milyanchikov from the Central Asian Border District specially for the Television News Service. [end recording]

### **Commission To Investigate 3 March Incidents**

PM0803122190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
 8 Mar 90 Morning Edition p3

[Own correspondent Andrey Orlov report under the rubric "Direct Line": "Commission Set Up to Investigate"]

[Text] Tashkent—A meeting of representatives of the public has been held in Yangiabad, where they voiced concern over incidents in Buka and Parkent in Tashkent Oblast.

IZVESTIYA has already reported these incidents. I will add that, according to the more precise figures now available, four people were killed in Parkent, one of whom was a member of the militia.

A Council of Elders, which will help to stabilize the situation and quash rumors, has been set up in Parkent under the auspices of the city soviet executive committee.

The Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium has formed a commission to investigate the circumstances and consequences of the mass unrest which occurred in Parkentskiy Rayon on 3 March. The commission includes Uzbek people's deputies and officials.

A meeting with journalists and representatives of the "Birlik" informal movement was held Tuesday at the republic Communist Party Central Committee. It was asked at the meeting who gave members of law enforcement bodies orders to open fire and whether it would have been possible to avoid the tragedy. E. Khamidov, secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, assured those present that the commission will thoroughly investigate everything. He noted the similarity between these events and recent events in Fergana. There are forces whipping up interethnic conflicts and, unfortunately, the organizers of the pogroms in Fergana Oblast have still not been found, although dozens of people involved have now been sentenced.

### **Tashkent Meeting Discusses Interethnic Strife**

LD0703120590 Tashkent Domestic Service in Uzbek  
 0215 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] In Yangiabad, Tashkent oblast, representatives of the public and of subdistrict [mahalla] committees held a meeting. Participants expressed their anxiety about the recent events in Buka and Parkent. Speakers at the meeting asked the central mass media to write sincerely about relations between the nationalities, including the events which took place in Tashkent recently. The meeting adopted an appeal to the residents of the town which calls for the maintenance of peace and rejection of provocative rumors.

It was decided to set up a Council of Elders under the town Executive Committee. The aim of this council is to

stabilize the situation and to jointly solve the problems of putting an end to rumors.

Participating in the meeting was Khamidov, secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee.

#### **MVD Troopers Involved in Fighting in Tajik Town**

*PM0703163790 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 7 Mar 90 First Edition p 4*

[KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Astafyev report: "What Happened in Parkent?"]

[Text] Blood has once again been shed in Uzbekistan. Clashes occurred between the local population and representatives of the forces of law and order on 3 March in the small rayon center of Parkent, which is 30km from Tashkent.

This is how the incident looks from descriptions provided by internal troopers and militia personnel and how it was recorded by some terse lines in the journal which one officer kept scrupulously, even when wounded.

The atmosphere was indeed uneasy in Parkent over the last few days after the Turks were evacuated here. Mindful of the complex situation, the republic leadership decided to send an internal troop subunit to Parkent along with additional militia forces.

The subunit arrived in the city early in the morning. Toward 0830 groups of people began to gather. The deputy chief of the oblast internal troop administration began to explain to the gathering over a loudspeaker that it was an unauthorized rally. The gathering was given a time limit to disperse, but this had no effect.

Then, following orders, militia personnel began to move the mob back from the road. They reached a small river. There those involved in the disturbance began to stone militiamen. What could 107 men do against a mob of many thousands? They began to fall back. At that time shots were heard from behind buildings and fences and small shot struck shields and helmets. They managed to glimpse people carrying sawed-off shotguns. They fired in their direction.

It finally proved possible to make their way to the rayon internal affairs department building. It was already blazing fiercely. Then a company massed on the second story of a building under construction alongside. From that moment on the troops were hostages. About another 20 members of the rayon leadership and militia personnel, among whom there were people who had been beaten up and seriously wounded, were in the same situation in the yard but ambulances and firefighting vehicles were not allowed through to them.

At 1248 a militiaman jumped from the blazing rayon department building. Whereupon the mob fell on him and began to brutally beat him up. Once again only the use of weapons saved the militiaman from death. The

raging mob demanded that the raykom [rayon committee] first secretary and officers be handed over and threatened the rest with violence.

At approximately 1600 two burned militiamen made their way with difficulty out of the rayon department cellar. People went for them and began to trample on them. Only one militiaman succeeded in clambering up to the building housing the troops. People scoffed at the body of Senior Militia Lieutenant Ashirali Khumsanbayev for a long time.

Mindful of the exceptional situation which the hostages were in, the leadership of the republic, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the internal troops elaborated a rescue operation. The republic prosecutor's office authorized the use of special means in emergency situations and weapons as an exceptional measure. The chairman of the Uzbek Council of Ministers ratified the decision regarding the operation. Toward evening there was not a single serviceman or militiamen left in Parkent. The Turks had long since been removed. Some 44 internal troopers and officers were injured (almost one in two) and six were hospitalized. There were also a considerable number of casualties among militia personnel.

#### **Turkmen Electoral Commission Reviews Vote Results**

*LD0803184590*

[Editorial Report] Ashkhabad Domestic Service in Russian at 1700 GMT on 7 March carries a 5-minute report on the latest meeting of the Turkmen Electoral Commission which examined the results of the repeat ballot for people's deputies held on 4 March.

A report on this matter made by the commission's deputy chairman, Atayev, noted in particular that at the concluding stage of the campaign to elect people's deputies to the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] the electorate's political activity was fairly high: During the run-off balloting held in four constituencies on 4 March there was a turnout of 72-90 percent of the electorate included in the electoral roll.

"At the meeting, information about the social analysis of the present composition of people's deputies of the Turkmen SSR was given. Today over one-third of the deputy corps is made up of workers and kolkhozniks; over 11 percent are women; 88.6 percent are communists. Compared with the last convocation, the relative significance of deputies who are scientists, teachers, medical workers, and national economy specialists has increased several times in the Turkmen SSR's new Supreme Soviet."

#### **Turkmenistan CP Congress Set For 11 May**

*LD0803183890 Ashkhabad Domestic Service  
in Russian 1700 GMT 7 Mar 90*

[Text] The Turkmenistan Communist Party [CP] Central Committee Plenum resolved to convene the next 24th Congress of the Turkmenistan CP on 11 May 1990 with the following agenda:



Report by the Central Committee of the Turkmenistan CP; report by the Auditing Commission of the Turkmenistan CP; the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 27th CPSU Congress and the draft rules of the CPSU; elections of the leading bodies of the Turkmenistan CP; elections of delegates to the 28th Congress of the CPSU.

The plenum endorsed the norm of representation to the 24th Congress of the Turkmenistan CP: One delegate from 200 CPSU members.

The Plenum resolved to hold report-back and election meetings in workshop and primary party organizations numbering over 15 CPSU members in March, rayon and town party conferences in March-April, and oblast party conferences in April 1990.

Bazarova, member of the Bureau of the Turkmenistan CP Central Committee, was relieved of her duties in connection with her retirement on pension.

#### **'Unauthorized' Rally Held in Frunze 5 Feb**

WA0703201490 *Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA*  
in Russian 7 Feb 90 p 4

[Kirghiz Telegraph Agency report: "To Heed the Voice of Reason"]

[Text] An unauthorized rally was held on the evening of 5 February in Central Square in the city of Frunze. Those assembled demanded that the migration of population to Kirghizia from other republics be regulated, and said that the Law on the State Language of the Kirghiz SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] is being implemented slowly, and that it is necessary to solve the urgent housing and economic problems faster.

This was the third rally in the square in recent days. As has already been reported in the press, the first two rallies were held on 25 and 26 January. For the most part, groups of young students and workers took part in the rallies; these groups were misled by rumors about the mass arrival in Kirghizia of refugees from Azerbaijan to whom apartments were allegedly being allocated from the housing stock of the city of Frunze.

Representatives of the republic government and the Frunze Executive Committee established a dialogue with those gathered in the square. Detailed official explanations were given regarding all issues of concern to the participants in the rally.

In subsequent days, ranking functionaries of the republic and city party, soviet, and law-enforcement organs spoke on Kirghiz TV. They not only refuted the rumors and fabrications circulated by certain irresponsible individuals but also informed the workers about what has already been done and is being done to meet the needs and requirements of the people. In the process, serious problems which have to be solved were discussed in a direct and sincere manner. Particular attention was drawn to the fact that this should be done in a quiet,

businesslike environment. Specific creative work rather than vociferous declarations at rallies will help alleviate many socio-economic problems.

This was also the subject of numerous meetings with labor, student, and teaching collectives of the city of Frunze in which members of the Bureau, secretaries of the Communist Party of Kirghizia Central Committee, and other leaders took part. Participants in the meetings referred to their complete understanding and support for such a course, and to the need to maintain stability and order in the republic.

However, certain individuals, detached from the genuine interests of the people and pursuing their ambitious designs, continued to agitate the young people, went to student and plant dormitories, and called on the people to take to the streets once again.

On 5 February, young people gathered for a rally. However, its organizers lost control of the crowd from the very beginning. A group of hooligan elements and provocateurs, some of whom were intoxicated, seized the initiative. They yelled out unworthy slogans, delivered tirades from the speaker's stand, and called for an immediate solution to all the complex problems without taking present-day reality into account. At the same time, many of those gathered condemned such actions and were outraged by them. Unfortunately, these voices were not heard.

In response to the demands of those gathered to hear explanations by the leaders of the republic, Prosecutor of the Kirghiz SSR G.I. Ivantsov explained that a quiet, regular dialogue was impossible at this unauthorized rally and under these circumstances. Nonetheless, this did not satisfy some of those assembled who continued on their actions. Still, the situation did not become uncontrollable.

On this occasion, serious violations of public order were successfully avoided. However, the peaceful and businesslike environment in which the citizens of Kirghizia live and work may be easily destroyed if we fail to rebuff the instigators and irresponsible persons who inflame the people's emotions with all kinds of fabrications which smack greatly of a provocation.

Their actions and plans will be doomed to failure if party, soviet, and law-enforcement organs and broad circles of the public in our republic succeed in explaining to the people the entire danger of these essentially anti-democratic actions which greatly harm perestroika. We should develop interethnic relations rather than aggravate them, and reinforce the friendship of the people of all nationalities and ethnic groups residing in the republic. At present, it is necessary to make an effort to consolidate all movements which facilitate perestroika processes, reinforce order and discipline, and maintain the truly creative environment in which all acute issues may be resolved, emerging problems may be

successfully solved, and plans for social-economic development and improvements in the life of people may be implemented.

**Kirghiz Extraordinary Session Postponed**

90US0592A Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA  
in Russian 9 Feb 90 p 1

[Decree of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium  
"On the Extraordinary 12th Session of the Kirghiz SSR  
Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] The Kirghiz SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]  
Supreme Soviet Presidium resolves:

To postpone the extraordinary 12th Session of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet of the 11th term scheduled for 10 February 1990.

[Signed] Chairman of the Presidium of the Kirghiz SSR  
Supreme Soviet T. Akmatov

[Signed] Secretary of the Presidium of the Kirghiz SSR  
Supreme Soviet A. Myrzaliyeva  
City of Frunze, 8 February 1990